Vigilant Self‐regulation and Costly Punishment in Public Goods Situations

Applying regulatory focus theory to the context of social dilemma situations, the present research demonstrates that individual differences in vigilant, prevention‐focused self‐regulation predict the tendency to invest private resources to punish uncooperative interaction partners (costly punishment), a behaviour that typically has strong positive effects on the collective level of cooperation. Analyses further support the distinctiveness of the vigilance system proposed in regulatory focus theory (prevention focus) in comparison with general defensive inhibitory tendencies (measured with Carver and White's Behavioral Inhibition System scale). Results document that individual differences in prevention‐focused self‐regulation but not differences in general defensive inhibitory tendencies are positively related to costly punishment. In sum, the findings indicate that vigilant, prevention‐focused self‐regulation plays a crucial role in the context of sanctions that enforce cooperation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dilemmas in brief therapy

This paper examines three central concerns for the short-term therapist at a time when therapy is widely available free of charge in the community, in a model that has been called ‘ serial life-span therapy’. Issues of referral-on, topping-up or extending contracts are experienced as dilemmas or as temptations, depending on what therapists believe their clients need and what their clients may demand of them. Short-term therapy has become accepted in many contexts, with therapy no longer used as a once-and-for all solution to clinical problems, but as a serial method over time which includes topping up and re-contracting. After an initial agreement of brevity, depending on the client's disturbance levels at assessment and on availability, there may be the need for referral-on at the end of a brief contract, when clients may be offered a different, long-term service, or they may be recommended to return later in life for more, if and when this becomes necessary. Flexible contracts rather than rigid rules about the termination of therapy are being practiced in many contexts, depending on ‘what works’ and how methods can be adjusted to new evidence. There is danger of collusion or control, and this can lead to therapeutic dilemmas, which involve taking acceptable risks, or to therapeutic temptations, which are due to the desire for narcissistic gratification, benefiting the therapist rather than the client in terms of power or Eros. Being able to let go of clients and manage issues of loss, grief and greed requires a measure of maturity in the therapist that aims for good-enough results rather than striving for perfect endings.     

A randomised Monty Hall experiment: The positive effect of conditional frequency feedback

The Monty Hall dilemma (MHD) is a notorious probability problem with a counterintuitive solution. There is a strong tendency to stay with the initial choice, despite the fact that switching doubles the probability of winning. The current randomised experiment investigates whether feedback in a series of trials improves behavioural performance on the MHD and increases the level of understanding of the problem. Feedback was either conditional or non-conditional, and was given either in frequency format or in percentage format. Results show that people learn to switch most when receiving conditional feedback in frequency format. However, problem understanding does not improve as a consequence of receiving feedback. Our study confirms the dissociation between behavioural performance on the MHD, on one hand, and actual understanding of the MHD, on the other. We discuss how this dissociation can be understood.     

萨特在人的发展问题上的"责任"困境

在萨特的人学理论中,“自由”无疑是一个最重要的范畴。存在就是自由,自由的绝对性使得它成为一切事物及其自身的根据。然而,为了保证人的发展的合理性,在高扬了自由之后,萨特力图在最后解决的却一直是“自由”与“责任”的统一,这样,萨特将自己陷于一个无从解脱的困境之中：由于绝对自由论的前提,他所倡导的对自己、对他人,乃至对世界的“责任”,最后却成了人们逃避责任的一种托辞。     

Anaesthesia or psychotherapy: Eradicating thoughts or working them through

The author presents two sessions from the analysis of a depressive narcissistic doctor, which are characterised by a mixture of co-operation and pseudo-co-operation. The dialogue is in parts intellectualised, complicated, lifeless and schizoid. Points at which the patient shows surprising insights are then partly denigrated by him, on the basis that change is not to be expected. Semi-lifeless contact assists the defensive claustrophobia that he experiences in meaningful contact. It becomes very clear that he is then afraid of entering into an openly aggressive conflict that entails the existential threat of object loss. However, this has so far been avoided. The secret pleasure in an anal-narcissistic, sadomasochistic addiction to doubt persists in the partial denigration. The patient's artificially maintained self-doubt and doubt of the object reinforce a genuine confusion that consists in never knowing exactly what lies behind the helpful and needed object.     

Social learning under the labeling effect: Exploring travellers’ behavior in social dilemmas

This paper presents results of a laboratory experiment, in which subjects made choices between public and private transportation when managing Personal Carbon Allowances (PCAs). The objectives of this study were twofold. Firstly, it was aimed at investigating the labeling effect under the social dilemma context. Secondly, it showed insights into the decision-making process when feedback about others’ choices was provided. A combination of the labeling effect and feedback helped individuals change their commuting pattern and increase the number of trips by public transportation under the PCAs regime. Feedback on others’ choices resulted in social learning and incentivized choice of public transportation more frequently in social dilemma situations.     

Probability of reciprocation in repeated prisoner's dilemma games

Both social cooperation and self‐control require reciprocation. In social cooperation situations a single person's cooperative act, if not reciprocated by others, would be unreinforced both immediately and in the long term. Similarly, a single act of self‐control (refusing a single cigarette, for example), if not followed up by other such acts, would also be unreinforced immediately and in the long term. The present experiments varied probability of reciprocation in a prisoner's dilemma‐like game that could resemble a social cooperation or a self‐control situation. Participants earned points by playing against a computer. The computer offered the participant a choice between 5 or 6 points (‘cooperation’ by the computer) or between 1 or 2 points (‘defection’ by the computer). The participant's choice of the lesser alternative (‘cooperation’) or the greater alternative (‘defection’) on the current trial led, respectively, to cooperation or defection by the computer on the next trial with a probability (probability of reciprocation, PR) which could vary. When PR was greater than 63%, consistent cooperation maximized the participant's earnings. When PR was less than 63%, defection maximized earnings. Three conditions were studied: PR signaled by spinners; PR unsignaled; PR unsignaled with participants believing that they were playing with another person, not the computer. With PR = 100% (‘tit‐for‐tat’) and PR = 50%, the modal participant maximized earnings under all three conditions. With PR = 75%, participants maximized earnings only when PR was signaled. These results indicate that differences between people's tendency to cooperate with other people (social cooperation) and their tendency to cooperate with their own future interests (self‐control) may lie in differences in subjective PR. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Prior experience and patterning in a prisoner's dilemma game

Female college students first played a pseudo-prisoner's dilemma (PPD) game with the experimenter, who followed a fixed strategy. In the first experiment the experimenter's strategies for different groups of subjects were: (a) play tit-for-tat; (b) play randomly; (c) always cooperate; (d) always defect (‘cooperation’ and ‘defection’, defined as in an actual prisoner's dilemma game). Only the tit-for-tat group increased cooperation over trials; other groups decreased cooperation. After playing the PPD with the experimenter, subjects played an actual prisoner's dilemma (PD) game with each other. In the PD game, subjects began cooperating moderately but cooperation deteriorated regardless of what the experimenter's strategy had been in the earlier (PPD) game. In a second experiment, subjects again played a PPD game with the experimenter and then played a PD game with each other. Half played one trial at a time as in the first experiment while half played in patterns of four trials at a time. In the PD game, patterning of trials retarded the development of mutual defection regardless of previous experience. The cooperation-preserving effect of patterning of trials in this social task is compared with similar effects on individual tasks involving self-control and risk-aversion. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decision making in the prisoner's dilemma game: The effect of exit on cooperation and social welfare

The prisoner's dilemma game is a mixed‐motive game that offers two players the simultaneous choice between a cooperative and a defective alternative. An often neglected aspect of such a binary‐choice game, however, is that in many real‐life encounters, people can choose not only to cooperate or defect, but they also have a third option: to exit the social dilemma. Although in the literature a consensus has emerged that the addition of an exit opportunity benefits cooperation, there is only scant research into its effect on social welfare. In order to allow a direct comparison of cooperation rates and welfare levels across binary‐choice and trinary‐choice games, in this study, we used a design in which the same participants played similar games with and without an exit option (i.e., a within‐subjects design), and this in a range of structural variations. The findings of our study indicated that the aggregated outcome of both players is generally lower in games with an exit option than in games without an exit option. Moreover, our results showed that the efficiency of the exit option strongly depends on the specific outcome structure of the game (in terms of its endowment size, (a)symmetry, and level of noncorrespondence). In the discussion, it is argued that the implementation of an exit option as a strategy to increase social welfare should be critically assessed.     

The effects of physical contact and decision type on moral decision making: A study of harm to save moral behavior

This study examined the relationship between physical contact and decision type in predicting “harm to save” behavior. Participants were assigned to making either a judgment or a choice involving moral dilemmas. All participants were presented with dilemmas that either required or did not require having physical contact with potential victims. Participants were asked to decide whether to sacrifice fewer people to save more (utilitarian responses) or not to do so and thus more people would die (deontological responses). The study sample included 345 participants who completed a set of self‐report measures. Results indicated an interaction between physical contact and decision type. In the choice condition only, participants reported significantly less utilitarian responses to the dilemmas that required having physical contact with the person to be harmed than to dilemmas that did not require physical contact. This difference was not found in the judgment condition. These results contribute to a greater understanding of the nature and potential malleability of human morality.