Improved matrix reasoning is limited to training on tasks with a visuospatial component

Recent studies (e.g.,  and ) have provided evidence that scores on tests of fluid intelligence can be improved by having participants complete a four week training program using the dual n-back task. The dual n-back task is a working memory task that presents auditory and visual stimuli simultaneously. The primary goal of our study was to determine whether a visuospatial component is required in the training program for participants to experience gains in tests of fluid intelligence. We had participants complete variations of the dual n-back task or a short-term memory task as training. Participants were assessed with four tests of fluid intelligence and four cognitive tests. We were successful in corroborating Jaeggi et al.'s results, however, improvements in scores were observed on only two out of four tests of fluid intelligence for participants who completed the dual n-back task, the visual n-back task, or a short-term memory task training program. Our results raise the issue of whether the tests measure the construct of fluid intelligence exclusively, or whether they may be sensitive to other factors. The findings are discussed in terms of implications for conceptualizing and assessing fluid intelligence.     

Two minds rationality

I argue that views of human rationality are strongly affected by the adoption of a two minds theory in which humans have an old mind which evolved early and shares many features of animal cognition, as well as new mind which evolved later and is distinctively developed in humans. Both minds have a form of instrumental rationality—striving for the attainment of goals—but by very different mechanisms. The old mind relies on a combination of evolution and experiential learning, and is therefore driven entirely by repeating behaviours which succeeded in the past. The new mind, however, permits the solution of novel problems by reasoning about the future, enabling consequential decision making. I suggest that the concept of epistemic rationality—striving for true knowledge—can only usefully be applied to the new mind with its access to explicit knowledge and beliefs. I also suggest that we commonly interpret behaviour as irrational when the old mind conflicts with the new and frustrates the goals of the conscious person.     

Conflict,metacognition, and analytic thinking

One hundred and three participants solved conflict and non-conflict versions of four reasoning tasks using a two-response procedure: a base rate task, a causal reasoning task, a denominator neglect task, and a categorical syllogisms task. Participants were asked to give their first, intuitive answer, to make a Feeling of Rightness (FOR) judgment, and then were given as much time as needed to rethink their answer. They also completed a standardized measure of IQ and the actively open-minded thinking questionnaire. The FORs of both high- and low-capacity reasoners were responsive to conflict, such that FORs were lower for conflict relative to non-conflict problems. Consistent with the quantity hypothesis, high-capacity reasoners made a greater distinction between conflict and non-conflict items on measures of Type 2 thinking, namely, rethinking time and probability of changing answers. In contrast to the quality hypothesis, however, this rethinking time did not advantage the ability of the high-capacity group to produce normative answers, except for the base rate task. Indeed, we observed that the correlation between capacity and the probability of normative answers emerged at the initial response, rather than after rethinking.     

Dual processes of emotion and reason in judgments about moral dilemmas

We report the results of two experiments that show that participants rely on both emotion and reason in moral judgments. Experiment 1 showed that when participants were primed to communicate feelings, they provided emotive justifications not only for personal dilemmas, e.g., pushing a man from a bridge that will result in his death but save the lives of five others, but also for impersonal dilemmas, e.g., hitting a switch on a runaway train that will result in the death of one man but save the lives of five others; when they were primed to communicate thoughts, they provided non-emotive justifications for both personal and impersonal dilemmas. Experiment 2 showed that participants read about a protagonist's emotions more quickly when the protagonist was faced with a personal dilemma than an impersonal one, but they read about the protagonist's decision to act or not act equally quickly for personal and impersonal dilemmas.     

Does a simultaneous memory load affect older and younger adults’ implicit associative learning?

This study investigated the effects of a simultaneous memory load on implicit associative sequence learning using the Triplets Learning Task (TLT). Participants in the Simultaneous condition held a secondary task memory load during the TLT, while those in the Sequential condition also performed both tasks, but successively, rather than simultaneously. Thus, the Simultaneous condition had a memory load during the TLT, while the Sequential condition did not. Probe blocks without the secondary task allowed separation of effects on learning from effects on its expression. Results revealed that the simultaneous memory load affected older, but not younger adults, by suppressing the expression of learning, not learning itself. Thus, older and younger adults can learn probabilistic associations while holding a simultaneous memory load, but the load can limit the extent to which older adults adapt their performance to environmental structure. Results are consistent with theories which propose that implicit associative learning does not call on limited capacity resources, and highlight the importance of distinguishing effects of dual tasks on the expression of learning from those on learning itself.     

Musical Training,Bilingualism, and Executive Function: A Closer Look at Task Switching and Dual‐Task Performance

This study investigated whether musical training and bilingualism are associated with enhancements in specific components of executive function, namely, task switching and dual‐task performance. Participants (n = 153) belonging to one of four groups (monolingual musician, bilingual musician, bilingual non‐musician, or monolingual non‐musician) were matched on age and socioeconomic status and administered task switching and dual‐task paradigms. Results demonstrated reduced global and local switch costs in musicians compared with non‐musicians, suggesting that musical training can contribute to increased efficiency in the ability to shift flexibly between mental sets. On dual‐task performance, musicians also outperformed non‐musicians. There was neither a cognitive advantage for bilinguals relative to monolinguals, nor an interaction between music and language to suggest additive effects of both types of experience. These findings demonstrate that long‐term musical training is associated with improvements in task switching and dual‐task performance.     

The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing?

People believe others are telling the truth more often than they actually are; this is called the truth bias. Surprisingly, when a speaker is judged at multiple points across their statement the truth bias declines. Previous claims argue this is evidence of a shift from (biased) heuristic processing to (reasoned) analytical processing. In four experiments we contrast the heuristic‐analytic model (HAM) with alternative accounts. In Experiment 1, the decrease in truth responding was not the result of speakers appearing more deceptive, but was instead attributable to the rater's processing style. Yet contrary to HAMs, across three experiments we found the decline in bias was not related to the amount of processing time available (Experiments 1–3) or the communication channel (Experiment 2). In Experiment 4 we found support for a new account: that the bias reflects whether raters perceive the statement to be internally consistent.     

Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading

The direct social perception (DSP) thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts’ Type 1 mindreading serves as a rival to DSP or whether some Type 1 mindreading can be perceptual. I will focus on Apperly and Butterfill’s dual process account of mindreading epistemic states such as perception, knowledge, and belief. This account posits a minimal form of Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states called registrations. I will argue that general dual process theories fit well with a modular view of perception that is considered a kind of Type 1 process. I will show that this modular view of perception challenges and has significant advantages over DSP’s phenomenological and psychological theses. Finally, I will argue that if such a modular view of perception is accepted, there is significant reason for thinking Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states is perceptual in nature. This would mean extending the scope of DSP to at least one type of epistemic state.     

Searching for an optimal balance: Dual career experiences of Swedish adolescent athletes

ObjectivesThe paper presents a national level Swedish project aimed at examining adolescent student-athletes' dual career experiences (including sport, studies, and private life) during their first year at national elite sport schools (Swedish abbreviation RIGs will be used) with a particular focus on development of their athletic and student identities. The developmental model of transitions faced by athletes (Wylleman & Lavallee, 2004) and the athletic career transition model (Stambulova, 2003) served as underlying frameworks.DesignA longitudinal mixed-method research design was used with autumn-to-spring quantitative and qualitative parts.MethodSixteen year old student-athletes, representing 27 sports and 33 RIGs (n = 261 in the first and n = 250 in the second measurement), completed three quantitative instruments. Additionally, in-depth interviews were conducted with 10 participants.ResultsResults revealed (a) significant changes in the participants' transition/adaptation variables from the first to the second measurement accompanied by rather high perceived quality of adjustment at RIG both at the beginning and at the end of the educational year; (b) significant contributions of the transition variables to the perceived quality of adjustment with personal resources as a key predictor; (c) significantly higher athletic than student identity in both quantitative measurements, but with inter- and intra-individual differences with regard to balancing the two shown by the qualitative data.ConclusionsThe study contributes to deeper understanding of dual career experiences of Swedish adolescent athletes; the authors provide recommendations for psychological dual career support services at RIGs and outline future research in the Swedish dual career model.     

Personal characteristics as predictors for dual career dropout versus continuation – A prospective study of adolescent athletes from German elite sport schools

ObjectivesThe primary objective of this study is to identify the personal characteristics that predict dropout versus continuation among dual career athletes from different sports who attend sports schools. These schools provide an optimal environment for combining an academic education with a sports career.MethodsAt the end of the school year, all 10th graders (52 girls, 73 boys) from five out of six sports schools in Saxony, Germany, completed a standardised questionnaire that measured personal characteristics deemed important for a successful career – personality traits (Freiburger Persönlichkeitsinventar – FPI), goal orientation (Sport Orientation Questionnaire – SOQ), and volitional skills (Volitional Components in Sport – VKS). In addition, demographic and sport-related data were collected. One year later, at the end of 11th grade, all participants again completed the questionnaire.ResultsAt Time 2, 37 athletes (29.6%) had dropped out of their sport career, and 88 athletes were still pursuing their sport career. A majority of the dropouts were from individual sports (n = 31) and were females (n = 23). A logistic regression analysis of physical complaints (higher for dropouts), win motivation and self-optimisation (each lower for dropouts) as significant covariates correctly classified 65% of the dropouts and 92% of the non-dropouts.ConclusionsPersonal characteristics, motivation and volition in particular, played important roles for those adolescent athletes who remained active in their sport. Accordingly, it is suggested that young athletes receive psychological training focused on these specific personal characteristics.