Controlled & automatic processing: behavior,theory, and biological mechanisms

This paper provides an overview of developments in a dual processing theory of automatic and controlled processing that began with the empirical and theoretical work described by Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) over a quarter century ago. A review of relevant empirical findings suggests that there is a set of core behavioral phenomena reflecting differences between controlled and automatic processing that must be addressed by a successful theory. These phenomena relate to: consistency in training, serial versus parallel processing, level of effort, robustness to stressors, degree of control, effects on long‐term memory, and priority encoding. We detail a computational model of controlled processing, CAP2, that accounts for these phenomena as emergent properties of an underlying hybrid computational architecture. The model employs a large network of distributed data modules that can categorize, buffer, associate, and prioritize information. Each module is a connectionist network with input and output layers, and each module communicates with a central Control System by outputting priority and activity report signals, and by receiving control signals. The Control System is composed of five processors including a Goal Processor, an Attention Controller, an Activity Monitor, an Episodic Store, and a Gating & Report Relay. The transition from controlled to automatic processing occurs in this model as the data modules become capable of transmitting their output without mediation by the Control System. We describe recent progress in mapping the components of this model onto specific neuroanatomical substrates, briefly discuss the potential for applying functional neuroimaging techniques to test the model's predictions, and its relation to other models.     

回族文化结构分析

本文从人类学角度探讨了回族文化的形成机制和传承模式,主张用"一体两翼"来概括表述回族文化的结构,提出比翼齐飞推动回族文化的进一步发展。     

Refining the dual‐process theory of preference construction: A reply to Gawronski,Martin and Sloman,Stanovich, and Wegener and Chien

Our target article proposed a dual-system framework for understanding context and task effects in choice. In this summary, we address the major points made by each set of commentators and, building on their suggestions, define a more precise dual-system theory of preference construction. We also propose some avenues for future research on a broader dual-system approach to understanding choice.     

Distractor-response bindings in dual task scenarios

If a response is executed in reaction to a target stimulus, accompanying distractor stimuli can be integrated with and later on retrieve this response, an effect called distractor-response binding. There has been some debate as to whether S-R binding is generally influenced by attentional processes and in particular the role of attentional processes for the binding of irrelevant stimuli and responses is unclear. We therefore analyze the impact of spatial input attention while engaging central attention in an additional task. In particular, participants worked in dual task situations that induced load on central attention while the distribution of spatial attention was manipulated by varying the location of the different tasks. Distractor-response binding occurred only if both tasks were presented in the same spatial location. In contrast, binding effects within one task were prevented if spatial attention was withdrawn from the task by presenting a second task in a separate area. It is concluded that input but no central attention is required for the integration of distractor stimuli and responses. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Priming of Pop-out in Visual Search: A Comparison of Young and Old Adults

An experiment examined potential age-related differences in priming of pop-out (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994, 1996, 2000; McPeek, Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1999), an implicit, memory-based phenomenon that facilitates repeated gaze or attention shifts between visually similar stimuli. Older and younger adults performed a visual search task requiring them to judge the orientation of a color singleton target. Trial-to-trial repetition of target color and/or target position primed attentional selection for both age groups, producing faster and more accurate responses. Age-related increases in the strength of priming by target color appeared to arise from generalized slowing in older observers’, but marginal age-related increases in the strength of priming by target position remained even after transformation to account for generalized slowing.     

When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model

When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.     

Practice-related reduction of dual-task costs under conditions of a manual-pedal response combination

Severe dual-task costs emerge when two tasks are performed at the same time. Schumacher, Seymour, Glass, Kieras, and Meyer (2001) showed a complete reduction of dual-task costs after extensive dual-task practice with a visual-manual (VM) task and an auditory-verbal (AV) task. First, we replicated these findings and found task conditions sufficient to achieve a high level of dual-task cost reduction (Experiment 1). Using these conditions, we tested whether the Schumacher et al. findings generalise to a different dual-task situation, in which participants practised a VM task and an auditory-pedal (AP) task (VM-AP) conjointly (Experiment 2). In the VM-AP task situation we found reduced dual-task costs after practice. Dual-task costs, however, remained on a high level after eight sessions of practice and also when extending practice to 12 sessions. No single participant showed evidence for time sharing in the VM-AP dual task. These results suggest that the finding of complete dual-task cost reduction does not generalise to the VM-AP task combination used in the present study. We discuss different factors potentially relevant for the observation of persisting dual-task costs over practice in the VM-AP task.     

The need for central resources in answering questions in different domains: Folk psychology,biology, and economics

This study examined whether, when lay people reason about everyday domains, they do so in a slow, serial, deliberate process or using an automatic, effortless, associative process, and whether there are differences in this respect between content domains. The cognitive resources used by lay persons in reasoning about everyday domains were investigated using a dual task methodology. Fifty-eight adult participants answered computer-administered questions on folk biology (ToB), folk economics (ToE), and folk psychology, where the latter included questions requiring participants to infer an emotion from a verbally presented situation (ToP) and false-belief tasks (ToM). Each domain was tested with questionnaires at two levels of difficulty. Half the participants concurrently performed the 2-back task. Cognitive load reduced accuracy on the main task for ToM tasks (especially for second-order false-belief items) but not for the other domains. Performing the main tasks reduces accuracy and increases latencies on the secondary task for all domains. These findings suggest that the appropriate generalisation does not relate to content domains (such as folk psychology vs. folk biology), but rather to the nature of the task under consideration. For ToE, ToB, and ToP, the relevant inference questions appear to be processed mainly by the associative systems in LTM, and the process is not affected by a concurrent secondary task. For ToM, the response generation processing occurs in the analytic subsystem, and is therefore affected by cognitive load. Further, the more difficult set of questions impaired the secondary task more than the simpler set, in every domain and in terms of both accuracy and latency. This suggests that the processing involved in the associative system consumes domain-general resources too.     

Causal conjunction fallacies: The roles of causal strength and mental resources

In two experiments we tested the prediction derived from Tversky and Kahneman's (1983) work on the causal conjunction fallacy that the strength of the causal connection between constituent events directly affects the magnitude of the causal conjunction fallacy. We also explored whether any effects of perceived causal strength were due to graded output from heuristic Type 1 reasoning processes or the result of analytic Type 2 reasoning processes. As predicted, Experiment 1 demonstrated that fallacy rates were higher for strongly than for weakly related conjunctions. Weakly related conjunctions in turn attracted higher rates of fallacious responding than did unrelated conjunctions. Experiment 2 showed that a concurrent memory load increased rates of fallacious responding for strongly related but not for weakly related conjunctions. We interpret these results as showing that manipulations of the strength of the perceived causal relationship between the conjuncts result in graded output from heuristic reasoning process and that additional mental resources are required to suppress strong heuristic output.