EMBODIED COGNITION IN CLASSICAL RABBINIC LITERATURE

Challenging earlier cognitivist approaches, recent theories of embodied cognition argue that the human mind and its functions are best understood as intimately bound up with the human body and its physiological dimensions. Some scholars have suggested that such theories, in departing from some core assumptions of the Western philosophical tradition, display significant similarities to certain non‐Western traditions of thought, such as Buddhism. This essay extends such parallels to the Jewish tradition and argues that, in particular, classical rabbinic thought presents a profoundly nondualistic account of the body–soul relation in its connection to cognition, action, and embodiment. Classical rabbinic texts therefore model the possibility of engaging with ‘Western’ conceptions such as God and the soul, while doing so in a manner that resonates strongly with many aspects of contemporary scientific theories. Thus, beyond their value as historical documents, insight into the texts and concepts of classical rabbinic Judaism can contribute to the further development of new theories of intellect and cognition.     

Using Dynamic Field Theory to extend the embodiment stance toward higher cognition

The embodiment stance emphasizes that cognitive processes unfold continuously in time, are constantly linked to the sensory and motor surfaces, and adapt through learning and development. Dynamic Field Theory (DFT) is a neurally based set of concepts that has turned out to be useful for understanding how cognition emerges in an embodied and situated system. We explore how the embodiment stance may be extended beyond those forms of cognition that are closest to sensorimotor processes. The core elements of DFT are dynamic neural fields (DNFs), patterns of activation defined over different kinds of spaces. These may include retinal space and visual feature spaces, spaces spanned by movement parameters such as movement direction and amplitude, or abstract spaces like the ordinal axis along which sequences unfold. Instances of representation that stand for perceptual objects, motor plans, or action intentions are peaks of activation in the DNFs. We show how such peaks may arise from input and are stabilized by intra-field interaction. Given a neural mechanism for instantiation, the neuronal couplings between DNFs implement cognitive operations. We illustrate how these mechanisms can be used to enable architectures of dynamic neural fields to perform cognitive functions such as acquiring and updating scene representations, using grounded spatial language, and generating sequences of actions. Implementing these DFT models in autonomous robots demonstrates how these cognitive functions can be enacted in embodied, situated systems.     

Development of sensorimotor synchronization abilities: Motor and cognitive components

The aim of the present study was to examine both the development of sensorimotor synchronization in children in the age range from 5 to 8 years and the involvement of motor and cognitive capacities. Children performed a spontaneous motor tempo task and a synchronization–continuation task using an external auditory stimulus presented at three different inter-stimulus intervals: 500, 700, and 900 ms. Their motor and cognitive abilities (short-term memory, working memory, and attention) were also assessed with various neuropsychological tests. The results showed some developmental changes in synchronization capacities, with the regularity of tapping and the ability to slow down the tapping rate improving with age. The age-related differences in tapping were nevertheless greater in the continuation phase than in the synchronization phase. In addition, the development of motor capacities explained the age-related changes in performance for the synchronization phase and the continuation phase, although working memory capacities were also involved in the interindividual differences in performance in the continuation phase. The continuation phase is thus more cognitively demanding than the synchronization phase. Consequently, the improvement in sensorimotor synchronization during childhood is related to motor development in the case of synchronization but also to cognitive development with regard to the reproduction and maintenance of the rhythm in memory.     

Platonic Knowledge and the Standard Analysis

Abstract

In this paper I explore Plato’s reasons for his rejection of the so‐called standard analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. I argue that Plato held that knowledge is an infallible mental state in which (a) the knowable is present in the knower and (b) the knower is aware of this presence. Accordingly, knowledge (epistēmē) is non‐propositional. Since there are no infallible belief states, the standard analysis, which assumes that knowledge is a type of belief, cannot be correct. In addition, I argue that Plato held that belief (doxa) is only possible for the sort of being capable of knowledge. This is because self‐reflexivity is necessary for infallible knowledge and self‐reflexivity is only possible if the intellect is immaterial. This capacity for self‐reflexivity is also essential for belief, since beliefs are, paradigmatically, not dispositions but self‐reflexive mental states.     

A temporally sustained implicit theory of mind deficit in autism spectrum disorders

Eye movements during false-belief tasks can reveal an individual’s capacity to implicitly monitor others’ mental states (theory of mind – ToM). It has been suggested, based on the results of a single-trial-experiment, that this ability is impaired in those with a high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (ASD), despite neurotypical-like performance on explicit ToM measures. However, given there are known attention differences and visual hypersensitivities in ASD it is important to establish whether such impairments are evident over time. In addition, investigating implicit ToM using a repeated trial approach allows an assessment of whether learning processes can reduce the ASD impairment in this ability, as is the case with explicit ToM. Here we investigated the temporal profile of implicit ToM in individuals with ASD and a control group. Despite similar performance on explicit ToM measures, ASD-diagnosed individuals showed no evidence of implicit false-belief tracking even over a one-hour period and many trials, whereas control participants did. These findings demonstrate that the systems involved in implicit and explicit ToM are distinct and hint that impaired implicit false-belief tracking may play an important role in ASD. Further, they indicate that learning processes do not alleviate this impairment across the presentation of multiple trials.     

Knowledge of Memory Aging Across the Lifespan

ABSTRACT. The authors examined knowledge of normal and pathological memory aging in a lifespan sample of 198 individuals who ranged in age from 13 to 88 years. Participants completed the Knowledge of Memory Aging Questionnaire (Cherry, Brigman, Hawley, & Reese, 2003). The authors hypothesized that high school students would be less knowledgeable about memory aging issues than college students, middle-aged, and community-dwelling older adults. Consistent with this hypothesis, response accuracy was lower for high school students compared to their older counterparts. Follow-up analyses revealed that high school students’ responses to a subset of questions that tap ageist views of adult cognition were less accurate than the other age groups, implying a response bias toward stereotypical images of memory aging. Implications for research and the design of instructional materials to increase people's knowledge about normative changes in adult cognition are discussed.     

Low-Income Preschoolers' False-Belief Performance

A group of 72 preschoolers (36 African Americans, 36 European Americans) enrolled in Head Start programs and other preschools serving low-income children were asked 3 variations of false-belief questions across 3 scenarios and given a language and cognition subtest. Children's performance varied across the questions and tasks, but after covarying for children's language and cognitive scores, those effects were no longer found to be significant. Age effects were still significant even after differences in children's language and cognitive abilities had been accounted for. Although no language and cognitive differences were found among European Americans and African Americans, the European Americans still outperformed African Americans on 1 of the task scenarios. Those results demonstrate (a) the importance of considering testing procedures and language and cognitive abilities when assessing children's social cognitive skills and (b) that age-related changes in false-belief understanding are associated with social cognitive conceptual changes that are independent of language and cognitive skills.     

The Construction of Symmetry in Children and Adults

The development of the concept of symmetry is important to an overall understanding of cognitive development in children and to spatial cognition in particular. Age differences in the construction of the 3 types of symmetry (bilateral, translational, and radial) were investigated in children and adults engaged in block construction. Children 2–4.5 years old produced bilateral symmetry in low frequencies independent of their precise vertical alignment of blocks. Children 4–12 years old and adults produced all 3 types of symmetry. The hypothesis predicting the sequence and frequency of the 3 types of symmetry based on an analysis of spatial complexity was partially supported. Bilateral symmetry was produced at significantly higher frequencies than the other 2 types across all age groups. Children 5–12 years old produced adult levels of bilateral symmetry while children 9–12 years old reached adult levels of construction of translational and radial symmetry.     

Observational Learning and the Role of Confinement in Pigeons: Suppression of Learning as a Function of Observing the Performance of a Conspecific

Observational learning of a successive discrimination problem by pigeons was studied using conspecifics as models responding for either contingent or noncontingent reinforcement. We found that observation of these models was associated with poorer performance on subsequent testing than was shown by a control group that learned without first observing conspecifics' performance. No significant difference was found between subjects without observational experience and another control group that was confined in the observation apparatus and observed an empty chamber only.