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81.
Tracy Lupher 《Synthese》2009,167(1):67-80
The conserved quantities theory of causation (CQTC) attempts to use physics as the basis for an account of causation. However,
a closer examination of the physics involved in CQTC reveals several critical failures. Some of the conserved quantities in
physics cannot be used to distinguish causal interactions. Other conserved quantities cannot always be the properties of fields
or particles. Finally, CQCT does not account for causal interactions that are static.
I would like to thank Fred Kronz, Cory Juhl, Joshua Dever, and two anonymous referees for their many helpful suggestions and
comments. 相似文献
82.
Gary Watson 《The Journal of Ethics》1999,3(4):353-368
In this paper I discuss two kinds of attempts to qualify incompatibilist and compatibilist conceptions of freedom to avoid what have been thought to be incredible commitments of these rival accounts. One attempt -- which I call soft libertarianism -- is represented by Robert Kane's work. It hopes to defend an incompatibilist conception of freedom without the apparently difficult metaphysical costs traditionally incurred by these views. On the other hand, in response to what I call the robot objection (that if compatibilism is true, human beings could be the products of design), some compatibilists are tempted to soften their position by placing restrictions on the origins of agency. I argue that both of these attempts are misguided. Hard libertarianism and hard compatibilism are the only theoretical options. 相似文献
83.
《Canadian journal of philosophy》2012,42(5):689-709
AbstractI explore the question of when an agent is derivatively, rather than directly, culpable for an undesirable outcome. The undesirable outcome might be a harmful incompetent or unwitting act, or it might be a harmful event. By examining various cases, I develop a sophisticated account of indirect culpability that is neutral about controversies regarding normative ethical issues and the condition on direct culpability. 相似文献
84.
Gary Slater 《Zygon》2014,49(3):593-611
The evolutionary debunking argument advanced by Sharon Street, Michael Ruse, and Richard Joyce employs the logic of Paul Griffiths and John Wilkins to contend that humans cannot have knowledge of moral truths, since the evolutionary process that has produced our basic moral intuitions lacks causal connections to those (putative) truths. Yet this argument is self‐defeating, because its aim is the categorical, normative claim that we should suspend our moral beliefs in light of the discoveries about their non‐truth‐tracking origins, when it is precisely this claim that relies upon the normativity under attack. This article cites Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) to argue that such self‐defeat can be avoided by expanding upon the basic structure of the argument put forth by Griffiths and Wilkins, provided that one embraces a version of realism that corresponds with Peirce's doctrine of final causation. So construed, final causation reconciles real generals (including real moral values) with natural selection and undergirds further speculation of moral facts within values per se. 相似文献
85.
《Body image》2014,11(4):464-473
We evaluated the structure and validity of the Upward Appearance Comparison Scale (UPACS) and Downward Appearance Comparison Scale (DACS) (O’Brien et al., 2009) in Chinese samples. In Study 1, principal component analysis on an initial sample (427 women, 123 men) and confirmatory factor analysis on another sample (447 women, 121 men) found that a 15-item, two component model had the best overall fit. Derived components had moderate correlations with most conceptually related measures and low correlations with less conceptually related indices. Study 2 participants (310 women, 201 men) completed the UPACS and DACS as well as measures of disordered eating, fatness concern, and negative affect; they were re-assessed one year later. Baseline UPACS scores predicted changes in disordered eating for women and fatness concerns for men, independent of initial disturbances, but DACS responses were not related to outcomes. Findings highlighted the potential utility of derived UPACS and DACS within a Chinese context. 相似文献
86.
István Aranyosi 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):67-78
The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of the most discussed puzzles in the mind–body literature. There has been a general agreement among philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some form of physicalism, that the dualist cannot escape the exclusion problem. I argue that a proper understanding of dualism – its form, commitments, and intuitions – makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from a dualist perspective. The paper proposes a dualist approach, based on a theory of event causation, according to which events are medium-grained, namely parsed into mental and physical property components. A theory of contrastive mental causation is built upon this theory of events, for which the problem of exclusion does not arise. 相似文献
87.
Thomas Jay Oord 《Zygon》2013,48(2):466-477
Theists in general and Christians in particular have good grounds for affirming divine action in relation to twenty‐first‐century science. Although humans cannot perceive with their five senses the causation—both divine and creaturely—at work in our world, they have reasons to believe God acts as an efficient, but never sufficient, cause in creation. The essential kenosis option I offer overcomes liabilities in other kenosis proposals, while accounting for a God who acts personally, consistently, persuasively, and yet in diversely efficacious ways. We can reasonably infer that the love, beauty, and truth expressed in creation derive from divine and creaturely causation. 相似文献
88.
Andrew R. Platt 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(5):849-871
This paper is the second of a two-part reexamination of causation in Descartes's physics. Some prominent contemporary scholars, including Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber, have argued that Descartes is an Occasionalist about natural motion. On their reading, Descartes holds that God alone causes the motions that are not caused by the free actions of finite minds. Hatfield and Garber offer similar, but independent arguments that Descartes's views about physics – in particular, his arguments that the laws of nature are grounded in God's immutability – entail Occasionalism about natural motion. In this paper I argue contra Hatfield and Garber that Descartes's natural philosophy does not entail Occasionalism. Descartes holds that God is a direct efficient cause of every natural motion. Yet he does not take this to imply that bodies lack genuine causal powers. According to Descartes, God concurs with bodies to cause natural motion in such a way that both God and bodies are genuine, efficient causes of motion. I conclude by presenting an account of how Descartes's theory of body is compatible with the thesis that bodies have intrinsic active causal powers. 相似文献
89.
Sukjae Lee 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(3):539-576
This paper propounds a new reading of Berkeley's account of the activity of finite spirits. Against existing interpretations, the paper argues that Berkeley does not hold that we causally contribute to the movement of our bodies. In contrast, our volitions to move our bodies are but occasions for God to cause their movement. In answer to the question of wherein then consists our activity, the paper proposes that our activity consists in the dual powers to produce (1) our volitions – the acts of willing – and (2) our ideas of imagination. 相似文献
90.
Thomas M. Ward 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(1):19-46
This paper examines some aspects of Spinoza's metaphysics of the essences of modes.2 I situate Spinoza's use of the notion of essence as a response to traditional, Aristotelian, ways of thinking about essence. I argue that, although Spinoza rejects part of the Aristotelian conception of essence, according to which it is in virtue of its essence that a thing is a member of a kind, he nevertheless retains a different part of such a conception, according to which an essence is some structural feature of a thing which causally explains other, non-essential features. I go on to develop an account of Spinoza's metaphysics of essence, according to which essences, what he sometimes calls formal essences, are produced by the divine essence prior to and independent of the creation of finite modes, and according to which essences are the formal or exemplar causes of finite modes. I then argue that finite modes, in virtue of the formal essences which they actualize, are genuine causal relata. Finally, I offer some speculations about Spinoza's answer to the question, ‘Why, in a necessitarian cosmos filled with formal essences, should there be temporal finite modes at all?’ 相似文献