全文获取类型
收费全文 | 152篇 |
免费 | 12篇 |
国内免费 | 2篇 |
专业分类
166篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 1篇 |
2021年 | 2篇 |
2020年 | 4篇 |
2019年 | 2篇 |
2018年 | 6篇 |
2017年 | 14篇 |
2016年 | 11篇 |
2015年 | 4篇 |
2014年 | 6篇 |
2013年 | 35篇 |
2012年 | 3篇 |
2011年 | 3篇 |
2010年 | 2篇 |
2009年 | 8篇 |
2008年 | 7篇 |
2007年 | 6篇 |
2006年 | 10篇 |
2005年 | 5篇 |
2004年 | 4篇 |
2003年 | 3篇 |
2002年 | 5篇 |
2001年 | 4篇 |
2000年 | 3篇 |
1999年 | 4篇 |
1998年 | 4篇 |
1997年 | 2篇 |
1995年 | 1篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 1篇 |
1992年 | 2篇 |
1991年 | 3篇 |
排序方式: 共有166条查询结果,搜索用时 6 毫秒
61.
Umut Baysan 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2018,96(3):419-431
What is an epiphenomenal property? This question needs to be settled before we can decide whether higher-level properties are epiphenomenal or not. In this paper, I offer an account of what it is for a property to have some causal power. From this, I derive a characterization of the notion of an epiphenomenal property. I then argue that physically realized higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal, because laws of nature impose causal similarities on the bearers of such properties, and these similarities figure as powers in the causal profiles of these properties. 相似文献
62.
Willis Doney 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(2):219-234
Malebranche held that God acts only by general volitions and so is not constantly interfering in the world. The content of God's volitions appears to include the general laws of nature and the particular initial configuration of the created world, so that occasional or natural causes have an important explanatory role. It is clear that at the least Malebranche meant by a ‘general volition’ the willing of events which followed general laws. Steven Nadler argued that this is all we should understand by a ‘general volition’, and so we should think that general volitions are simply particular volitions which follow a general law. I argue that this view is not the correct interpretation of Malebranche's general volitions, for it does not do justice to the theological doctrine of the Treatise, masks the genuine difference between Arnauld and Malebranche, and conflicts with what Malebranche says about practical volitions. I then argue that despite Malebranche's view of general volitions, there is still an important difference between his view and Leibniz's. 相似文献
63.
Genevieve Lloyd 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(1):141-147
In this paper I argue that Kierkegaard's theory of change is motivated by a robust notion of contingency. His view of contingency is sharply juxtaposed with a strong notion of absolute necessity. I show that how he understands these notions explains certain ambiguous claims he makes about causation. I attempt to provide a coherent interpretation of his view of causality that is consistent with both human choice and the causal sequence of change. I end by suggesting a compatibilist interpretation of Kierkegaard's philosophy. 相似文献
64.
Alex Broadbent 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(2):169-189
The counterfactual analysis of causation has focused on one particular counterfactual conditional, taking as its starting‐point the suggestion that C causes E iff (~C □→ ~E). In this paper, some consequences are explored of reversing this counterfactual, and developing an account starting with the idea that C causes E iff (~E □→ ~C). This suggestion is discussed in relation to the problem of pre‐emption. It is found that the ‘reversed’ counterfactual analysis can handle even the most difficult cases of pre‐emption with only minimal complications. The paper closes with a discussion of the wider philosophical implications of developing a reversed counterfactual analysis, especially concerning the differentiation of causes from causal conditions, causation by absences, and the extent to which causes suffice for their effects. 相似文献
65.
In this paper, the ontological, terminological, epistemological, and ethical aspects of omission are considered in a coherent and balanced framework, based on the idea that there are omissions which are actions and omissions which are non-actions. In particular, we suggest that the approach to causation which best deals with omission is Mackie's INUS conditional proposal. We argue that omissions are determined partly by the ontological conditional structure of reality, and partly by the interests, beliefs, and values of observers. The final upshot is that moral judgments involved in cases of omissions cannot be grounded on, but are the ground for judgments about what INUS conditions count as omissions. 相似文献
66.
Derek Lam 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(3):247-266
Quantities like mass and temperature are properties that come in degrees. And those degrees (e.g. 5 kg) are properties that are called the magnitudes of the quantities. Some philosophers talk about magnitudes of phenomenal qualities as if some of our phenomenal qualities are quantities. The goal of this essay is to explore the anti-physicalist implication of this apparently innocent way of conceptualizing phenomenal quantities. I will first argue for a metaphysical thesis about the nature of magnitudes based on Yablo’s proportionality requirement of causation. Then, I will show that, if some phenomenal qualities are indeed quantities, there can be no demonstrative concepts about some of our phenomenal feelings. That presents a significant restriction on the way physicalists can account for the epistemic gap between the phenomenal and the physical. I’ll illustrate the restriction by showing how that rules out a popular physicalist response to the Knowledge Argument. 相似文献
67.
Dominic K. Dimech 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(4):637-650
Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise the quasi-realist reading of Hume on causation by showing how quasi-realism does not speak to inductive scepticism. I also offer evidence that Hume takes inductive scepticism to result from his theory of causation, and that his scepticism is tied to his rejection of metaphysical causal realism. 相似文献
68.
Dwayne Moore 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2017,47(1):20-42
According to proponents of the causal exclusion problem, there cannot be a sufficient physical cause and a distinct mental cause of the same piece of behaviour. Increasingly, the causal exclusion problem is circumvented via this compatibilist reasoning: a sufficient physical cause of the behavioural effect necessitates the mental cause of the behavioural effect, so the effect has a sufficient physical cause and a mental cause as well. In this paper, I argue that this compatibilist reply fails to resolve the causal exclusion problem. 相似文献
69.
Mikael Pettersson 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2017,95(2):256-269
Many photographs seem to be images of absences: for instance, a photograph of a shadow seems to be an image of an absence, as shadows are plausibly thought of as being absences of light. Absence photography is puzzling, however, as, first, it is a common idea that photographs can only be images of things that have caused them, and, second, it is unclear whether absences can cause anything. In this paper, I look at various ways to unravel the puzzle. Along the way, I also hope to cast some light on the idea that photography is a causal medium. 相似文献
70.
Pat Lewtas 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2017,95(3):475-487
This paper argues that emergent conscious properties can't bestow emergent causal powers. It supports this conclusion by way of a dilemma. Necessarily, an (allegedly efficacious) emergent conscious property brings about its effects actively or other than actively (in senses explained in the paper). If actively, then, the paper argues, the emergent conscious property can't have causal powers at all. And if other than actively, then, the paper argues, the emergentist finds himself committed to incompatible accounts of causation. 相似文献