Causal Learning: Association Versus Computation

Causal learning enables humans and other animals not only to predict important events or outcomes, but also to control their occurrence in the service of needs and desires. Computational theories assume that causal judgments are based on an estimate of the contingency between a causal cue and an outcome. However, human causal learning exhibits many of the characteristics of the associative learning processes thought to underlie animal conditioning. One problem for associative theory arises from the finding that judgments of the causal power of a cue can be revalued retrospectively after learning episodes when that cue is not present. However, if retrieved representations of cues can support learning, retrospective revaluation is anticipated by modified versions of standard associative theories.     

On immediate function

Behavior is a property of living organisms, not of inanimate matter. The problems of physical science are to understand how a phenomenon works; biological science adds the questions of what a phenomenon does and how something that does such things came to be. Exclusive dedication to cause–effect explanations ignores how behavior helps creatures cope with their internal and external environments. Laws of causation describe the precursors to behavior; laws of function describe the effects of behavior. The numerous instances of learning reflect the many ways that selective pressure for altering behavior on the basis of experience has been manifested. Little basis exists for assuming that the various forms of learning reflect either common functions or common processes. Instead, it seems that evolutionary processes have resulted in domain-specific learning. The rules of learning must be understood in terms of the function that the particular manifestation of learning serves for the organism. Evolutionary theory provides the framework for understanding function as well as relations between function and causal mechanisms.     

DIVINE ACTION: IS IT CREDIBLE?

Abstract. The concept of God's acting in the world has been seen to be problematic in light of the claims of scientific knowledge that the regularity of a law like universe rules out divine action. There are resources in both scientific knowledge and religion that can render meaningful and credible divine action. The new physics, chaos theory, cognitive psychology, and the concept of top-down causation are used to understand how God acts in the world. God's action is not an intervention, but is understood on the model of how the mind influences the brain in a downward causative manner. Suggestions for imagining God's actions are discussed.     

A physical critique of physical causation

The conserved quantities theory of causation (CQTC) attempts to use physics as the basis for an account of causation. However, a closer examination of the physics involved in CQTC reveals several critical failures. Some of the conserved quantities in physics cannot be used to distinguish causal interactions. Other conserved quantities cannot always be the properties of fields or particles. Finally, CQCT does not account for causal interactions that are static. I would like to thank Fred Kronz, Cory Juhl, Joshua Dever, and two anonymous referees for their many helpful suggestions and comments.     

因果论分析疾病的不典型首发症状

疾病首发症状的不典型是导致误诊误治的重要原因,本文就疾病首发症状的不典型进行哲学分析,通过举例阐述如何在临床上运用因果联系的思维方法识别不典型首发症状,以及因果联系在首发症状不典型病例应用中的注意事项。最后,文章分析了由因果理论得出的病因诊断和对因治疗医疗模式在临床运用中的重要性及其发展前景。     

Trumping the causal influence account of causation

Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example

Determination,realization and mental causation

How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (henceforth, ‘determination’) provides the key to solving the problem of MC: if mental properties are determinables of their physical realizers, then (since determinables and determinates are distinct, yet don’t causally compete) all three threats may be avoided. Not everyone agrees that determination can do this good work, however. Some (e.g., Douglas Ehring, Eric Funkhauser, and Sven Walter) object that mental-physical realization can’t be determination, since such realization lacks one or other characteristic feature of determination. I argue that on a proper understanding of the features of determination key to solving the problem of MC these arguments can be resisted.     

Distant Causation in <Emphasis Type="Italic">C</Emphasis>+

The action language C+ of Giunchiglia, Lee, Lifschitz, McCain and Turner is a high-level, logical formalism for the representation of domains involving action and change. However, one cannot directly express relationships which hold between states more than one time-step distant, or even say that one action determines another at the next time. We present C+_timed, a generalization of C+ which removes these limitations. As for C+, translations to the language of causal theories are given. We also define a new kind of transition system called a ‘run system’ to provide a graphical semantics. Finally, we show how domains involving prohibition and permission can be modelled, by incorporating the ideas of another extension of C+.     

Nancey Murphy's Nonreductive Physicalism

This essay examines Nancey Murphy's commitment to downward causation and develops a critique of that notion based upon the distinction between the causal relevance of a higher-level event and its causal efficacy. I suggest the following: (1) nonreductive physicalism lacks adequate resources upon which to base an assertion of real causal power at the emergent, supervenient level; (2) supervenience's nonreductive nature ought not obscure the fact that it affirms an ontological determination of higher-level properties by those at the lower level; and (3) the notion of divine self-renunciation, while consonant with Murphy's claim of supervenient, divine action, is nonetheless problematic. Throughout, I claim that the question of the causal efficacy of a level is logically independent from the assertion of its conceptual or nomological nonreducibility.     

Reviews

Michel Serres Genesis
John Earman Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers, and Shrieks: Singularities and Acausalities in Relativistic Spacetimes
D. Bohm and B. J. Hiley The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory