全文获取类型
收费全文 | 152篇 |
免费 | 12篇 |
国内免费 | 2篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 1篇 |
2021年 | 2篇 |
2020年 | 4篇 |
2019年 | 2篇 |
2018年 | 6篇 |
2017年 | 14篇 |
2016年 | 11篇 |
2015年 | 4篇 |
2014年 | 6篇 |
2013年 | 35篇 |
2012年 | 3篇 |
2011年 | 3篇 |
2010年 | 2篇 |
2009年 | 8篇 |
2008年 | 7篇 |
2007年 | 6篇 |
2006年 | 10篇 |
2005年 | 5篇 |
2004年 | 4篇 |
2003年 | 3篇 |
2002年 | 5篇 |
2001年 | 4篇 |
2000年 | 3篇 |
1999年 | 4篇 |
1998年 | 4篇 |
1997年 | 2篇 |
1995年 | 1篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 1篇 |
1992年 | 2篇 |
1991年 | 3篇 |
排序方式: 共有166条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
101.
Carol Rausch Albright 《Zygon》2001,36(3):485-492
Eugene d'Aquili and Andrew B. Newberg's The Mystical Mind: Probing the Biology of Religious Experience presents a core theory regarding the neurophysical nature of mystical experience; extensions of this theory, focusing upon near-death experiences and the nature of religion itself; and buttressing arguments proposing that genetically based neurophysical "operators" within the brain compel human beings to think in certain ways. On the basis of this work, the authors pose a "metatheology," suggesting that certain brain operations may underlie all the religions of the world. The core theory, its extensions, and related arguments are discussed in turn, concluding with commentary on the authors' constructive theology. 相似文献
102.
Hans-Ulrich Hoche 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(3):389-409
From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which
an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic ‘phenomenon’ in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans’s reflexive model with a complementaristic approach
in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans’s ontological monism and
his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical
causation.
相似文献
Hans-Ulrich HocheEmail: |
103.
John Polkinghorne 《Zygon》2000,35(4):927-940
This account of the dynamical theory of chaos leads to a metaphysical picture of a world with an open future, in which the laws of physics are emergent-downward approximations to a more subtle and supple reality and in which there is downward causation through information input as well as upward causation through energy input. Such a metaphysical picture can accommodate both human and divine agency. 相似文献
104.
For the last 50 years the dominant stance in experimental biology has been reductionism in general, and genetic reductionism in particular. Philosophers were the first to realize that the belief that the Mendelian genes were reduced to DNA molecules was questionable. Soon, experimental data confirmed these misgivings. The optimism of molecular biologists, fueled by early success in tackling relatively simple problems has now been tempered by the difficulties encountered when applying the same simple ideas to complex problems. We analyze three examples taken from experimental data that illustrate the shortcomings of this sort of reductionism. In the first, alterations in the expression of a large number of genes coexist with normal phenotypes at supra-cellular levels of organization; in the second, the supposed intrinsic specificity of hormonal signals is negated; in the third, the notion that cancer is a cellular problem caused by mutated genes is challenged by data gathered both from the reductionist viewpoint and the alternative view proposing that carcinogenesis is development gone awry. As an alternative to reductionism, we propose that the organicist view is a good starting point from which to explore these phenomena. However, new theoretical concepts are needed to grapple with the apparent circular causality of complex biological phenomena. 相似文献
105.
Dennis Bielfeldt 《Zygon》2001,36(1):153-177
The problem of divine agency and action is analogous to the problem of human agency and action: How is such agency possible in the absence of a dualistic causal interaction between disparate orders of being? This paper explores nondualistic accounts of divine agency that assert the following: (1) physical monism, (2) antireductionism, (3) physical realization, and (4) divine causal realism. I conclude that a robustly causal deity is incompatible with nonddualism's affirmation of physical monism. Specifically, I argue the incoherence of nondualistic strategies that advocate divine information transfer without energy transfer or the divine downward causation of physical events. Furthermore, I claim that the principle of explanatory exclusion makes any nondualistic, noninterventionist account of divine agency highly dubious. Finally, I suggest that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam can avoid a causally inert deity only if they are willing to deny the current presumption of the causal closure of the physical. 相似文献
106.
Mariusz Tabaczek 《Zygon》2013,48(2):380-404
The methodological nonreductionism of contemporary biology opens an interesting discussion on the level of ontology and the philosophy of nature. The theory of emergence (EM), and downward causation (DC) in particular, bring a new set of arguments challenging not only methodological, but also ontological and causal reductionism. This argumentation provides a crucial philosophical foundation for the science/theology dialogue. However, a closer examination shows that proponents of EM do not present a unified and consistent definition of DC. Moreover, they find it difficult to prove that higher‐order properties can be causally significant without violating the causal laws that operate at lower physical levels. They also face the problem of circularity and incoherence in their explanation. In our article we show that these problems can be overcome only if DC is understood in terms of formal rather than physical (efficient) causality. This breakdown of causal monism in science opens a way to the retrieval of the fourfold Aristotelian notion of causality. 相似文献
107.
John Woods 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(1):103-113
‘Those ice cubes melted because by melting total entropy increased and entropy increase has a very high objective chance.’ What role does the chance in this explanation play? I argue that it contributes to the explanation by entailing that the melting was almost necessary, and defend the claim that the fact that some event was almost necessary can, in the right circumstances, constitute a causal explanation of that event. 相似文献
108.
April Bleske-Rechek Katelyn M. Morrison Luke D. Heidtke 《The Journal of general psychology》2013,140(1):48-70
The human tendency to conflate correlation with causation has been lamented by various scientists (Kida, 2006; Stanovich, 2009), and vivid examples of it can be found in both the media and peer-reviewed literature. However, there is little systematic data on the extent to which individuals conflate correlation with causation. In three experiments, we presented people with one of four research vignettes generated from the combination of two independent variables: whether the vignette described an experimental or non-experimental design, and whether it revealed a positive or negative association. Upon reading their vignette, participants selected inferences that could be drawn from the findings. Participants drew causal inferences from non-experimental vignettes as often as they did from experimental vignettes, and more frequently for causal statements and directions of association that fit with intuitive notions than for those that did not. We discuss our findings in relation to other biases in human thinking. 相似文献
109.
Andrew R. Platt 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(4):623-646
This paper is the first of a two-part reexamination of causation in Descartes's physics. Some scholars – including Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber – take Descartes to be a `partial' Occasionalist, who thinks that God alone is the cause of all natural motion. Contra this interpretation, I agree with literature that links Descartes to the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence. This paper surveys this literature, and argues that it has failed to provide an interpretation of Descartes's view that both distinguishes his position from that of his later, Occasionalist followers and is consistent with his broader metaphysical commitments. I provide an analysis that tries to address these problems with earlier `Concurentist' readings of Descartes. On my analysis, Occasionalism entails that created substances do not have intrinsic active causal powers. As I read him, Descartes thinks that bodies have active causal powers that are partly grounded in their intrinsic natures. But I argue – pace a recent account by Tad Schmaltz – that Descartes also thinks that God immediately causes all motion in the created world. On the picture that emerges, Descartes's position is both continuous with, and a subtle departure from, the Thomisitic theory of divine concurrence. 相似文献
110.
John Grey 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(3):446-467
Spinoza's doctrine of the eternity of the mind is often understood as the claim that the mind has a part that is eternal. I appeal to two principles that Spinoza takes to govern parthood and causation to raise a new problem for this reading. Spinoza takes the composition of one thing from many to require causal interaction among the many. Yet he also holds that eternal things cannot causally interact, without mediation, with things in duration. So the human mind, since it is the idea of a body existing in duration, cannot have an eternal part. In order to solve this problem, I propose an aspectual reading of Spinoza's doctrine of the eternity of the mind: the mind itself is eternal, under one of its aspects. 相似文献