Characterizing the Linguistic Chameleon: Personal and Social Correlates of Linguistic Style Accommodation

Linguistic style accommodation between conversationalists is associated with positive social outcomes. We examine social power and personality as factors driving the occurrence of linguistic style accommodation, and the social outcomes of accommodation. Social power was manipulated to create 144 face‐to‐face dyadic interactions between individuals of high versus low power and 64 neutral power interactions. Particular configurations of personality traits (high self‐monitoring, Machiavellianism and leadership, and low self‐consciousness, impression management and agreeableness), combined with a low‐power role, led to an increased likelihood of linguistic style accommodation. Further, greater accommodation by low‐power individuals positively influenced perceptions of subjective rapport and attractiveness. We propose individual differences interact with social context to influence the conditions under which nonconscious communication accommodation occurs.     

Sex,Power, and Money: Prediction from the Dark Triad and Honesty–Humility

Data were collected from two undergraduate student samples to examine (i) the relations of the ‘Dark Triad’ variables (Machiavellianism, Psychopathy, and Narcissism) with the HEXACO personality dimensions, as well as (ii) the ability of the aforementioned characteristics and of the Big Five personality factors to predict outcome variables related to sex, power, and money. Results indicated that the common variance of the Dark Triad was very highly correlated with low Honesty–Humility and that the unique variance of each of the Dark Triad variables also showed theoretically meaningful relations with the other five HEXACO factors. Furthermore, the Dark Triad and Honesty–Humility were strong predictors of three domains of outcome variables—Sex (short‐term mating tendencies and sexual quid pro quos), Power (Social Dominance Orientation and desire for power), and Money (conspicuous consumption and materialism)—that were not well predicted by the dimensions of the Big Five. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Exchange Boundary Framework: Understanding the Evolution of Power within Collaborative Decision-Making Settings

Many community decision-making bodies encounter challenges in creating conditions where stakeholders from disadvantaged populations can authentically participate in ways that give them actual influence over decisions affecting their lives (Foster-Fishman et al., Lessons for the journey: Strategies and suggestions for guiding planning, governance, and sustainability in comprehensive community initiatives. W.K. Kellogg Foundation, Battle Creek, MI, 2004). These challenges are often rooted in asymmetrical power dynamics operating within the settings (Prilleltensky, J Commun Psychol 36:116–136, 2008). In response, this paper presents the Exchange Boundary Framework, a new approach for understanding and promoting authentic, empowered participation within collaborative decision-making settings. The framework expands upon theories currently used in the field of community psychology by focusing on the underlying processes through which power operates in relationships and examining the evolution of power dynamics over time. By integrating concepts from social exchange theory (Emerson, Am Soc Rev 27:31–41, 1962) and social boundaries theory (Hayward, Polity 31(1):1–22, 1998), the framework situates power within parallel processes of resources exchange and social regulation. The framework can be used to understand the conditions leading to power asymmetries within collaborative decisionmaking processes, and guide efforts to promote more equitable and authentic participation by all stakeholders within these settings. In this paper we describe the Exchange Boundary Framework, apply it to three distinct case studies, and discuss key considerations for its application within collaborative community settings.     

Power,Subjectivity, and Agency: Between Arendt and Foucault

The author argues for bringing the work of Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt into dialogue with respect to the links between power, subjectivity, and agency.Although one might assume that Foucault and Arendt come from such radically different philosophical starting points that such a dialogue would be impossible, the author argues that there is actually a good deal of common ground to be found between these two thinkers. Moreover, the author suggests that Foucault's and Arendt's divergent views about the role that power plays in the constitution of subjectivity and agency should be seen as complementary rather than opposed.     

Behaviour variability and the Situated Focus Theory of Power

Power often affects judgement and behaviour differently in different contexts. The present chapter proposes the Situated Focus Theory of Power in an attempt to explain the greater variability in the behaviour and judgements of powerful compared to powerless individuals. It is proposed that power increases attunement to the situation by means of selective attention and processing flexibility. Factors that drive cognition such as motivation (e.g., needs, goals, expectancies), inner experiences (e.g., feelings, ease of retrieval), as well as properties of the environment (e.g., affordances), guide more unequivocally the responses of powerful compared to powerless individuals. Powerful individuals process more extensively information that is relevant compared to information that is irrelevant to these factors, whereas powerless individuals attend more equally to different types of information. These differences in processing focus affect content-free aspects of behaviour. Specifically, power promotes readiness to act, prioritisation, and behaviour variability across situations.     

Another view of “we”: Majority and minority group perspectives on a common ingroup identity

Drawing on the evidence of the role of social categorisation and identity in the development and maintenance of intergroup biases, research on the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000 Gaertner, S. L. and Dovidio, J. F. 2000. Reducing intergroup bias: The Common Ingroup Identity Model, Philadelphia, PA: The Psychology Press.  [Google Scholar]) has investigated how modifying the ways that the self and others are categorised can reduce prejudice and discrimination. In this article, we review more recent research that extends our initial formulation of the model by considering more fully alternative forms of recategorisation (a dual identity as well as a one-group representation), the different preferences of majority and minority groups for these different forms of recategorised representations, and the potential implications of these different preferences on the content of intergroup interaction and on the possibilities for social change towards equality.     

Evolutionary Theologies and Divine Action1

Abstract

Two challenges loom large for efforts to develop a theology of evolution. The first is the problem of purpose: can evolutionary processes, in which chance plays so prominent a role, be understood as the context of God's purposive action? The second is the problem of the pervasiveness of suffering and death in evolution. To the extent that we succeed in responding to the first difficulty by giving an account of how God's purposes are enacted in the history of life, we deepen the conundrum about God's relation to natural evils. In particular, if we embrace evolution as God's clever way of making life make itself, we will find it difficult to sustain the classical theological claim that death is a disruptive interloper in God's good creation.     

Al-Ghazali's Use of the Terms “Necessity” and “Habit” in his Theory of Natural Causality

The present article aims at analyzing the terms “necessity” (Al-darura) and “habit” (al-āda) in al-Ghazali's (1058?–?1111) theory of natural causality (Al-Sbābiah al-Tabī'īa) by answering the following question: Why does Al-Ghazali use term “habit” and negation of “necessity” with regard to natural Causality? Al-Ghazali denies causal necessity that links cause and effect since this relationship does not draw on logical rules that make it necessary. This, however, does not mean that he denies the existence of a causal relationship between things, as he recognizes its existence. He, however, denies the necessity of that relationship, as he claims that the source of causal necessity stems from a psychological emotion rather than from being inherent in things themselves. Al-Ghazali also attempts to base causal necessity on “habit” by claiming that the similarity of event A as cause and event B as effect stems from observation, repetition and the sequencing of natural phenomena. Al-Ghazali, then, endeavors to prove that science is based on expectation and assumption that draws on observation, the senses, and repetition and does not consider it as constant and absolute.