Reasoning to what is true in fiction

The paper discusses the principle by which we reason to what is true in fiction. The focus is David Lewis's article Truth in Fiction (1978) which proposes an analysis in terms of counterfactuals and possible worlds. It is argued thatLewis's account is inadequate in detail and also in principle in that it conflicts radically with basic and familiar tenets of literary criticism. Literary critical reasoning about fiction concerns not the discovery of facts in possible worlds but the recovery of meanings in interpretative frameworks. The model theoretic approach fails to account for common literary or rhetorical devices like unreliable narration, connotation and point of view. And in explaining indeterminacy of content in terms of truth-value gaps it gives too simplistic an account of critical reasoning about character motivation and thematic development. A more adequate account of content-indeterminacy can be provided through a comparison of the interpretation of fiction with the interpretation of human action. A broader motif in the paper is the underlying tension between what is required for the logic of fiction and what is required for the aesthetics of fiction.     

On the uses of language in working and idealized logic

The interpretation of discourse covers a continuum with two extremes: on the one hand, a text considered as an ideal, distant object, and on the other hand, a conversation regarded as a real, present event. On the basis of a distinction between relatively context-invariant propositions and relatively context-dependent statements, it is argued that statements in conversational discourse are easier to interpret than statements in texts, whereas only propositions in symbolic logic can be interpreted with exactitude. In the same way, the interpretation of dialogical arguments proceeds more easily than the interpretation of arguments in texts. While dialogical argumentation requires a dialectical approach, textual argumentation necessitates an imaginative reconstruction of the argument. From this it can be concluded that for different sorts of argumentative discourse diverse sorts of interpretative activities have to be used.     

Interpretation as a misunderstanding

In the following article ‘who’ as the agent in the clinical session becomes questioned. By speaking we are introduced in the world of misunderstanding, where we are not merely speaking but being spoken to. Listening to what is being said and in this way misunderstanding what the patient is trying to say helps us in order to locate where the subject of the unconscious places himself in relation to the desire of the Other. In the article, it is conveyed how interpretation is not something that clarifies or explains to the patient his difficulties, but instead locates them by letting them take part in the session. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, locating the subject of the unconscious is crucial as this gives the patient a clue about where they place themselves in relation to the Other. This is why cutting the session is an essential element of its technique, as it stops in this way something that can disturb or hide where the subject of the unconscious has appeared. This allows patients to experience where they are gratifying themselves in their own difficulty. Interpretation is not speaking about the truth but instead, making the truth present in the session.     

Interpreting conjoined noun phrases and conjoined clauses: Collective versus distributive preferences

Two experiments are reported that show that introducing event participants in a conjoined noun phrase (NP) favours a single event (collective) interpretation, while introducing them in separate clauses favours a separate events (distributive) interpretation. In Experiment 1, acceptability judgements were speeded when the bias of a predicate toward separate events versus a single event matched the presumed bias of how the subjects' referents were introduced (as conjoined noun phrases or in conjoined clauses). In Experiment 2, reading of a phrase containing an anaphor following conjoined noun phrases was facilitated when the anaphor was they, relative to when it was neither/each of them; the opposite pattern was found when the anaphor followed conjoined clauses. We argue that comprehension was facilitated when the form of an anaphor was appropriate for how its antecedents were introduced. These results address the very general problem of how we individuate entities and events when presented with a complex situation and show that different linguistic forms can guide how we construe a situation. The results also indicate that there is no general penalty for introducing the entities or events separately—in distinct clauses as “split” antecedents.     

Functional analysis of aberrant behavior through measurement of separate response topographies

Functional analysis results for multiple topographies of aberrant behavior were graphed in an aggregate fashion and then separately for 48 clients. The results indicated that multiple topographies of behavior may be maintained by different contingencies. These results indicate that graphing functional analysis data in an aggregate fashion and then separately may improve the accuracy of their interpretation.     

On Ultrafilter Logic and Special Functions

Logics for generally were introduced for handling assertions with vague notions,such as generally, most, several, etc., by generalized quantifiers, ultrafilter logic being an interesting case. Here, we show that ultrafilter logic can be faithfully embedded into a first-order theory of certain functions, called coherent. We also use generic functions (akin to Skolem functions) to enable elimination of the generalized quantifier. These devices permit using methods for classical first-order logic to reason about consequence in ultrafilter logic.Presented by André Fuhrmann     

Finding our way in the dark

Accepting the common lay definition of nightmare as any form of upsetting, dreamlike cognition occurring in the midst of sleep, the author argues for a classification of nightmares that would be based, not on physiological findings, but on what the upsetting nocturnal occurrence turns out to mean to the dreamer. Three types of nightmare identified on this basis are illustrated through dream sequences from classic Hollywood movies and amplified by clinical examples: (1) the dream that symbolizes the next stage of life as unusually daunting, (2) the dream that exposes the shadow of another person in a shocking way, and (3) the 'empathy dream', in which the dreamer experiences directly the anxieties of another subject. It is suggested that the accurate interpretation of a particular upsetting dream depends upon which type of nightmare the dream turns out to be.     

Children's comprehension of sentences with focus particles

We report three studies investigating children's and adults' comprehension of sentences containing the focus particle only. In Experiments 1 and 2, four groups of participants (6-7 years, 8-10 years, 11-12 years and adult) compared sentences with only in different syntactic positions against pictures that matched or mismatched events described by the sentence. Contrary to previous findings (Crain, S., Ni, W., & Conway, L. (1994). Learning, parsing and modularity. In C. Clifton, L. Frazier, & K. Rayner (Eds.), Perspectives on sentence processing. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum; Philip, W., & Lynch, E. (1999). Felicity, relevance, and acquisition of the grammar of every and only. In S. C. Howell, S. A. Fish, & T. Keith-Lucas (Eds.), Proceedings of the 24th annual Boston University conference on language development. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Press) we found that young children predominantly made errors by failing to process contrast information rather than errors in which they failed to use syntactic information to restrict the scope of the particle. Experiment 3 replicated these findings with pre-schoolers.     

An ERP study of sensory mismatch expressions in Japanese

Combinations of different sensory words produce mismatch expressions like smooth color and red touch in contrast to normal expressions like red color and smooth touch. Concerning these sensory mismatch expressions, results of three experiments are reported. Experiment 1 revealed that (i) mismatch expressions were less comprehensible than normal expressions, and that (ii) there were two patterns among mismatch expressions: the high-comprehensible mismatch expression (HighCME, e.g., smooth color) and the low-comprehensible mismatch expression (LowCME, e.g., red touch). Experiment 2 revealed that the mismatch expressions produced a significantly greater N400 amplitude than the normal expressions. Experiment 3 implied that the difference between High/LowCME was reflected in a later latency band or in a topographical difference of N400, although the statistical significance was marginal. It is argued that the processes to integrate linguistic elements (e.g., combining adjectives and nouns) are not homogeneous.