The influence of visual mental imagery size on metamemory accuracy in judgment of learning

Many studies have found the font size of to-be-remembered words has a significant influence on judgments of learning (JOLs). However, few studies have investigated whether JOLs are affected by the mental imagery size of to-be-remembered words, even when the font sizes themselves are kept identical in study materials. This study investigated whether the visual mental imagery size influences the participants’ JOLs and what the underlying mechanisms are. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants learned words with identical font sizes, mentally generated large or small imageries and then made JOLs. We found that JOLs under the large imagery condition were significantly higher than those under the small imagery condition, but actual recall performance exhibited no significant difference. In Experiment 3, participants pressed a button immediately after mental imagery generation and showed that it took significantly longer to generate large imageries than to generate small imageries, and the difference in JOLs between two conditions was no longer significant. In Experiment 4, we used a questionnaire to investigate the contribution of beliefs and found that participants believed large imageries were easier to remember. These findings indicate that imagery size has a significant impact on JOLs, in which beliefs may play a leading role.     

Getting at the source of distinctive encoding effects in the DRM paradigm: evidence from signal-detection measures and source judgments

Studying Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) lists using a distinctive encoding task can reduce the DRM false memory illusion. Reductions for both distinctively encoded lists and non-distinctively encoded lists in a within-group design have been ascribed to use of a distinctiveness heuristic by which participants monitor their memories at test for distinctive-task details. Alternatively, participants might simply set a more conservative response criterion, which would be exceeded by distinctive list items more often than all other test items, including the critical non-studied items. To evaluate these alternatives, we compared a within-group who studied 5 lists by reading, 5 by anagram generation, and 5 by imagery, relative to a control group who studied all 15 lists by reading. Generation and imagery improved recognition accuracy by impairing relational encoding, but the within group did not show greater memory monitoring at test relative to the read control group. Critically, the within group’s pattern of list-based source judgments provided new evidence that participants successfully monitored for distinctive-task details at test. Thus, source judgments revealed evidence of qualitative, recollection-based monitoring in the within group, to which our quantitative signal-detection measure of monitoring was blind.     

Reconsidering research on self-humanizing: The importance of mean comparative judgments

Self-humanization is defined as the tendency to view oneself as more essentially human than others. Researchers have claimed that people attribute human nature traits more strongly to themselves than to others, but not uniquely human traits. In this article we suggest that such claims are based on the misinterpretation of results. Most studies have not presented mean comparative judgments, making it impossible to determine whether people thought they possessed characteristics less strongly or more strongly than the average person. We found that people (N = 256) in Poland, Italy, and Korea perceived themselves as possessing desirable human nature and uniquely human characteristics more than others, as possessing undesirable uniquely human traits less than others, and as similar to others in terms of undesirable human nature characteristics. It seems that being more human than others means possessing some traits more than others and possessing some traits less than others.     

Semantic coherence and fallacies in estimating joint probabilities

In three experiments on joint probability estimation, gist representations were manipulated with analogies, and the suboptimal strategy of ignoring relevant denominators was counteracted with training in using 2 × 2 tables to clarify joint probability estimates. The estimated probabilities of two events, as well as their conjunctive and disjunctive probabilities, were assessed against two benchmarks, logical fallacies and semantic coherence—a constellation of estimates consistent with the relationship among sets. Fuzzy‐trace theory (FTT) predicts that analogies will increase semantic coherence, and a table intervention affecting denominator neglect will both increase semantic coherence and reduce fallacies. In all three experiments, analogies increased semantic coherence. In both experiments training participants to use 2 × 2 tables, such tables reduced fallacies and increased semantic coherence. As the relations among sets in the problem materials progressed in cognitive complexity from identical sets, mutually exclusive sets, and subsets to overlapping sets, fallacies generally increased, and semantic coherence generally decreased. These findings indicate that denominator neglect is pervasive, but that it can be remedied with a straightforward intervention that clarifies relations among sets. Further, intuitive gist‐based probability estimation can be improved through the use of simple analogies. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Illusion of confirmation from exposure to another's hypothesis

We examine the influence of exposure to an advisor's hypothesis, in the form of a point estimate of an uncertain quantity, on subsequent point estimates and confidence judgments made by advisees. In three experiments, a group of unexposed advisees produced their own estimates before being presented with that of the advisor, while a group of exposed advisees were presented with the advisor's estimate before making their own. Not surprisingly, exposed advisees deliberately incorporated the information conveyed by the advisor's estimate in producing their own estimates. But the exposure manipulation also had a contaminating influence that shifted what the advisees viewed as their own, independent estimates toward those of the advisor. Seemingly unaware of this influence, exposed advisees were subject to an illusion of confirmation in which they expressed greater confidence in the accuracy of the advisor's estimate than did unexposed advisees. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

个体关于加工流畅性的信念对字体大小效应的影响

本研究考察个体关于加工流畅性的信念对学习判断(Judgment of learning, 简称JOL)的影响, 探讨字体大小效应的产生机制。研究通过两个实验分别考察个体关于“字体大小影响加工流畅性” (实验1)以及“加工流畅性影响记忆效果” (实验2)等信念对字体大小效应的影响。结果发现: 1)当人们相信大字体更流畅(实验1)或者越流畅越好记(实验2)时, 他们在大字体项目上的JOL值显著高于小字体项目上的JOL值; 2)当人们相信小字体更流畅(实验1)或者流畅性与记忆无关(实验2)时, 他们在大字体和小字体项目上的JOL值无显著差异, 字体大小效应消失。上述结果表明, 个体关于加工流畅性的信念是字体大小效应产生的重要原因, 是人们进行学习判断的重要线索。     

Gender Differences in the Self-Assessment of Accuracy on Cognitive Tasks

Generally, self-assessment of accuracy in the cognitive domain produces overconfidence, whereas self-assessment of the accuracy of visual perceptual judgments produces underconfidence. The possible effect of gender differences on these robust findings appears to be underinvestigated. In this paper, I report two studies that take a step toward redressing this shortcoming. In Study 1, a group of young adults (N =185) were presented with a test of General Knowledge and a visual perceptual task. The results indicated the typical over/underconfidence phenomena noted above, but, when analyzed by sex, indicated statistically significant differences; men were more confident than women on both tasks. In Study 2, participants (N =303) with a wider age range completed 4 tests of cognitive ability, which were drawn from the theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence. Results indicated that the tendency for men to express higher levels of confidence than women in the accuracy of their work appears to remain constant across the life-span. These findings are discussed in relation to self-concept and gender stereotyping.