Bird and the Dispositional Essentialist Account of Spatiotemporal Relations

The basic principles of dispositional essentialism do not require that the fundamental spatiotemporal relations are dispositional in nature. Nevertheless, Bird (who defends dispositional monism) argues that they possess dispositional essences in virtue of the fact that the obtaining of these relations can be characterised by the satisfaction of a certain counterfactual. In this paper I argue that his suggestion fails, and so, despite his attempt, the case of the spatiotemporal relations remains the ‘big bad bug’ for the thesis of dispositional monism.

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) succeed in a test of quantity conservation

Nonhuman animals demonstrate a number of impressive quantitative skills such as counting sets of items, comparing sets on the basis of the number of items or amount of material, and even responding to simple arithmetic manipulations. In this experiment, capuchin monkeys were presented with a computerized task designed to assess conservation of discrete quantity. Monkeys first were trained to select from two horizontal arrays of stimuli the one with the larger number of items. On some trials, after a correct selection there was no feedback but instead an additional manipulation of one of those arrays. In some cases, this manipulation involved moving items closer together or farther apart to change the physical arrangement of the array but not the quantity of items in the array. In other cases, additional items were added to the initially smaller array so that it became quantitatively larger. Monkeys then made a second selection from the two arrays of items. Previous research had shown that rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) succeeded with this task. However, there was no condition in that study in which items were added to the smaller array without increasing its quantity to a point where it became the new larger array. This new condition was added in the present experiment. Capuchin monkeys were sensitive to all of these manipulations, changing their selections when the manipulations changed which array contained the larger number of items but not when the manipulations changed the physical arrangement of items or increased the quantity in one array without also reversing which of the two arrays had more items. Therefore, capuchin monkeys responded on the basis of the quantity of items, and they were not distracted by non-quantitative manipulations of the arrays. The data indicate that capuchins are sensitive to simply arithmetic manipulations that involve addition of items to arrays and also that they can conserve quantity.     

Triangulating Political Responsibility: The Motivated Formation of Responsibility Judgments

This article analyzes the process through which partisan bias arises during the formation of citizens' judgments of political responsibility. Informed by theories of motivated political reasoning, it argues that exposure to partisan cues motivates partisans to pursue directional goals, goals which bias the cognitive processing of information and, in turn, overall judgments of responsibility. It further argues that the nature of this biased processing will be such that partisans devalue information inconsistent with their partisan affect. Using a pair of experiments, I test these hypotheses by manipulating both objective evidence concerning gubernatorial responsibility for a state's fiscal imbalance and the presence of partisan cues. Findings support both sets of expectations. The results also suggest that the effects of partisan bias are greater in judgments tied to institutional actions than in those tied to institutional roles and expectations.     

Biases in social comparisons: Optimism or pessimism?

Social comparisons typically lead to two kinds of biases: A comparative optimism bias (i.e., a tendency for people to view themselves as more likely than others to be the beneficiaries of positive outcomes) or a comparative pessimism bias (i.e., a tendency for people to view themselves as less likely than others to be such beneficiaries); rarely are people fully calibrated in terms of how they compare to others. However, there is little systematic research on the factors that determine when a comparative optimism versus pessimism bias will occur, how they can be attenuated and whether such attenuation is always desirable. In this paper, we report four studies which demonstrate the following key results: First, we show that perceived level of control over the outcome drives whether a comparative optimism or pessimism bias will occur (Study 1). Second, an increase in perceived similarity between self and a comparison target person attenuates the comparative optimism bias in domains that people view as highly controllable (Study 2a) and attenuates the comparative pessimism bias in domains that people view as less controllable (Study 2b). Finally, we show that people are willing to work harder when they experience more comparative optimism in higher control scenarios and when they experience less comparative pessimism in lower control scenarios, illustrating that motivating people to strive harder for positive outcomes can result from exacerbated or attenuated bias, depending on the context (Study 3).     

What coping tells about personality

In this study, 123 participants (non‐psychology students) who responded to an interpersonal stress situation staged in the laboratory were judged by unacquainted observers in terms of the Big Five dimensions, intelligence and social attractiveness. Coping behaviour appeared to predict personality impressions in a way that mirrors the relations between personality and coping observed in previous research: Overall, higher levels of Extraversion (E), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C) and Openness to experience (O) (as well as intelligence and social attractiveness) were predicted by problem‐focussed behaviour and cognitive restructuring, whereas higher levels of Neuroticism (N) were predicted by withdrawal/passivity. The interpersonal impact of the particular coping reactions, as indicated by a positive personality impression, were largely inconsistent with their impact on affect following the stress induction. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Metacognitive Judgments and Control of Study

ABSTRACT— Recent evidence indicates that people's judgments of their own learning are causally related to their study behavior and not epiphenomenal. I argue here that people use these metacognitions in an effort to selectively study material in their own region of proximal learning. First they attempt to eliminate materials that are already well learned. Then they progress successively from studying easier to more difficult materials. Successful implementation of this metacognitively guided strategy enhances learning. The necessary components are, first, that the metacognitions be accurate, and second, that the appropriate choices are implemented for study. With these parts in place, the individual is in position to effectively take control of his or her own learning.     

Evaluation of the Dispositional Hope Scale in injury survivors

Hope is a higher-order cognitive construct that encompasses the belief in one’s ability to accomplish personal goals. Hope has been conceptualised as consisting of two constructs – Pathways (the individual’s perceived means available to achieve goals) and Agency (belief in ones ability to succeed in using the identified Pathways). This study aimed to validate a measure of hope, the Dispositional Hope Scale (DHS: [Snyder, C. R., Harris, C., Anderson, J. R., Holleran, S. A., Irving, L. M., Sigman, S. T., et al. (1991). The will and the ways: Development and validation of an individual differences measure of hope. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(4), 570–585]) in a large sample of traumatic injury survivors (N = 1025). The findings support the psychometric properties of the scale, as well as the two-factor structure of Agency and Pathways, in this population. This study provides support for the use of the DHS as a measure of hope in traumatised populations.     

Cardiac modulation of startle: Effects on eye blink and higher cognitive processing

Cardiac cycle time has been shown to affect pre-attentive brainstem startle processes, such as the magnitude of acoustically evoked reflexive startle eye blinks. These effects were attributed to baro-afferent feedback mechanisms. However, it remains unclear whether cardiac cycle time plays a role in higher startle-related cognitive processes, as well. Twenty-five volunteers responded first by ’fast as possible’ button pushes (reaction time, RT), and second, rated perceived intensity of 60 acoustic startle stimuli (85, 95, or 105 dB; 50 ms duration; binaural; instantaneous rise time), which were presented either 230 or 530 ms after the R-wave, and eye blink responses were measured by EMG. RT was divided into evaluation and motor response time according to previous research. Increasing stimulus intensity enhanced startle eye blink, intensity ratings, and RT components. Eye blinks and intensity judgments were lower when startle was elicited at a latency of R + 230 ms, but RT components were differentially affected: the evaluative component was attenuated, and the motor component was accelerated when stimuli were presented 230 ms after the R-wave. We conclude that the cardiac cycle affects the attentive processing of acoustic startle stimuli.     

时序信息和空间信息在工作记忆中的分离存储

采用相对新近性判断范式（judgments of relative recency）,通过三个实验探讨了工作记忆中时序信息和空间信息的存储方式及其关系。实验一比较了有无空间线索两种条件下时序信息的记忆绩效,结果发现,有无空间线索并不影响对时序信．E-的记忆。实验二和实验三通过控制刺激呈现的视野范围和减少呈现位置的不确定性来利化空间线索,结果表明,时序信息的记忆绩效也不受空间线索的影响。由此推论,工作记忆中的时序信息和空间信息是分离编码存储的,加入空间线索并不能提高时序信息的记忆绩效。