An artificial opposition between grammaticality and frequency: comment on

In a recent Cognition paper (Cognition 85 (2002) B21), Bornkessel, Schlesewsky, and Friederici report ERP data that they claim “show that online processing difficulties induced by word order variations in German cannot be attributed to the relative infrequency of the constructions in question, but rather appear to reflect the application of grammatical principles during parsing” (p. B21). In this commentary we demonstrate that the posited contrast between grammatical principles and construction (in)frequency as sources of parsing problems is artificial because it is based on factually incorrect assumptions about the grammar of German and on inaccurate corpus frequency data concerning the German constructions involved.     

Framing the Lewinsky Affair: Third-Person Judgments by Scandal Frame

Recent studies have documented a “third-person effect” whereby people are found to judge others as more influenced than themselves by the mass media. Meanwhile, contemporary research on issue framing has demonstrated the powerful role of mass media in shaping people's political judgments. But are the perceptual judgments that define third-person effects sensitive to how the media frame an issue? Two studies investigated this question in the context of the Lewinsky-Clinton scandal, one in late August 1998 and the other during spring 1999. Several hundred undergraduates in each study were randomly assigned to one of two media frames. In the 1998 study, the political scandal was depicted as a matter of sexual indiscretion by the president or as legal wrongdoing; in the 1999 study, the recently concluded impeachment process was depicted as the consequence of partisanship or of Clinton's actions. The participants’ judgments of media influence on themselves and on the public were then recorded. The results show that third-person effects were sensitive to issue framing, but change occurred primarily in participants’ judgments about their own vulnerability to media influence.     

On the link between different combinations of Negative Affectivity (NA) and Positive Affectivity (PA) and job performance

Despite the assumed orthogonality of Negative Affectivity (NA) and Positive Affectivity (PA), the effects of the different combinations of NA and PA on work-related outcomes such as job performance have been neglected. The present study among 42 employees of a local social services department in the Netherlands was conducted to fill this gap. The results show that a negative link between NA and job performance (as assessed by the immediate supervisor) exists only when PA is low. This finding elucidates the role of dispositional affect in organizational research and emphasizes that the interaction between both affectivity dimensions should be included when studying how affect relates to job performance and other work-related outcome variables.     

Preferences and Children's Use of Gender-Stereotyped Knowledge About Musical Instruments: Making Judgments About Other Children's Preferences

A developmental model of gender-stereotype acquisition (Martin, 1989) proposes that by the age of 8 years children draw upon information about gender-stereotyped interests as well as other children's sex when deciding how much other children would like different activities; younger children rely on sex only when making such decisions. We examined whether the judgments that children made about other children's preferences were different from those that they made about their own preferences for masculine and feminine musical instruments. Three hundred twelve children aged 8–9 years ranked 6 instruments in order of preference, and rated on a 4-point scale how much they would like to play each one. Children were then asked to decide how much other children would like to play each instrument. Only girls' own preferences for feminine instruments differed according to the gender-stereotyping of their most-preferred instrument. Judgments about how much other children would like masculine and feminine instruments did not differ according to those children's gender-stereotyped interest. Children made stereotypical predictions about the preferences of children of unknown sex who played either a masculine or feminine instrument. Implications for a theoretical account of the development of children's gender-stereotypes are discussed.     

Abnormality, cognitive virtues, and knowledge

Causal analyses of one’s knowing that p have recently emphasized the involvement of cognitive virtues in coming to believe that p. John Greco suggests that in order to deal with Gettier-type cases, a virtue analysis of knowing should include a requirement that one’s knowing does not in a certain way involve abnormality. Yet Greco’s emphasis on statistical abnormality either renders his analysis subject to a generality problem or to objections regarding certain Gettier-type cases. When we instead consider abnormality in the sense of a causally differentiating factor in relation to a causal contrast situation, the account remains unclear concerning its application to an interesting non-Gettier-type case concerning chance. The exploration of these shortcomings casts doubt on the epistemological usefulness of the schema, ‘If you know, then there is no abnormality in your being right.’     

Quantity representation in children and rhesus monkeys: linear versus logarithmic scales

The performances of 4- and 5-year-olds and rhesus monkeys were compared using a computerized task for quantity assessment. Participants first learned two quantity anchor values and then responded to intermediate values by classifying them as similar to either the large anchor or the small anchor. Of primary interest was an assessment of where the point of subjective equality (PSE) occurred for each species across four different sets of anchors to determine whether the PSE occurred at the arithmetic mean or the geometric mean. Both species produced PSEs that were closer to the geometric mean for three of four anchor sets. This indicates that monkeys and children access either a logarithmic scale for quantity representation or a linear scale that is subject to scalar variability, both of which are consistent with Weber's law and representation of quantity that takes the form of analog magnitudes.     

Automatic optimism: Biased use of base rate information for positive and negative events

People generally judge that positive events will occur in their lives and negative events will not, even when both events have the same objective likelihood to occur. In four studies, we examined the possibility that this optimistic bias is the result of people’s automatic affective reactions to future events. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate, in two different contexts, that people are consistently optimistic in their predictions, despite identical base rates for positive and negative events. In Study 2, optimistic bias was not influenced by incentives for motivated reasoning or rewards for accuracy, suggesting that bias was the result of automatic processes. Studies 3 and 4 showed that optimistic bias was more pronounced when predictions were speeded and when participants made predictions after exposure to affectively valenced words. Together, these findings suggest that people optimistically interpret base rates and that this optimism is due to an effortless affective process.     

转移方式对基于劳动的物品所有权判断的影响

劳动在人们的所有权判断中起着重要作用。以往研究虽然考察了幼儿和成人基于劳动的所有权判断,但却忽视了原材料转移方式的作用,且大部分集中在西方国家。本研究以中国3～5岁的幼儿和成人为对象,考察了他们在拿和借两种转移方式下基于劳动的所有权判断。结果发现,4～5岁的幼儿及成人在两种转移方式下的所有权判断存在显著差异。相比于拿条件,他们在借条件下不太倾向于判断劳动者是新加工物品的所有者。4～5岁幼儿在拿条件下更倾向认为劳动者是新加工物品的所有者,而成人在两种条件下都倾向于支持原材料占有者是新加工物品的所有者。3岁幼儿在两种转移方式下的所有权判断不存在显著差异,且不支持任何一方。结果提示,转移方式会影响个体基于劳动的所有权判断,并且从4岁开始幼儿能够区分不同转移方式的作用。     

Children's moral judgments of commission and omission based on their understanding of second‐order mental states1

Abstract: Children's moral judgments about acts of commission and omission with negative outcomes were studied based on their understanding of mental states. Children (N = 142) in the first, third, and fifth grades made judgments about four tasks composed of two levels of mental states (first‐order or second‐order) and two types of acts (commission or omission). The results showed that the 7‐year‐olds responded considering only first‐order mental states, but the 9‐ and 11‐year‐olds also used second‐order mental states in their judgments. Whether the acts were commission or omission did not make a difference. These results indicate that children can make moral judgments regarding acts of commission and omission based on an understanding of second‐order mental states by approximately the age of 9 years.