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201.
202.
ANNE EDLAND 《Scandinavian journal of psychology》1994,35(3):281-291
The effects of time pressure on decisions and judgments were studied and related to the use of different decision rules in a multiattribute decision task. The decision alternatives were students described by their high school grades in Swedish, Psychology and Natural Science. The subjects were asked to choose the student they thought would be most able to follow a university program and graduate as a school psychologist. On the basis of earlier findings using the same kind of decision task (Svenson et al., 1990) it was hypothesised that subjects under time pressure would prefer candidates having the maximum grade across all attributes to a greater extent than subjects under no time pressure. Furthermore, it was hypothesised that subjects under time pressure would also focus more on the most important attribute and choose the alternatives being best on that attribute. The results supported these hypotheses. 相似文献
203.
CARL MARTIN ALLWOOD 《Scandinavian journal of psychology》1994,35(3):198-211
A person's confidence judgement of a statement reflects his/her degree of belief in the correctness of that statement. Deficient ability to assess the correctness of statements (or beliefs) can have serious consequences in many situations. This study compares the realism (calibration) of subjects' confidence ratings in two situations ( n = 64). The first situation was when the subjects confidence rated their own answers to general knowledge questions. The second was when the subjects gave confidence ratings of another person's answers to general knowledge questions. The results show that subjects were more poorly calibrated and were more overconfident in the second situation, i.e. when they gave confidence ratings of answers given by another person, compared with when they rated their own answers. The data further indicates that the results can not be explained in terms of the amount of cognitive processes invested when making the confidence judgements. For example, the subjects rated the other person's answers to questions they had answered themselves, and to questions they had not seen before. No differences in confidence or in calibration and other measures of judgmental realism were found between these two categories of questions. Nor did instructions to imagine the thought process of the other person improve any of these measures. The subjects disagreed with the other person's answer on 23% of all occasions. Significantly poorer calibration was shown where subjects disagreed with the other person than where they agreed. Contents of a social nature attended to by the subjects may have affected the results. The results, when related to previous research in the area, give rise to the question of how the social situation can be arranged to achieve the best calibration. 相似文献
204.
The purpose of this study was to test predictions of two recent theories of realism of confidence. Ecological approaches to realism of confidence in one's general knowledge (Gigerenzer et al. , 1991; Juslin, in press a ; Björkman, in press) predict good calibration or, in the case of poor cognitive adjustment, overconfidence, within the cognitive domain. The subjective distance theory of confidence in sensory discriminations (Björkman et al. , 1992) predicts a pervasive underconfidence bias for sensory discriminations. Empirical data are reported showing that: (a) Calibration for sensory judgments is considerably poorer than calibration for well adapted cognitive judgements, a difference that can be entirely traced to underconfidence in the sensory domain. (b) While an initial overconfidence bias in the cognitive domain is removed by outcome feedback, the bias observed in sensory discriminations is unaffected even by a prolonged feedback session. It is suggested that the nature of confidence in sensory discriminations is different from the nature of confidence in cognitive judgments. 相似文献
205.
J. J. Chambliss 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》1991,11(2):167-186
Unpublished correspondence with Elsie Ripley Clapp, along with extensive notes for a 1911 course, The Analysis of Experience, provide the context for a consideration of John Dewey's discussion of the relation between desire and thinking. Dewey's philosophic point of view is portrayed as it was developing in his own mind. The unity of thought and desire, the necessity of making objects of inquiry, the identification of thinking and acting, are themes in these materials which would appear in their published form in such works as Essays in Experimental Logic, Democracy and Education, and Human Nature and Conduct. In the unpublished materials, Dewey is seen as a naturalist at work in his laboratory, reworking his ideas and acknowledging Clapp's assistance in getting Dewey to connect practical situations in life with the philosophic distinctions under development. The 1911 materials are an excellent connection between problematics in Dewey's earlier writings on ethics, epistemology, and logic, and his later writings, on the same subjects in the 1920's and 1930's. 相似文献
206.
情绪对个体判断和决策影响研究概述 总被引:11,自引:0,他引:11
情绪对个体判断和决策影响已经成为目前的一个研究热点。情感启发式、决策情感理沦等为研究情绪对个体判断和决策的影响提供了一定的理论基础.而近期提出的“风险作为情感”假设为研究提供了较为全面的理沦框架。此外,个体差异比较、时间压力以及信息激起为研究情绪在个体判断和决策中的作用提供了很好的研究思路。 相似文献
207.
Marzena Cypryańska John B. Nezlek Aleksandra Jaskółowska Magdalena Maria Formanowicz 《The Journal of social psychology》2017,157(2):148-151
In his reply to our critique of research on self-humanizing, Haslam claims that we used a narrow definition of self-humanizing that ignored the evidence from the correlational research he and his colleagues have done. We disagree. First, we relied upon a definition of self-humanizing based upon comparative judgments that Haslam and colleagues have consistently used. Second, we were well aware of the correlational research he and his colleagues have done. We simply did not think, and do not think, these correlations verified the existence of self-humanizing as defined. In his reply, Haslam offered a new definition of self-humanizing that defines self-humanizing in terms of correlations between comparative judgments and ratings of how much traits reflect human nature. Although we believe this change represents some progress, numerous issues in the study of self-humanizing remain to be resolved. We offer some suggestions for future research on this important topic. 相似文献
208.
Everybody Will Win,and All Must Be Hired: Comparing Additivity Neglect with the Nonselective Superiority Bias
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Two streams of research looking at referent‐dependent judgments from slightly different angles are subadditivity research and research on the nonselective superiority bias. Both biases violate basic formal constraints: the probabilities of a set of exclusive events cannot add up to more than 100%, and a set of attractive candidates cannot all be rated as superior to the group mean. We examine in three experiments how these two biases are related, by asking the same participants to perform both kinds of tasks on the same material. Both biases appear to be widespread, even for sets where all alternatives are presented together, but they differ in the way they are affected by response format and experimental setup. Thus, presenting participants with an unbiased set of ratings will reduce but not normalize their probability estimates of the same alternatives; while presenting them with an unbiased (additive) set of probabilities will make most alternatives appear inferior to the group mean, inverting the superiority bias. Self‐reports reveal that additivity neglect and the nonselective superiority bias can be based on two main response‐strategies: (i) considering each alternative independently or (ii) comparing alternatives, while neglecting their complementarity. In both cases, assessments will be the outcome of a compromise between the perceived “absolute” merits of each alternative, its standing relative to referents, and properties of the response scale. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
209.
The Average Fuel‐Efficiency Fallacy: Overestimation of Average Fuel Efficiency and How It Can Lead to Biased Decisions
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People falsely believe that equal increases in vehicles' fuel efficiency (e.g., miles per gallon (MPG)) will result in equal fuel savings. Whereas previous research on this “MPG illusion” has focused on people's biased choices of upgrading vehicle models, it has not examined a more common situation, namely, estimating a given vehicle's fuel efficiency based on the average of two efficiency values (e.g., in the city and on highways). In such situations, we find an additional bias in people's judgment and choice, the average fuel‐efficiency fallacy, in which people falsely believe that the combined fuel efficiency (e.g., of city and highway MPG) is a simple—instead of a harmonic—mean of the two values. Owing to the curvilinear relationship between fuel efficiency and fuel consumption, the combined fuel‐efficiency value would always be lower than the simple average, resulting in consistent overestimations of the actual fuel efficiency. In a series of studies, we demonstrate how this fallacy of overestimating combined fuel efficiency leads to suboptimal choices between vehicles. In addition, we find that the solution prescribed for the MPG illusion—using gallons per 100 miles—does reduce, but not eliminate, the average fuel‐efficiency fallacy, and that comprehension of the gallons per 100 miles measure is a precursory condition for this nudge to have any effect. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
210.
Teigen and Brun have suggested that distinct from their numerical implications, most probability phrases are either positive or negative, in that they encourage one to think of reasons why the target event will or will not occur. We report two experiments testing our hypotheses that (a) the direction of a phrase can be predicted from properties of its membership function, and (b) this relation is invariant across contexts, and (c) —originally formulated by Teigen and Brun (1999)—that strong modifiers intensify phrase directionality. For each phrase, participants encoded membership functions by judging the degree to which it described the numerical probabilities 0.0, 0.1, …, 1.0, and also completed sentences including the target phrase. The types of reasons given in the sentence completion task were used to determine the phrase's directionality. The results support our hypotheses (a) and (b) regarding the relation between directionality and the membership functions, but we found only limited support for hypothesis (c) regarding the effects of modifiers on directionality. A secondary goal, to validate an efficient method of encoding membership functions, was also achieved. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献