Underlying mechanisms of initial feelings of knowing in children

Past research has pointed to two contrasting mechanisms behind feeling‐of‐knowing judgments (FOKs). The trace‐based account proposes a direct internal monitor that detects the presence or non‐presence of a target item. The inferential account dictates that judgments are actually based on cues external to the memory trace, such as familiarity; FOKs could therefore be based on sometimes misleading information. Thus, while a direct mechanism will lead to good learning strategies (i.e. successful searches), an inferential process could potentially lead to less optimal strategies (i.e. search for unknown target information). The question posed in this research was: What processes underlie the judgments children make prior to fully retrieving a target item? We used a simplified version of Reder and Ritter's (1992 ) game show paradigm to investigate the accuracy (and mechanism) of children's initial FOKs. The experiment found that initial FOKs were largely driven by familiarity of the cues. These data have important implications for strategies children utilize in educational settings.     

Keeping up impressions: Inferential rules for impression change across the Big Five

Not all first impressions have equal longevity. Which kinds of impression have the greatest mobility—downward and upward—over the course of acquaintanceships? In this article, we propose an inferential account of impression maintenance across Big Five trait domains. With data from field and laboratory studies, we provide evidence that positive impressions of agreeableness (A), conscientiousness (C), and emotional stability (ES) are especially vulnerable to small amounts of contrary evidence, whereas positive first impressions of extraversion (E) and openness (O) are more resistant to contrary information. Impressions of E and O demonstrated minimal susceptibility to negativity effects in a longitudinal study of college roommate impressions (Study 1), in a study of perceivers’ implicit theories about different trait domains (Study 2), and in an experimental study of manipulated impression change (Study 3).     

Children's metacognitive judgments in an eyewitness identification task

Two experiments examined children's metacognitive monitoring of recognition judgments within an eyewitness identification paradigm. A confidence-accuracy (CA) calibration approach was used to examine patterns of calibration, over-/underconfidence, and resolution. In Experiment 1, children (n=619, mean age=11 years 10 months) and adults (n=600) viewed a simulated crime and attempted two separate identifications from 8-person target-present or target-absent lineups given lineup instructions that manipulated witnesses choosing patterns by varying the degree of social pressure. For choosers, but not nonchoosers, meaningful CA relations were observed for adults but not for children. Experiment 2 tested a guided hypothesis disconfirmation manipulation designed to improve the realism of children's metacognitive judgments. Children (N=796, mean age=11 years 11 months) in experimental and control conditions viewed a crime and attempted two separate identifications. The manipulation had minimal impact on the CA relation for choosers and nonchoosers. In contrast to adults, children's identification confidence provides no useful guide for investigators about the likely guilt or innocence of a suspect. These experiments revealed limitations in children's metacognitive monitoring processes that have not been apparent in previous research on recall and recognition with younger children.     

大学生对学习行为的责任归因

探讨大学生对日常不同学习行为的控制程度的认识、责任判断、情感反应和帮助行为的关系特点,以验证责任归因理论对我国学生的适用程度。与此同时,研讨归因理论的同类研究中很少涉及的学生思想、观念对责任归因的影响。     

编码强度对字体大小效应的影响

本研究采用3个实验考察编码强度对字体大小效应的影响, 探讨由于知觉特征而引发的元认知错觉的内在产生机制(实验1)与有效的矫正措施(实验2和实验3)。结果发现:(1)大字体词语的知觉流畅性显著优于小字体, 并且贝叶斯多层中介分析结果表明, 知觉流畅性对字体大小效应起部分中介作用(实验1); (2)随着编码强度的增加, 由字体大小引起的学习判断错觉逐渐消失(实验2和实验3)。以上结果表明, 刺激的知觉特征(字体大小)对个体学习判断的影响, 随编码强度激活线索的增加而逐渐减弱。这一结果为真实教学情境中提高学习者的编码强度, 进而削弱学习判断对知觉特征线索的依赖, 并准确地监测自身的学习进程提供了科学依据。     

Absolute and Relative Decision Processes in Eyewitness Identification

A prominent and long-standing theory of eyewitness identification decision making distinguishes between absolute judgments, based on the lineup members' match to the witness's memory of the perpetrator, versus relative judgments, based on match values relative to other lineup members. This distinction was implemented in a computational model and simulations showed that the model predicts an accuracy advantage for absolute judgments over relative judgments under some conditions. The present experiment tested this prediction by evaluating the accuracy of witnesses instructed to use relative or absolute rules. Contrary to predictions, the overall analysis did not show an absolute advantage. Additional exploratory analyses showed a relative advantage when the suspect was surrounded by high-similarity foils. These results are consistent with a model that assumes that side-by-side comparisons of lineup members increase diagnostic accuracy by allowing witnesses to give greater weight to more diagnostic features and less weight to less diagnostic features.     

Configural instability of data from the Life Orientation Test—Revised

Scores obtained with the Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R) are commonly interpreted according to the optimism–pessimism factorial model. Positive items would measure individual differences in positive outcome expectancy, and negative items would measure differences in negative outcome expectancy. Configural stability was assessed using four datasets from French adults, N₁ = 429, N₂ = 278, N₃ = 468, and N₄ = 909. Two times out of four the third positive item-variable could also be regressed on the pessimism factor, with a significant improvement of the goodness of fit. Moreover, the semantic content of the best items reveals that the positive vs. negative outcome expectancy interpretation of the factors was not self-consistent. Practical consequences for the use of the usual optimism composite score are discussed.     

Lay personality knowledge and dispositionist thinking: A knowledge-activation framework

We explicate a knowledge-activation framework depicting the link between lay personality knowledge and dispositional judgments, building on work by [Dweck et al., 1995a] and [Dweck et al., 1995b]. According to this framework, most people possess knowledge consistent with an entity theory (personality is fixed) and incremental theory (personality is malleable), which operates according to knowledge-activation principles. Consistent with this claim, we find that people render more confident dispositional judgments when their entity knowledge is made relatively more accessible through priming manipulations that activate aspects of their existing knowledge. Findings also illustrate the usefulness of incorporating both specific and general knowledge in our analysis. The present framework enhances and complements the individual-differences approach to the study of person theories prevalent in the literature.     

On the law of Regular Minimality: Reply to Ennis

Ennis's critique touches on issues important for psychophysics, but the points he makes against the hypothesis that Regular Minimality is a basic property of sensory discrimination are not tenable.(1) Stimulus variability means that one and the same apparent stimulus value (as measured by experimenter) is a probabilistic mixture of true stimulus values. The notion of a true stimulus value is a logical necessity: variability and distribution presuppose the values that vary and are distributed (even if these values are represented by processes or sets rather than real numbers). Regular Minimality is formulated for true stimulus values. That a mixture of probabilities satisfying Regular Minimality does not satisfy this principle (unless it also satisfies Constant Self-Similarity) is an immediate consequence of my 2003 analysis. Stimulus variability can be controlled or estimated: the cases when observed violations of Regular Minimality can be accounted for by stimulus variability corroborate rather than falsify this principle. In this respect stimulus variability is no different from fatigue, perceptual learning, and other factors creating mixtures of discrimination probabilities in an experiment.(2) Could it be that well-behaved Thurstonian-type models are true models of discrimination but their parameters are so adjusted that the violations of Regular Minimality they lead to (due to my 2003 theorems) are too small to be detected experimentally? This is possible, but this amounts to admitting that Regular Minimality is a law after all, albeit only approximate: nothing in the logic of the Thurstonian-type representations per se prevents them from violating Regular Minimality grossly rather than slightly. Moreover, even very small violations predicted by a given class of Thurstonian-type models can be tested in specially designed experiments (perhaps under additional, independently testable assumptions). The results of one such experiment, in which observers were asked to alternately adjust to each other the values of stimuli in two observation areas, indicate that violations of Regular Minimality, if any, are far below limits of plausible interpretability.     

Finding evidence of dispositional coping

Data from college students and their parents were used in this longitudinal investigation, the primary goal of which was to examine the conditions under which coping style and coping behaviors are related. Participants completed a dispositional coping measure and reported on their coping with the most stressful event of the week for six weeks. Reports about the participants’ dispositional coping were also collected from the participants’ parents. Findings were consistent with the expectation that style would be a fairly weak predictor of coping in a given encounter but would predict more strongly aggregated coping responses across encounters. Additionally, parents tended to agree with each other about their child’s coping style, but the correlations between child and parental reports were generally small and nonsignificant.