Waiting for the bus: when base-rates refuse to be neglected

The paper reports the results from 16 versions of a simple probability estimation task, where probability estimates derived from base-rate information have to be modified by case knowledge. In the bus problem [adapted from Falk, R., Lipson, A., & Konold, C. (1994). The ups and downs of the hope function in a fruitless search. In G. Wright & P. Ayton (Eds.), Subjective probability (pp. 353-377). Chichester, UK: Wiley], a passenger waits for a bus that departs before schedule in 10% of the cases, and is more than 10 min delayed in another 10%. What are Fred's chances of catching the bus on a day when he arrives on time and waits for 10 min? Most respondents think his probability is 10%, or 90%, instead of 50%, which is the correct answer. The experiments demonstrate the difficulties people have in replacing the original three-category 1/8/1 partitioning with a normalized, binary partitioning, where the middle category is discarded. In contrast with typical studies of "base-rate neglect", or under-weighing of base-rates, this task demonstrates a reversed base-rate fallacy, where frequentistic information is overextended and case information ignored. Possible explanations for this robust phenomenon are briefly discussed.     

Stochastic matching and the voluntary nature of choice

Attempts to characterize voluntary behavior have been ongoing for thousands of years. We provide experimental evidence that judgments of volition are based upon distributions of responses in relation to obtained rewards. Participants watched as responses, said to be made by "actors," appeared on a computer screen. The participant's task was to estimate how well each actor represented the voluntary choices emitted by a real person. In actuality, all actors' responses were generated by algorithms based on Baum's (1979) generalized matching function. We systematically varied the exponent values (sensitivity parameter) of these algorithms: some actors matched response proportions to received reinforcer proportions, others overmatched (predominantly chose the highest-valued alternative), and yet others undermatched (chose relatively equally among the alternatives). In each of five experiments, we found that the matchingactor's responses were judged most closely to approximate voluntary choice. We found also that judgments of high volition depended upon stochastic (or probabilistic) generation. Thus, stochastic responses that match reinforcer proportions best represent voluntary human choice.     

Coping After Bone Marrow Transplantation: The Predictive Roles of Optimism and Dispositional Coping

Bone marrow transplantation (BMT) is an invasive and taxing treatment for certain cancers. This study investigated the psychological constructs of optimism and dispositional coping and their relative predictive role for situational coping. Participants were 85 cancer patients enrolled in a randomized clinical trial of T-cell depletion for prevention of graft-versus-host disease (GVHD) who completed baseline and 1-year interviews. Results of simultaneous regression analyses showed that optimism did not predict situational instrumental or palliative coping strategies but was negatively predictive of situational avoidant coping. Each of the three situational coping strategies was most strongly predicted by the corresponding dispositional coping strategy. This research was sponsored by the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute: N01-HB-47095, N01-HB-47097, N01-HB-47094 and N01-HB-47098.     

The Psychometric Properties of Dispositional Flow Scale-2 in Internet Gaming

This study examined the psychometric properties of the Dispositional Flow Scale-2 (DFS-2; Jackson and Eklund in Journal of Sports and Exercise Psychology, 24:133-150, 2002). One thousand five hundred and seventy-eight secondary school students (One thousand and seventy four males, four hundred and eleven females, ninety-three missing) from six schools in Singapore completed the questionnaires. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to evaluate the factorial structure of the DFS-2. A nine-first-order factor model was compared to a higher order model with a global flow factor. Support was found for the higher order factor. Multigroup analysis demonstrated invariance of the factor forms, factor loadings, factor variances, and factor covariances across age and sex. The DFS-2 subscales were found to have acceptable reliability estimates, and convergent validity. We conclude that DFS-2 is a valid instrument for assessing global flow experience in Internet gaming.     

Exploring children’s face-space: A multidimensional scaling analysis of the mental representation of facial identity

We explored differences in the mental representation of facial identity between 8-year-olds and adults. The 8-year-olds and adults made similarity judgments of a homogeneous set of faces (individual hair cues removed) using an “odd-man-out” paradigm. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) analyses were performed to represent perceived similarity of faces in a multidimensional space. Five dimensions accounted optimally for the judgments of both children and adults, with similar local clustering of faces. However, the fit of the MDS solutions was better for adults, in part because children’s responses were more variable. More children relied predominantly on a single dimension, namely eye color, whereas adults appeared to use multiple dimensions for each judgment. The pattern of findings suggests that children’s mental representation of faces has a structure similar to that of adults but that children’s judgments are influenced less consistently by that overall structure.     

Framing of comparisons in research and practice

We discuss important ways in which the framing of a question or a decision can have significant effects on responses. Several areas of research and theory that indicate the scope and importance of these effects are presented. The major discussion, however, is limited to how respnses to comparative judgments and constrained by the other or sequence in which the direction of comparison occurs. Direction of comparison is first discussed with respect to similarity judgments, in which a model taking direction of comparison into account is used to explain both degrees of perceived similarity and asymmetries in judgment. A feature-matching model of comparison is then developed and is used to analyze preference judgments, judgments of change, and self-relevant judgments involving comparisons of the self with other people, with counterfactual alternatives to reality, and with the self at a different point in time. This model is employed to account for predecisional conflict and difficulty, the preference that one makes, and the degree of satisfaction or regret that one feels subsequent to making a comparison. Finally, the potential for applying this framework to areas of consumer behavior, political decision making, and psychotherapy is explored. Techniques for taking advantage of direction of comparison effects as well as methods for eliminating the biases associated with these effects are discussed.     

Does expertise and thinking mode matter for accuracy in judgments of job applicants’ cognitive ability?

The present research examined the role of thinking mode for accuracy in recruiters and laypeople’s judgments of applicants’ cognitive ability. In Study 1, students who relied on their intuition were somewhat less accurate. In Study 2, an experimental manipulation of thinking mode (intuitive vs analytical) revealed no apparent differences in accuracy. Moreover, there were no differences in accuracy or agreement between recruiters and laypeople. Examination of the use of specific resume content suggested that intuitive thinking corresponds to basing one’s judgments more on the way that applicants present themselves in their personal letter and less on diagnostic biographical information such as SAT scores. The findings point to the possibility that professional recruiters may not possess intuitive expertise in this context.     

Who Is to Blame? Children's and Adults' Moral Judgments Regarding Victim and Transgressor Negligence

Research has documented that individuals consider outcomes, intentions, and transgressor negligence when making morally relevant judgments (Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Engelhardt, 2017). However, less is known about whether individuals attend to both victim and transgressor negligence in their evaluations. The current study measured 3- to 6-year-olds (N = 70), 7- to 12-year-olds (N = 54), and adults' (N = 97, ages 18–25 years) moral judgments about scenarios in which an accidental transgression occurred involving property damage or physical harm. Participants were either assigned to conditions where the victim or the transgressor was negligent. Results revealed attention to negligence among all participants across a range of different moral judgment measures (including acceptability judgments, punishment judgments, and attributions of blame), with age-related increases in attention to negligence evident. Results provide novel evidence that children and adults consider not just outcomes and intentions, but also the role of negligence in both victims and transgressors, when making social decisions.     

意图信息在物权判断和道德判断中的作用

意图会影响人们的道德判断,但尚不清楚意图在物权判断中的作用。本研究以266名非法学专业的大学生为被试,通过包含不同意图（恶意/善意/无意）的故事情境,考察了在损失求偿和获益分享情境中人们的物权判断和道德判断。结果发现,在损失求偿情境中,不管是出于善意、恶意还是无意,被试均判断行为者应当赔偿他人损失,但不认为无意的行为者应受谴责。在获益分享情境中,被试认为善意的行为者应分享给他人带来的收益且应受赞扬,但恶意的行为者不应分享收益和受赞扬。综合来看,物权判断比道德判断较少受意图信息的影响,反映人们的物权判断具有领域特异性。     

Retrieval-induced forgetting of negative stimuli: The role of emotional intensity

Repeatedly retrieving a subset of previously studied items can cause forgetting of related non-retrieved material. We examined whether such retrieval-induced forgetting holds also for negative material. Participants studied neutral and negative stimuli and then repeatedly retrieved a subset of the neutral material. Later, a recall test was conducted in which participants were asked to recall all previously studied items. On average, retrieval practice on the neutral items caused the same amount of forgetting for neutral and negative items, indicating that the emotionality of material does not affect retrieval-induced forgetting. More detailed analysis, however, revealed that the forgetting of negative items decreased with both the emotional intensity of a negative item and the dispositional negative affectivity of a participant. The decreases in retrieval-induced forgetting may have been driven by item-specific processing of material, which is known to be enhanced for highly negative stimuli and participants high in dispositional negative affectivity and to reduce or even eliminate retrieval-induced forgetting.