Fluency and positivity as possible causes of the truth effect

Statements’ rated truth increases when people encounter them repeatedly. Processing fluency is a central variable to explain this truth effect. However, people experience processing fluency positively, and these positive experiences might cause the truth effect. Three studies investigated positivity and fluency influences on the truth effect. Study 1 found correlations between elicited positive feelings and rated truth. Study 2 replicated the repetition-based truth effect, but positivity did not influence the effect. Study 3 conveyed positive and negative correlations between positivity and truth in a learning phase. We again replicated the truth effect, but positivity only influenced judgments for easy statements in the learning phase. Thus, across three studies, we found positivity effects on rated truth, but not on the repetition-based truth effect: We conclude that positivity does not explain the standard truth effect, but the role of positive experiences for truth judgments deserves further investigation.     

厌恶情绪对法律判断的影响:基于进化心理学的视角

进化心理学认为,厌恶是人类在疾病、资源缺乏等适应性压力情境下,为抵御有害物质入侵通过自然选择而形成的进化心理机制。根据进化的观点,道德厌恶是由生理厌恶进化而来。道德厌恶有利于避免违反社会规范的行为。厌恶的激活会使道德判断更加苛刻,由此提出厌恶在法律判断中的几点启示:(1)避免直觉情绪对判断的干扰;(2)保持审议厅清洁,避免外在环境引起的厌恶情绪干扰法律判断;(3)对陪审团成员进行个体意识性和厌恶敏感性测量,避免道德过度警觉的现象发生。     

Keeping the illusion of control under control: Ceilings, floors, and imperfect calibration

Prior research has claimed that people exaggerate probabilities of success by overestimating personal control in situations that are heavily or completely chance-determined. We examine whether such overestimation of control persists in situations where people do have control. Our results suggest a simple model that accounts for prior findings on illusory control as well as for situations where actual control is high: People make imperfect estimates of their level of control. By focusing on situations marked by low control, prior research has created the illusion that people generally overestimate their level of control. Across three studies, we show that when they have a great deal of control, people under-estimate it. Implications for research on perceived control and co-variation assessment are discussed.     

The predictive value of daily vs. retrospective well-being judgments in relationship stability

The present study examined the role of daily and retrospective judgments of well-being and relationship satisfaction in relationship longevity. Participating couples completed a 14-day diary report of well-being and relationship satisfaction. After the daily diary survey, they evaluated the 14-day period. Participants also rated their global relationship satisfaction at that time. Retrospective judgments of daily well-being predicted later relationship status better than daily ratings of well-being did, whereas daily ratings of relationship domain satisfaction predicted later status better than retrospective judgments of daily relationship domain satisfaction did. Furthermore, global relationship satisfaction predicted later relationship status better than daily ratings of relationship domain satisfaction did. In general, global, summary judgments had a greater predictive value of future relationship status than did specific, daily judgments. Finally, synchronicity of daily fluctuations of well-being between partners predicted later relationship status.     

The roles of dispositional rumination,inferiority feelings and gender in interpersonal rumination experiences of college students

Given that little is known about the underlying mechanisms of rumination in response to an interpersonal offense, the purpose of this research is to reveal if inferiority feelings, dispositional rumination, and gender predict rumination regarding an interpersonal offense in a college student population. A sample of 147 undergraduate students completed the Ruminative Thought Style Scale, the Inferiority Feelings Scale and the Rumination About an Interpersonal Offense scale. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis confirm that although the majority of variation in interpersonal rumination is accounted for by dispositional rumination, inferiority feelings still explain a significant amount of variation in interpersonal rumination. Additional analysis demonstrates that dispositional rumination has a partial mediator role between inferiority feelings and interpersonal rumination, which indicates that feelings of inferiority make individuals more prone to dispositional rumination, which in turn, increases their tendency to ruminate following an interpersonal offense.     

Direct and indirect freedom in addiction: Folk free will and blame judgments are sensitive to the choice history of drug users

People view addiction as a source of diminished free will and moral responsibility. Yet, people are also sensitive to the personal histories of moral actors, including, perhaps, the way by which people became addicted. Across two studies (N = 806), we compare people’s moral intuitions about cases in which the actor becomes addicted by force or by choice. We find that perceptions of reduced free will partially mediate an association between choice (vs. no choice) in addiction and moral blame for a bad act (Study 1). We replicate this pattern and show that blame judgments are stronger when the bad act is related (vs. unrelated) to obtaining the addictive substance (Study 2). Our work is novel in demonstrating that lay people evince relatively nuanced intuitions about the role of free will in addiction and morality—they track direct and indirect paths to choices when making free will and blame judgments.     

The proportion heuristic: problem set size as a basis for performance judgments

How do people evaluate their degree of mastery over a task? A series of four studies demonstrated that a potentially irrelevant cue can have a strong influence on such evaluations. In these studies, the total amount of work given to participants (the problem set size) influenced both (a) the amount of work participants completed before feeling that they had performed well and were adequately prepared for a related future task, and (b) participants' assessments of their performance and their feelings of preparedness for a related future task. These effects occurred even when a randomization procedure was used to emphasize the arbitrary nature of the problem set size. The effects vanished, however, when participants were given extra time to evaluate their progress after completing each problem. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Implicit action encoding influences personal-trait judgments

When an observed action (e.g., kicking) is compatible to a to be produced action (e.g., a foot-key response as compared to a finger-key response), then the self-produced action is more fluent, that is, it is more accurate and faster. A series of experiments explore the notion that vision-action compatibility effects can influence personal-trait judgments. It is demonstrated that when an observed individual carries out an action that is compatible with the participants' response, (1) this individual is identified more fluently, and (2) the observed individual's personality is attributed with the properties of the observed action. For example, if it is easier to identify one individual with a foot-response when he is seen kicking a ball, as compared to typing, he is perceived to be more 'sporty'. In contrast, if it is easier to identify one individual with a finger response when he is seen typing as compared to kicking a ball, he is associated with the 'academic' trait. These personal-trait judgment effects can be observed with explicit measures, where participants are asked to rate the sporty/academic nature of the person on a scale. They are also obtained when implicit measures are taken in a priming task, where participants are never explicitly asked to rate the personalities of the individuals. A control experiment rules out that these personal-trait effects are merely due to an association of motor responses (foot, finger) to individuals while identifying them, but that these effects depend on a prior manipulation of vision-action fluency.