Emotion-specific modulation of early visual perception

Exposure to fearful facial expressions enhances vision at low spatial-frequencies and impairs vision at high spatial-frequencies. This perceptual trade-off is thought to be a consequence of a fear-related activation of the magnocellular visual pathway to the amygdala. In this study we examined the generality of the effect of emotion on low-level visual perception by assessing participants' orientation sensitivity to low and high spatial-frequency targets following exposure to disgust, fear, and neutral facial expressions. The results revealed that exposure to fear and disgust expressions have opposing effects on early vision: fearful expressions enhanced low spatial-frequency vision and impaired high spatial-frequency vision, while disgust expressions, like neutral expressions, impaired low spatial-frequency vision and enhanced high spatial-frequency vision. Thus we show the effect of exposure to fear on visual perception is not a general emotional effect, but rather one that may that depend on amygdala activation, or one that may be specific to fear.     

Moral emotions and the envisaging of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing

Anger may be more responsive than disgust to mitigating circumstances in judgements of wrongdoing. We tested this hypothesis in two studies where we had participants envision circumstances that could serve to mitigate an otherwise wrongful act. In Study 1, participants provided moral judgements, and ratings of anger and disgust, to a number of transgressions involving either harm or bodily purity. They were then asked to imagine and report whether there might be any circumstances that would make it all right to perform the act. Across transgression type, and controlling for covariance between anger and disgust, levels of anger were found to negatively predict the envisioning of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing, while disgust was unrelated. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings to less serious transgressions, using a continuous measure of mitigating circumstances, and demonstrated the impact of anger independent of deontological commitments. These findings highlight the differential relationship that anger and disgust have with the ability to envision mitigating factors.     

Nine- and twelve-month-old infants relate emotions to people's actions

Under investigation was whether 9- to 12-month-olds appreciate that a person's expression of pleasure when gazing toward an object is consistent with that person's subsequent handling of the object. Infants were randomly assigned to an experimental and control group. In the experimental group infants during the pretrials saw a Happy or an Unhappy person saying either “Oh I like objects” or, “I don't like objects”, respectively, while looking at an abstract object. In the habituation phase, infants saw an actor holding the abstract object, but the emotional expression of the actor was obscured. In the posttrial, infants were alternately presented with either the Happy or the Unhappy actor holding the object. In the control group, infants received the same three phase procedure, except that no object was present during the pre- and habituation trials. Analyses comparing the between-subjects variables revealed that infants in the Experimental group looked significantly longer at the Unhappy actor than infants in the Control group but less long at the Happy actor. This study is the first to compare positive and negative emotions and to show that infants as young as 9 months use these emotions to make inferences about people's subsequent actions on objects.     

Emotions in sexual morality: Testing the separate elicitors of anger and disgust

Recent work suggests that negative moral judgements of sexual activities are informed by disgust and anger. A correlational study (N=62) and an experiment (N=176) examined the specific antecedents that elicit these distinct, though correlated, moral emotions. Participants in Study 1 rated their emotional reactions to, and judgements of, 10 sexual scenarios. Across scenarios, judgements of abnormality predicted disgust independent of anger, and judgements of harm/rights violation predicted anger independent of disgust. Study 2 replicated these results in an experimental design. Participants rated their emotions and judgements in response to behaviours that varied in degree of potential sexual morality violation (non-sexual, heterosexual, homosexual) and rights violation (no harm, indirect harm, direct harm). Judgement of rights violation mediated the effects of harm on anger. Judgements of abnormality, but not other antecedents proposed to elicit moral disgust, mediated the effects of sexual immorality on disgust.     

Social neuroscience evidence for dehumanised perception

Dehumanisation describes perceiving a person as nonhuman in some ways, such as lacking a mind. Social psychology is beginning to understand cognitive and affective causes and mechanisms—the psychological how and why of dehumanisation. Social neuroscience research also can inform these questions. After background on social neural networks and on past dehumanisation research, the article contrasts (a) research on fully humanised person perception, reviewing studies on affective and cognitive factors, specifically mentalising (considering another's mind), with (b) dehumanised perception, proposing neural systems potentially involved. Finally, the conclusion suggests limitations of social neuroscience, future research directions, and real-world consequences of this all-too-human phenomenon.     

Exposed intestines and contaminated cooks: Sex,stress, & satiation predict disgust sensitivity

An evolutionary perspective predicts that the intensity of the disgust response should depend on the ancestral costs and benefits of coming into contact with disease vectors. Previous research advanced the compensatory behavioral prophylaxis hypothesis: progesterone-induced immunosuppression should be accompanied by increased disgust and contaminant-avoidance. However, extant data do not address whether factors other than progesterone-induced immunosuppression also trigger heightened disgust. The current study delineates two competing prophylaxis hypotheses and adjudicates between them by testing whether stress and satiation, which shift the costs and benefits of prophylactic behavior but are unrelated to progesterone-induced immunosuppression, predict disgust sensitivity. Results revealed a sex–stress–satiation interaction in predicting Disgust Scale-Revised (DS-R) scores. This study provides evidence of a broader system of compensatory prophylaxis, illuminates the functional basis of facultative shifts in disgust, and presents conceptual and statistical analyses for more cleanly cleaving the psychology of disgust at its natural joints.     

A dirty animal is a scary animal! Effects of disgust-related information on fear beliefs in children

The present study investigated whether disgust-valenced information has an impact on children's fear beliefs about animals. Non-clinical children aged between 9 and 13 years (n=159) were presented with disgust-related and cleanliness-related information about unknown animals (Australian marsupials). Before and after information, beliefs of disgust and fear regarding the animals were assessed. Results showed that disgust-related information not only induced higher levels of disgust but also increased children's fear beliefs in relation to these animals. The other way around, cleanliness-related information decreased levels of disgust and resulted in lower levels of fear. The implications for the role of disgust in the development of animal fear are briefly discussed.     

Sex differences and sex similarities in disgust sensitivity

Across two studies, we test for sex differences in the factor structure, factor loadings, concurrent validity, and means of the Three Domain Disgust Scale. In Study 1, we find that the Three Domain Disgust Scale has indistinguishable factor structure and factor loadings for men and women. In Study 2, we find a small sex difference in sensitivity to pathogen and moral disgust and a large sex difference in sensitivity to sexual disgust, with women more sensitive to disgust across domains. However, correlations between Three Domain Disgust Scale factors and the five factors and 30 facets of the NEO Personality Inventory were indistinguishable between the sexes. These findings suggest that, despite mean sex differences in disgust sensitivity, the Three Domain Disgust Scale measures similar constructs in men and women. Implications for understanding the constructs measured by the Three Domain Disgust Scale are discussed.     

Conservative protestants and engagement with sexual minorities living with HIV: the role of disgust and recategorizing contact

Conservative Protestants in the United States have historically distanced themselves from gay men, lesbians, and transgender persons living with HIV based largely on fears of moral contamination which are propagated by disgust. We argue how disgust can implicitly reify social divides that engender condemnation and subjugation. However, we will propose that it is achievable to safeguard the traditional tenets of sexuality and gender among conservative Protestants and actively oppose misapplications of those tenets to exclude persons living with HIV. We will support our thesis by describing the work of a medical clinic founded on conservative Protestant ideology that serves hijras and kotis living with HIV in India. We will introduce how applications of recategorizing contact, cognitive consistency, and cultural scaffolding are formative in maintaining one’s ideological integrity without enacting exclusion based on fear and disgust.     

Norms with feeling: towards a psychological account of moral judgment

There is a large tradition of work in moral psychology that explores the capacity for moral judgment by focusing on the basic capacity to distinguish moral violations (e.g. hitting another person) from conventional violations (e.g. playing with your food). However, only recently have there been attempts to characterize the cognitive mechanisms underlying moral judgment (e.g. Cognition 57 (1995) 1; Ethics 103 (1993) 337). Recent evidence indicates that affect plays a crucial role in mediating the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction. However, the prevailing account of the role of affect in moral judgment is problematic. This paper argues that the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction depends on both a body of information about which actions are prohibited (a Normative Theory) and an affective mechanism. This account leads to the prediction that other normative prohibitions that are connected to an affective mechanism might be treated as non-conventional. An experiment is presented that indicates that "disgust" violations (e.g. spitting at the table), are distinguished from conventional violations along the same dimensions as moral violations.