Missed Opportunities: Speculation on What Japanese Psychology Could Have Been

Takasuna (Integr. Physiol. Behav. Sci. 41, 2007) mentioned the ease with which evolutionary theory was accepted by Japanese psychologists, and certainly this is admirable. He also mentioned the stubborn force which had to be used to gain an understanding of the (thoroughly Western) subjective–objective distinction. Alas, during the formative years of Japanese psychology, there was much philosophical work afoot attempting to destroy that distinction. It is speculated that only a small change of which books were translated, or with which Americans early Japanese psychologists trained under, would have made Japan into a haven for these still underdog theories.     

How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?

Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. In this paper I attempt to understand how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical realism. I do this by going through several distinct (though often related) arguments from disagreement, carefully distinguishing between them, and critically evaluating their merits. My conclusions are rather skeptical: Some of the arguments I discuss fail rather clearly. Others supply with a challenge to realism, but not one we have any reason to believe realism cannot address successfully. Others beg the question against the moral realist, and yet others raise serious objections to realism, but ones that—when carefully stated—can be seen not to be essentially related to moral disagreement. Arguments based on moral disagreement itself have almost no weight, I conclude, against moral realism.

Models and fictions in science

Non-actual model systems discussed in scientific theories are compared to fictions in literature. This comparison may help with the understanding of similarity relations between models and real-world target systems. The ontological problems surrounding fictions in science may be particularly difficult, however. A comparison is also made to ontological problems that arise in the philosophy of mathematics.

Perilous thoughts: comment on van Fraassen

Bas van Fraassen’s empiricist reading of Perrin’s achievement invites the question: whose doubts about atoms did Perrin put to rest? This comment recontextualizes the argument and applies the notion of empirical grounding to some contemporary work in behavioral biology.     

Against digital ontology

The paper argues that digital ontology (the ultimate nature of reality is digital, and the universe is a computational system equivalent to a Turing Machine) should be carefully distinguished from informational ontology (the ultimate nature of reality is structural), in order to abandon the former and retain only the latter as a promising line of research. Digital vs. analogue is a Boolean dichotomy typical of our computational paradigm, but digital and analogue are only “modes of presentation” of Being (to paraphrase Kant), that is, ways in which reality is experienced or conceptualised by an epistemic agent at a given level of abstraction. A preferable alternative is provided by an informational approach to structural realism, according to which knowledge of the world is knowledge of its structures. The most reasonable ontological commitment turns out to be in favour of an interpretation of reality as the totality of structures dynamically interacting with each other. The paper is the first part (the pars destruens) of a two-part piece of research. The pars construens, entitled “A Defence of Informational Structural Realism”, is developed in a separate article, also published in this journal.     

威胁相关面孔表情对眼睛注视方向知觉的影响

以往研究发现眼睛注视方向知觉受面孔表情的影响,愤怒面孔相较于恐惧面孔更倾向被判断为看着观察者。虽然研究者对此提出了不同的解释,但目前尚不清楚愤怒和恐惧表情在注视方向知觉中的这种差异影响到底来自于面孔的结构信息还是物理特征信息。本研究采用注视方向辨别任务,计算直视知觉范围（The Cone of Direct Gaze,CoDG）为因变量,分别以直立,倒置及模糊图片为实验材料,试图通过分离面孔结构信息和物理特征信息,对以上问题进行探讨。结果发现在保留面孔全部信息的情况下（实验1）愤怒面孔的CoDG大于恐惧面孔;在破坏结构信息加工,只保留特征信息加工的情况下（实验2））愤怒和恐惧表情在直视知觉范围上的差异消失了;在削弱物理特征信息加工,保留结构信息加工的情况下（实验3）二者在CoDG上的差异又复现。本研究结果说明不同威胁性面孔表情对眼睛注视知觉的影响主要来自于二者在与情绪意义相关的结构信息加工上的不同,而二者非低级的物理信息上的差异,支持信号共享假说和情绪评价假说对威胁性面孔表情与注视方向整合加工解释的理论基础。     

Differential reactions of men and women to realism,physical damage,and emotionality in violent films

Community college students rated brief segments of violence from films selected to represent a variety of approaches to the depiction of violence. Men and women differed substantially on these sequences, men seeing them as more enjoyable, amusing, realistic, and emotional. Men also showed less inclination to restrict showing of such sequences to children, on television, or by X-rating. While no sex differences appeared in ratings of suffering or overall appraisals of violence, women' enjoyment ratings declined precipitously for the films rated as depicting more suffering, while those of men did not. However, both men and women saw more violence in sequences emphasizing suffering of characters, even when this ran counter to actual physical damage depicted. For men, enjoyment of these violent media excerpts and self-reports of recent physical violence were essentially unrelated, while women showed highly significant positive relations for the two variables. These findings suggest that the dynamics of violence for men and women may be different enough to make differential analysis by sex an especially productive research tactic.     

Putting Religion Back Into Religious Ethics

This essay on Richard Miller’s Friends and Other Strangers (2016) locates its arguments in the context of how the practice of religious ethics bears upon debates about normativity in the study of religion and the cultural turn in the humanities. After reviewing its main claims about identity and otherness, I focus on three areas. First, while commending Miller’s effort to analogize virtuous empathy with Augustine’s ethics of rightly ordered love, I raise questions about his use of Augustine and his distinctive formulation of Augustinian “iconic realism.” Second, I suggest his discussion of public reason is at odds with the dialogical spirit of the book and may distract from the democratic solidarity required by our political moment. Third, more briefly, I highlight the practical implications of Miller’s vision for higher education at both the graduate and undergraduate level.     

METHODOLOGY IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION: A REPLY TO CRITICS

Debates about methodology have been central to the emergence of the “field of science of religion.” Two questions that have motivated scholars in that field over the past half century: “is it theoretically justifiable to bring scientific and religious beliefs into dialogue?” and “can theology be rational in the same way as science?” This article responds to commentary on Against Methodology: Recent Debates on Rationality and Theology, a book which critically examines three major methodologists of recent years: Nancey Murphy, Alister McGrath, and J. Wentzel van Huyssteen. Themes raised in the commentary include the status of realism and truth in science, the unity of science, the adequacy of the term “critical realism,” proper ways of seeking legitimacy for an academic discipline, and new directions for the field of science and religion.     

Depressive realism and clinical depression

Depressive realism suggests that depressed individuals make more accurate judgments of control than their nondepressed counterparts. However, most studies demonstrating this phenomenon were conducted in nonclinical samples. In this study, psychiatric patients who met criteria for major depressive disorder underestimated control in a contingent situation and were consistently more negative in their judgments than were nondepressed controls. Depressed patients were less likely than their nondepressed counterparts to overestimate control in a noncontingent situation, but largely because they perceived receiving less reinforcement. Depressed patients were no more likely to use the appropriate logical heuristic to generate their judgments of control than their nondepressed counterparts and each appeared to rely on different primitive heuristics. Depressed patients were consistently more negative than their nondepressed counterparts and when they did appear to be more “accurate” in their judgments of control (as in the noncontingent situation) it was largely because they applied the wrong heuristic to less accurate information. These findings do not support the notion of depressive realism and suggest that depressed patients distort their judgments in a characteristically negative fashion.