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211.
Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism, and explain why this intuitive case is not undermined by the possibility of such hallucinations. Specifically, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism as arguing that the only way to make sense of the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences is by means of a naïve realist ontology. I then explain why this intuitive argument is not undermined by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences that possess the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences but, being hallucinations, do not have the ontological nature specified by naïve realism.  相似文献   
212.
    
According to a common philosophical intuition, the deep nature of things is hidden from us, and the world as we know it through perception and science is, just like a dream, shadows, or a computer simulation, somehow shallow and lacking in reality. This “intuition of unreality” clashes with a strong, but perhaps more naive, intuition to the effect that the world as we know it seems perfectly real. Shadows, dreams, or informational structures appear too unreal to be identical to the world as we know it! This clash between the two intuitions forms the basis of the “problem of reality.” In the late nineteenth century psychiatrists encountered patients they referred to as “metaphysician doubters” who constantly questioned the reality of the world. This essay draws on studies of these patients in order to reject, and indeed diagnose, the intuition of unreality and recent metaphysical doctrines drawing on it, such as structuralism, digitalism, and virtual realism.  相似文献   
213.
    
Realistic visualizations have been found to enhance the learning of object shapes, but regarding the learning of processes, the effects of realism are largely unclear. Previous findings indicate that realism can induce a higher level of extraneous cognitive load compared with schematics and that details are attention-consuming. The present experiment was conducted to assess the effects of realism on learning about a process with combinations of texts and pictures. It was hypothesized that realism would be a hindrance in engaging with texts due to the potential for distraction exerted by details. Students either learned with a schematic or a realistic version of a life-cycle diagram accompanied by texts. Realism increased participants' extraneous cognitive load, while there were no significant differences regarding retention performance. The results confirm previous results that realism can increase subjective extraneous cognitive load, but highlight that realism may not prevent learners from understanding textual information.  相似文献   
214.
    
This article provides a semantic reading of Tracy Llanera's brilliant book Richard Rorty: Outgrowing Modern Nihilism. Llanera is reframing the debate of how to react to the malaise of modern nihilism by proposing a change of metaphor: instead of trying to “overcome” nihilism, we should try to “outgrow” nihilism. This article invites Llanera to shed more light on her project with respect to the semantic categories of realism and representationalism, and with respect to the growing field of conceptual engineering. Can Llanera's project be fruitfully understood as engineering the concepts of “transcendence” and “redemption”? How much of the project hangs on the idea that language does not represent but is rather a tool that helps us fulfill our varying needs? How neat is the entanglement of semantic and existential meaning?  相似文献   
215.
    
This paper examines the early aesthetic writings of Joseph Margolis from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s in order to argue for the relevance of these works in understanding Margolis’s later, more well-known views in the philosophy of art. Specifically, the paper addresses Margolis’s early essays on the definition and ontology of art and aesthetic perception. These essays not only show Margolis engaged in the most significant debates in mid-century analytic aesthetics but also provide important indications of the limitations of that approach to thinking about the arts that informs the development of Margolis’s later cultural realism.  相似文献   
216.
    
ABSTRACT

This paper addresses a central positive claim in Matti Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts: that a certain kind of metaphysically ambitious realist about normativity – the ardent realist – is committed to the metasemantic idea that the distinctive inferential role of normative concepts suffices to fix the extension of those concepts. I argue first that commitment to this sort of inferential role metasemantic view does nothing to secure ardent realism. I then show how the ardent realist can address Eklund’s leading challenge without appeal to distinctively metasemantic commitments.  相似文献   
217.
This paper aims to reveal the source of the dispute between naive realism and intentionalism. To accomplish this task, it examines Adam Pautz’s challenge to naive realism, according to which a naive intuition about visual phenomenology, which is the only workable case for naive realism, is problematic. It argues that naive realists can address the challenge from Pautz by rejecting his assumption that naive realists and intentionalists agree on the nominal definition of visual phenomenology. The paper then argues that the reason naive realists want to preserve the naive intuition is its irresistibility rather than its reliability. Given this, it concludes that the disagreement between naive realism and intentionalism is rooted in what philosophical projects they tackle. Naive realists are engaged in the philosophical project of delineating a coherent view of the actual world in which the irresistible naive intuition can be true; the intentionalist philosophical project differs from it.  相似文献   
218.
    
John J. Tilley 《Theoria》2020,86(3):293-308
A familiar claim, meant as a challenge to moral knowledge, is that we can credibly accept putative moral facts just in case they explain natural facts. This article critically addresses Elizabeth Tropman's response to a version of that claim. Her response has interest partly because it falls within, and extends, an influential philosophical tradition – that of trying to expose (some) sceptical challenges as spurious or ill-conceived. Also, Tropman's target is not just any version of the claim just mentioned. It is Gilbert Harman's classic version, according to which putative moral facts must earn credibility by explaining the formation of moral beliefs. This version has wide influence, and variations of it are possible in many areas. Tropman's response is thus well worth attention.  相似文献   
219.
ABSTRACT

Commentators have generally seen the compassionate person as a second-rate character vis-à-vis the ascetic ‘saint’ who denies the will-to-life and resigns from willing altogether in Schopenhauer's ethical thought. In this paper I offer another way to interpret Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, which is textually grounded and genuinely Schopenhauerian, but which draws out similarities to Kant’s ethics that, I shall argue, have not been hitherto appreciated. Once these Kantian similarities are appreciated one sees that the compassionate person is no longer a runner up ethically and epistemically to the saint, rather, the compassionate person and the saint are at odds with each other, and really represent – unbeknownst to Schopenhauer himself–two distinct and incompatible ethical ideals.

To motivate this interpretation, I will first delineate the traditional interpretation of what Schopenhauer means by the compassionate person’s intuitive insight into the way the world really is. Second, I will offer a novel, and to my mind, textually preferable reading of what this intuitive insight consists in. Finally, I’ll suggest in light of recent work in metaethics by Colin Marshall – notably in his 2018 book titled Compassionate Moral Realism–that my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s ethics offers a creditable moral realist option for the contemporary landscape.  相似文献   
220.
Theories of autobiographical memory have emphasised effortful generative retrieval, but recent research indicates that subjectively effortless direct retrieval is common. We compared the processes of direct and generative retrieval. Sixty-five participants retrieved 24 autobiographical memories across three cue types: concrete, emotional, and personal. We recorded retrieval latency, and participants judged direct versus generative retrieval and rated memory specificity, vividness, significance, rehearsal, and emotionality. Overall, direct retrieval was common, especially for personal cues. Directly retrieved memories were recalled faster, were less likely to be specific, and were rated more significant, rehearsed, and emotional than generatively retrieved memories. The speed of both direct and generative retrieval varied similarly according to cue type, suggesting they did not involve fundamentally different cognitive processes. These findings challenge theories that assume direct retrieval bypasses constructive processes. Instead we suggest that both direct and generative retrieval involve construction that is similarly affected by cue concreteness and relevance.  相似文献   
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