Searching for the Self: Early Phenomenological Accounts of Self-Consciousness from Lotze to Scheler

Abstract

Phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness are often said to combine two elements by means of a necessary connection: the primitive and irreducible subjective character of experiences and the idealist transcendental constitution of consciousness. In what follows I argue that this connection is not necessary in order for an account of self-consciousness to be phenomenological, as shown by early phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness – particularly in Munich phenomenology. First of all, I show that the account of self-consciousness defended by these phenomenologists was not influenced as much by Husserl as by two important figures in the prehistory of phenomenology: their teacher Theodor Lipps, and – indirectly, through Lipps’ influence – Hermann Lotze. Second, I show that their account of self-consciousness takes the metaphysical realism underlying Lotze’s and Lipps’ views on the distinction between feeling and sensations seriously. I argue that this distinction played a central role in the development of many early phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness.     

Learning to say goodbye. An essay on Philip Pullman's The Amber Spyglass Volume 3 of His Dark Materials

This paper discusses the third volume of Pullman's remarkable trilogy. The two main child characters, Lyra and Will, are now entering adolescence, and the novel explores their intense and ambivalent feelings towards the parents and the variously protective or hostile parental figures who surround them. The novel devises remarkable imaginary worlds – for example the land of the mulefa, and the underworld visited by Will and Lyra – through which to explore issues of considerable intellectual and emotional depth. The ‘realism’ to which Pullman is committed is apparent in the conclusion of the book, where the two child characters, who have fallen in love with one another, have to accept the necessity of separation.     

An investigation of the generalizability and dependability of Direct Behavior Rating Single Item Scales (DBR-SIS) to measure academic engagement and disruptive behavior of middle school students

A total of 4 raters, including 2 teachers and 2 research assistants, used Direct Behavior Rating Single Item Scales (DBR-SIS) to measure the academic engagement and disruptive behavior of 7 middle school students across multiple occasions. Generalizability study results for the full model revealed modest to large magnitudes of variance associated with persons (students), occasions of measurement (day), and associated interactions. However, an unexpectedly low proportion of the variance in DBR data was attributable to the facet of rater, as well as a negligible variance component for the facet of rating occasion nested within day (10-min interval within a class period). Results of a reduced model and subsequent decision studies specific to individual rater and rater type (research assistant and teacher) suggested degree of reliability-like estimates differed substantially depending on rater. Overall, findings supported previous recommendations that in the absence of estimates of rater reliability and firm recommendations regarding rater training, ratings obtained from DBR-SIS, and subsequent analyses, be conducted within rater. Additionally, results suggested that when selecting a teacher rater, the person most likely to substantially interact with target students during the specified observation period may be the best choice.     

FALSIFIABILITY AND TRACTION IN THEORIES OF DIVINE ACTION

One of the most focused research programs in the science‐religion dialogue that has taken place up to the present is the series of volumes published jointly by the Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences. Originating with the encouragement of Pope John Paul II, this series has produced seven volumes focusing on how divine action can be understood in light of contemporary science. A retrospective volume published in 2008, Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action: Twenty Years of Challenge and Progress, contains articles reviewing the series as a whole. In this article I analyze the series as a whole as well as some of the pivotal problems discussed throughout the series, such as the zero‐sum game, scientific “traction,” falsifiability in theories of divine action, and locating special divine action in the physical world.     

Sinnott-Armstrong,Walter, ed., Moral Psychology,Volume 3. The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion,Brain Disorders,and Development,Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008, pp. xix + 569, US $30 (paperback)

Many take the claim that you cannot ‘get’ an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ to imply that non-moral beliefs are by themselves incapable of justifying moral beliefs. I argue that this is a mistake and that the position that moral beliefs are justified exclusively by non-moral beliefs—a view that I call moral inferentialism—presents an attractive non-sceptical moral epistemology.     

Nietzsche on creating and discovering values

ABSTRACT

This article considers Friedrich Nietzsche’s claims about value creation alongside his proclamation that ‘nature is always value-less’ (GS 301), assessing their implications for his metaethics. It begins by weighing the evidence for a recent constructivist interpretation of Nietzsche’s metaethics, arguing that despite several apparent interpretive advantages, Nietzschean constructivism ultimately fails. Through a close reading of GS 301 and related passages, the constructivist interpretation is shown to be misguided in taking Nietzsche’s talk of value creation as expressing (or playing a significant role in) a metaethical view according to which the evaluative attitudes of philosophers ground what is valuable. Against this, it is argued that GS 301 should be understood as an assertion of the status of philosophers as the causal sources of new evaluative outlooks that shape the held values of their respective cultures, a claim developed through analysis of passages in which Nietzsche discusses his ideal of the ‘genuine philosopher’ and contrasts this figure with ‘critics’ or ‘philosophical laborers’ (BGE 210–211). It is next argued that, insofar as it is best understood as describing a social or anthropological phenomenon rather than a metaphysical one, GS 301 is a poor piece of evidence not only for the constructivist interpretation, but in fact for any account of Nietzsche’s metaethical position—including radical anti-realist interpretations informed by his statement that ‘nature is always value-less’. The paper then concludes by appealing to another passage, GS 55, which hints towards a very different—and plausibly realist—picture of Nietzsche’s metaethics     

Moderate structural realism about space-time

This paper sets out a moderate version of metaphysical structural realism that stands in contrast to both the epistemic structural realism of Worrall and the—radical—ontic structural realism of French and Ladyman. According to moderate structural realism, objects and relations (structure) are on the same ontological footing, with the objects being characterized only by the relations in which they stand. We show how this position fares well as regards philosophical arguments, avoiding the objections against the other two versions of structural realism. In particular, we set out how this position can be applied to space-time, providing for a convincing understanding of space-time points in the standard tensor formulation of general relativity as well as in the fibre bundle formulation.     

The methodology of genuine modal realism

David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors.     

ROCKMORE ON ANALYTIC PRAGMATISM

Abstact: This article responds critically to Tom Rockmore's essay “On Classical and Neo‐Analytic Forms of Pragmatism,” which appeared in Metaphilosophy in 2005. Rockmore charges analytic pragmatism with having a conflicted epistemology, relying on incoherent appropriations of Hegel, and maintaining an unpragmatic commitment to metaphysical realism. We rebut these charges by arguing that what Rockmore sees as conflicted in analytic pragmatist epistemology is simply fallibilism, that appropriations of Hegel needn't be as global as Rockmore claims, and that commitments to metaphysical realism need not disqualify philosophers from being pragmatists.     

Persisting problems for a quantificational theory of complex demonstratives

I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.” King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.