Epistemology without metaphysics

The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to use epistemic norms to gather the facts with which to evaluate epistemic norms; relatedly, it discusses how epistemic norms can rationally evolve. It concludes with some discussion of the impact of this view on “ground level” epistemology.

The (Old) New Realism: What Holt Has to Offer for Ecological Psychology

As Ecological Psychology pushes into new areas, success will be made easier by a rediscovery its theoretical history, in particular the “New Realism”, lead in part by E. B. Holt. Three New Realists tenants seem particularly relevant: (1) we experience reality, (2) relations are real, and (3) things are what you see when you see those things. Though the two groups differ in terms of their conception of perception, and what can be perceived, their conceptions are related in very insightful ways. Further, the comparison reemphasizes the extent of unique empirical claims ecological psychologists make, and grounds those claims within a larger framework for psychology as a whole. This makes obvious the need for further work on the mathematics of invariants, the physiological mechanisms of information extraction, and the behaviors of perception.

消极偏差还是积极缺乏:抑郁的积极心理学解释

抑郁的认知理论被认为是当代最具影响的抑郁理论之一,其中贝克抑郁理论与无望抑郁理论是两大主要的认知理论。认知理论主张消极认知偏差是导致抑郁的易感因素。然而,"抑郁现实主义"及"积极错觉"等研究却证实抑郁个体并不存在消极认知偏差。以往研究的矛盾实际上反映了当代心理学过分关注消极的病理化倾向。新兴的积极心理学则试图从全新视角解释抑郁,导致抑郁的原因不是个体身上积极因素的缺位,而是积极力量未被充分发挥。     

Über zwei Formen von Realismus in der Quantentheorie

On Two Types of Realism in Quantum Theory. Current realist approaches to the foundations of quantum theory emphasize the dichotomy between (Copenhagen) positivism and ‘beable’-realism. Recently it was even attempted to turn this picture into two (equally possible) histories in order to legitimate Bohmian Mechanics as a viable alternative. This paper argues that this dichotomy is philosophically inadequate and historically questionable by embedding it into the philosophical discussion on positivism and realism that has taken place since the 1920s. Logical Empiricists back then advocated empirical realism and contrasted it to absolutistic metaphysical realism. From this viewpoint David Bohm's ‘beable’-realism combines elements of Mach's sensualism with a pre-Kantian metaphysics. As Wesley Salmon's position shows, empirical realism can become quite pronounced without relapsing into Bohmian philosophy. Instead it arrives close to the GRWP-interpretation. Hence, when Bernard d'Espagnat binds both together as ‘ontological interpretations’, he blurs the borderline between empirical and metaphysical realism that his Veiled Reality has set out to draw, quite in concordance with Logical Empiricism. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

CRITICAL REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: RESPONSE TO ROBBINS, VAN HUYSSTEEN, AND HEFNER

Abstract. I read Robbins's essay as a hermeneutics of suspicion against the claims of critical realism, especially the tendency of critical realism to achieve correspondence with the world rather than participation in changing it. I read van Huyssteen's essay as an application of critical realism which tends toward correspondence in spite of his correct statement of the theory. I read Hefner's paper as an exposition of both claims and methods capable of conveying truth and genuine knowledge. As such, Hefner's paper illustrates an adequate application of the theory of critical realism and overcomes the suspicion suggested by Robbins.     

IAN BARBOUR ON RELIGION AND THE METHODS OF SCIENCE: AN ASSESSMENT

Abstract. Two aspects of Ian Barbour's position on the relation between religion and science are considered. First is his preference for comparing religions as a whole to scientific paradigms. It is suggested that the concept of a tradition as defined by Alasdair MacIntyre is more useful than Thomas Kuhn's paradigm. Thus, the Christian tradition could be compared to the Aristotelian or Newtonian scientific traditions. Within traditions, both religious and scientific, we find schools with enough agreement on fundamentals to be designated research programs, as defined by Imre Lakatos; here fruitful comparisons between theology and science are possible. Barbour's critical realism is intended as a compromise between highly rationalistic and sociological accounts of science. However, rationalism and sociology of science are answers to two different sets of questions rather than extremes on a spectrum of answers to the same question. Thus, there is no middle position between them, and no compromise need be found.     

威胁相关面孔表情对眼睛注视方向知觉的影响

以往研究发现眼睛注视方向知觉受面孔表情的影响,愤怒面孔相较于恐惧面孔更倾向被判断为看着观察者。虽然研究者对此提出了不同的解释,但目前尚不清楚愤怒和恐惧表情在注视方向知觉中的这种差异影响到底来自于面孔的结构信息还是物理特征信息。本研究采用注视方向辨别任务,计算直视知觉范围（The Cone of Direct Gaze,CoDG）为因变量,分别以直立,倒置及模糊图片为实验材料,试图通过分离面孔结构信息和物理特征信息,对以上问题进行探讨。结果发现在保留面孔全部信息的情况下（实验1）愤怒面孔的CoDG大于恐惧面孔;在破坏结构信息加工,只保留特征信息加工的情况下（实验2））愤怒和恐惧表情在直视知觉范围上的差异消失了;在削弱物理特征信息加工,保留结构信息加工的情况下（实验3）二者在CoDG上的差异又复现。本研究结果说明不同威胁性面孔表情对眼睛注视知觉的影响主要来自于二者在与情绪意义相关的结构信息加工上的不同,而二者非低级的物理信息上的差异,支持信号共享假说和情绪评价假说对威胁性面孔表情与注视方向整合加工解释的理论基础。     

Where is the Fundamental Disagreement Between Naive Realism and Intentionalism?

This paper aims to reveal the source of the dispute between naive realism and intentionalism. To accomplish this task, it examines Adam Pautz’s challenge to naive realism, according to which a naive intuition about visual phenomenology, which is the only workable case for naive realism, is problematic. It argues that naive realists can address the challenge from Pautz by rejecting his assumption that naive realists and intentionalists agree on the nominal definition of visual phenomenology. The paper then argues that the reason naive realists want to preserve the naive intuition is its irresistibility rather than its reliability. Given this, it concludes that the disagreement between naive realism and intentionalism is rooted in what philosophical projects they tackle. Naive realists are engaged in the philosophical project of delineating a coherent view of the actual world in which the irresistible naive intuition can be true; the intentionalist philosophical project differs from it.     

AN EASTERN ORTHODOX CRITIQUE OF THE SCIENCE–THEOLOGY DIALOGUE

On the basis of both philosophical arguments and the theological perspectives of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, a critique of two beliefs that are common within the mainstream science–theology dialogue is outlined. These relate to critical realism in understanding language usage and to naturalistic perspectives in relation to divine action. While the naturalistic perspectives on the history of the cosmos that are predominant within the dialogue are seen as generally acceptable from an Orthodox perspective, it is argued that they require theological expansion. This expansion suggests an understanding other than the “causal joint” model commonly adopted in relation to “special” divine action. This alternative model renders the distinction between “special” and “general” divine action redundant, and is based on what has been called a “teleological‐Christological” understanding of the cosmos, rooted in the fourth gospel's notion of the divine Logos. The relevance of this critique to scholars outside of the Orthodox community is urged.