Interpersonal perceptions of personality traits in elite coach-athlete dyads

IntroductionThe extent to which coaches and athletes can effectively work together is an essential consideration in the pursuit of athletic success. This is particularly important at the elite level due to the high pressures on tangible outcomes, such as reaching the podium of a major competition. This study sought to explore and explain how both coaches and athletes identify personality traits in themselves and their partners to manage and maintain a positive relationship.MethodsUsing a mixed methodological design underpinned by critical realism, four elite coach-athlete dyads (four male coaches, one male athlete, three female athletes) were purposefully recruited from a single sport. Each participant completed the 44-item Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999) on their own and their partner’s perceived personality traits. The data generated were used to inform the discussions in follow-up, individual semi-structured interviews with all participants.ResultsThe interview data were analysed using thematic analysis, which generated three higher themes and seven lower order themes. The three higher order themes were perceived compatibility, relationship persona and collective personality.ConclusionThe present investigation has identified what coaches and athletes perceive to be the key personality characteristics to manage and maintain a successful working relationship.     

Examining the dimensional structure and factorial validity of the Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory in a sample of male athletes

Objectives

Research examining how emotional intelligence (EI) relates to the performance of athletes has been conducted using various EI measures including the Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i; Bar-On, 1997), but no one has investigated the factor structure of the EQ-i in the area of sport psychology. The current study explored the dimensional structure and factorial validity of the EQ-i in a sample of male athletes.

Design

Confirmatory factor analysis was used to examine [Bar-On, 1997] and [Bar-On, 2004] model of emotional-social intelligence and the 1-5-15 dimensional structure which underpins the EQ-i.

Method

A total sample of 706 male athletes from various sports and competing at the national age group level through to the professional level of competition completed the EQ-i.

Results

Confirmatory factor analyses demonstrated that the 1-5-15 dimensional structure was a poor fit for the data. A re-specification of the model representing the best fit for the data was a 1-4-15 dimensional structure. The factorial validity of the individual subscales was also examined at the item level using confirmatory factor analysis. Thirteen of the 15 subscales showed close, reasonably good, or mediocre fit for the data.

Conclusion

Further construct validation of Bar-On’s model and measure is required. Sport psychologists administering the EQ-i in applied practice should consider using the EQ-i subscales rather than referring back to the 1-5-15 dimensional structure.     

Recent Consideration of World Government in the IR Literature: A Critical Appraisal

Because recent contributions on world government in the international relations (IR) literature have focused on relatively nebulous issues, they are of limited usefulness for illuminating whether or not an actual world government would advance the human prospect. This question cannot be sensibly addressed unless in the light of a specific institutional proposal. Along the authority-effectiveness continuum separating the relatively ineffectual existent United Nations on the one hand, and the traditional world federalist ideal of the omnipotent world state on the other, there are intermediate possibilities not subject to the respective disadvantages of the extreme endpoints of this continuum.     

Indirect measures as a signal for evaluative change

Implicit and explicit attitudes can be changed by using evaluative learning procedures. In this contribution we investigated an asymmetric effect of order of administration of indirect and direct measures on the detection of evaluative change: A change in explicit attitudes is more likely detected if they are measured after implicit attitudes, whereas these latter change regardless of the order. This effect was demonstrated in two studies (n=270; n=138) using the self-referencing task whereas it was not found in a third study (n=151) that used a supraliminal sequential evaluative conditioning paradigm. In all studies evaluative change was present only for contingency aware participants. We discuss a potential explanation underlying the order of measure effect entailing that, in some circumstances, an indirect measure is not only a measure but also a signal that can be detected through self-perception processes and further elaborated at the propositional level.     

An Ultra‐Realist Theory of Perception

In this paper I argue for a theory of perception distinct both from classical sense‐datum theories and from intentionalist theories, that is theories according to which one perceives external objects by dint of a relation with a propositional content. The alternative I propose completely rejects any representational element in perception. When one sees that an object has a property, the situation or state of affairs of its having that property is one's perception, so that the object and property are literally part of one's mind. The most obvious objection to this view is that it embodies a rampant form of idealism. It is argued to the contrary, via consideration of the metaphysics of situations, that the theory is entirely consistent with a robustly realist view of the world.     

From Conceptual Analysis to Serious Metaphysics

Abstract

Habermas’s recent work in epistemology has been marked by a decisive rejection of his earlier epistemic conception of truth in which he understood truth as ‘what may be accepted as rational under ideal conditions’. Arguing that no ‘idealization of justificatory conditions’ can do justice to both human fallibility and the unconditional nature of truth, he has attempted to develop a realistic conception of truth that severs any conceptual link between truth and justification while respecting the epistemic relevance of justification for ascertaining the truth. But realizing this second goal has proved elusive for Habermas because he veers too close to a form of metaphysical realism in his epistemology. By contrast, Hilary Putnam’s recent turn to what he calls ‘natural realism’ is more successful in articulating a form of realism that, in taking its leave of an epistemic conception of truth, still manages to keep its distance from metaphysical realism.     

The Limits of Photography

Abstract

This paper is about what counts as a photograph and what does not. One way in which this question arises stems from new technologies that keep changing our way of producing photographs, such as digital photography, which not only has now widely replaced traditional film photography but also challenges the very limits of what we count as a photograph. I shall discuss below at some length different aspects of digital photography, but also want to focus here on a new striking type of photographic camera, announced in early 2012 by Lytro, Inc., namely, the so-called ‘Light Field Camera’, which is said to represent a revolution in the photographic world. Indeed, unlike in the case of any previously available cameras, the photographs produced by a Light Field Camera can be re-focused after the photograph has been taken, which harbours many interesting consequences with regard to the resulting image and the way we interact with it. But of course, the initial question also arises in the case of traditional film photography as well as ‘traditional’ digital photography. The question amounts to asking about what the essential features of photographs are – in short, what their nature is.     

Ostrich Nominalism and Peacock Realism: A Hegelian Critique of Quine

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to offer a Hegelian critique of Quine’s predicate nominalism. I argue that at the core of Hegel’s idealism is not a supernaturalist spirit monism, but a realism about universals, and that while this may contrast to the nominalist naturalism of Quine, Hegel’s position can still be defended over that nominalism in naturalistic terms. I focus on the contrast between Hegel’s and Quine’s respective views on universals, which Quine takes to be definitive of philosophical naturalism. I argue that there is no good reason to think Quine is right to make this nominalism definitive of naturalism in this way – where in fact Hegel (along with Peirce) offers a reasonably compelling case that science itself requires some commitment to realism about universals, kinds, etc. Furthermore, even if Hegel is wrong about that, at least his case for realism is still a naturalistic one, as it is based on his views on concrete universality, which is an innovative form of in rebus realism about universals.     

In Defense of Anti‐Archimedean Moral Realism: A Response to Recent Critics

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that many putatively nonmoral metaethical theories can only be understood as being internal to the moral domain. If correct, this position, referred to as anti‐archimedeanism, has profound implications for the methodology of metaethics. This is particularly true for skeptical metaethical theories. This article defends a version of anti‐archimedeanism that is true to the spirit rather than the letter of Dworkin's original thesis from several recent objections. First, it addresses Kenneth Ehrenberg's recent attempt to demonstrate how certain metaethical theories can be understood in a morally neutral manner. It then discusses Charles Pigden's claim that Dworkin begs the question against error theorists and nihilists by assuming a conceptual space that error theorists and nihilists would reject. It concludes that the anti‐archimedean methodology originally proposed by Dworkin is defensible, and can be used to support a robust form of moral realism.