回合式教学法的有效学习：来自自闭症儿童职前教师的证据

使用异步培训技术自主学习循证教育干预方法,或可帮助自闭症儿童职前教师应对新时代自闭症儿童融合教育高质量发展带来的挑战。采用3个实验探究了自闭症儿童职前教师在3种学习材料呈现方式下对回合式教学法的自主学习效果。结果发现,学习材料呈现方式对自闭症儿童职前教师自主学习回合式教学法的效果有显著影响：“字幕+画面+声音解说”组成的视听双通道材料——真实教学视频下的学习效果最好,“文本+图像”组成的PPT材料比同属视觉单通道材料的Word文本更有优势。结果表明,无论是在知识层面的学习(实验1、2和3),还是在实操层面的忠诚度提升(实验3),学习内容以视听双通道方式呈现时,自闭症儿童职前教师的自主学习效果最好。     

时间判断的视听通道效应的实验研究

该实验用视觉或听觉两种方式一次呈现两个时距,随机地指定其中的一个时距要求被试立即再现或延迟5秒再现。实验结果表明:①对短时距信息(1秒,1.5秒,2秒)的判断,听觉比视觉具有明显的优势,听觉的再现时距较精确,延迟对听觉的时间信息检测的破坏作用较小;而对长时距信息(10秒,11秒,12秒)的判断,却未发现听觉比视觉有优势现象。②通道效应的产生机制源于记忆的特点而不是感觉储存的特点。③对短时距的判断通常表现为正时间顺序误差,而对长时距的判断则表现为负时间顺序误差。     

Modality-repetition and attentional effects on reflex blinking in infants and adults

The ability of a brief prepulse to inhibit reflexively elicited startle is a robust phenomenon in adults of several species but is weak or absent in infants. The possibility that afferent processing of the prepulse is inadequate in infants was tested by assessing the integrity of two other types of reflex modulation that occur in modality-specific paths, that is, attenuation by repetition of same-modality stimuli and enhancement by modality-selective attention. The reflex, measured by electromyographic activity of the muscle controlling blink, was elicited by intense light flashes or noise bursts preceded by brief acoustic or visual prepulses and delivered during attention-directing acoustic or visual foregrounds that evoked cardiac deceleration. Modality-repetition effects were evidenced by smaller peak blink magnitude and longer latency of blinking to same than to different modality pairs and did not differ as a function of age (4-month-old infants or college students). Attention effects were also seen in both infants and adults and, in accord with previous findings, were evident in magnitude for infants and latency for adults. Thus, immaturity in paths mediating these effects could not explain delayed development of prepulse inhibition. Other possibilities include delayed maturation of extrinsic inhibition or of transient-processing systems.     

Scheid on Punishment

I critically evaluate the notion of structure Ted Sider presents in Writing the Book of the World. A prerequisite to understanding Sider's notion of structure is understanding Sider's take on ideology and ontology. In Section II, I discuss this. In Section III, I consider arguments in favor of structure. In Section IV, I examine one debate that is considered by Sider to be nonsubstantive: the debate over modality. I conclude, in Section V, by examining the reception Writing the Book of the World has received in the philosophical community.     

Working with issues of difference in supervision of counselling

In this paper, I describe some meanings of the word ‘difference’ and connect these to aspects of the supervisory relationship, roles, tasks and process. Describing some theoretical views of the origins of the sense of difference and the significance of this for the work of the supervisor and supervisee, I suggest that, for maturational processes to take place, the development of a potential space is essential. Ideas are drawn from cross-cultural counselling, but are applied broadly to the client-counsellor-supervisor triangle of relationship, particularly the emphasis on the need to address difference and the possibility of proxy-self communication. I give examples from supervisory practice to illustrate.     

Thomas Bradwardine on God and the Foundations of Modality

Scholars have claimed that the fourteenth-century thinker Thomas Bradwardine held that God's will freely determined what was necessary, possible and impossible and in this regard, he was a medieval precursor to Descartes. In this article, I argue against this interpretation of Bradwardine. I show that Bradwardine held that objects derive their modal status based on whether God's necessary and immutable being isrepugnant or non-repugnant to their existence. I offer readings of thepassages in which Bradwardine appears to state that God's will determines modality that render them consistent with the non-voluntarist interpretation of his modal theory.     

The Red and The Real

It is often claimed that principles of individuation imply essential properties of the things individuated. For example, sets are individuated by their members, hence sets have their members essentially. But how does this inference work? First I discuss the form of such inferences, and conclude that the essentialist inference is not a purely formal matter: although there is a form which all principles of individuation have in common, it is not true that any statement of that form is a principle of individuation, and hence there is no valid inference based purely on that form. However, I argue that there is a viable version of the essentialist inference nonetheless. The resources for a proper reconstruction of this type of inference can be gathered from reflections upon the role principles of individuation play in the project of the ontologist: such principles turn out to carry a modal weight similar to that of definitions or conceptual truths. It follows that, no matter how austere the ontology, some portion of essentialist modality is inevitable.     

Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism

Entitlement is conceived as a kind of positive epistemic status, attaching to certain propositions, that involves no cognitive or intellectual accomplishment on the part of the beneficiary—a status that is in place by default. In this paper I will argue that the notion of entitlement—or something very like it—falls out of an idea that may at first blush seem rather disparate: that the evidential support relation can be understood as a kind of variably strict conditional (in the sense of Lewis 1973). Lewis provided a general recipe for deriving what he termed inner modalities from any variably strict conditional governed by a logic meeting certain constraints. On my proposal, entitlement need be nothing more exotic than the inner necessity associated with evidential support. Understanding entitlement in this way helps to answer some common concerns—in particular, the concern that entitlement could only be a pragmatic, and not genuinely epistemic, status.     

Interstimulus Intervals and Sensory Modality Modulate the Impact of a Cognitive Task on Postural Control

The present literature not only reveals the use of a wide variety of cognitive tasks but variability in their interaction with postural control. The question then arises, as to, whether postural control is sensitive to specific features of a cognitive task. The present experiment assessed the impact of cognitive tasks with interstimulus intervals (ISI) of varied duration and sensory modality on postural control in young adults. Seventeen participants (23.71 ± 1.99 years old) were instructed to stand on a force platform while concurrently performing cognitive tasks with ISIs of two and 5 s. The tasks were presented both, auditorily and visually. The visual tasks consisted of counting the total occurrence of a single digit. The auditory tasks consisted of counting the total occurrence of a single letter. Performing the cognitive tasks with an ISI of 2 s resulted only in an increase in the anteroposterior mean power frequency. Presenting the tasks visually also significantly reduced area of 95% confidence ellipse and AP and mediolateral sway variability. These results may suggest that ISIs can modify postural performance by altering the allocation of attentional focus. Also, presenting tasks using a visual sensory modality appears to yield lower postural sway.     

Essence in abundance

Fine (1994 “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16) is widely thought to have refuted the simple modal account of essence, which takes the essential properties of a thing to be those it cannot exist without exemplifying. Yet, a number of philosophers have suggested resuscitating the simple modal account by appealing to distinctions akin to the distinction Lewis (1983. “New Work For a Theory of Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377; 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell) draws between sparse and abundant properties, treating only those in the former class as candidates for essentiality. I argue that ‘sparse modalism’ succumbs to counterexamples similar to those originally posed by Fine, and fails to capture paradigmatic instances of essence involving abundant properties and relations.