Incorporating Demographic Embeddings Into Language Understanding

Meaning depends on context. This applies in obvious cases like deictics or sarcasm as well as more subtle situations like framing or persuasion. One key aspect of this is the identity of the participants in an interaction. Our interpretation of an utterance shifts based on a variety of factors, including personal history, background knowledge, and our relationship to the source. While obviously an incomplete model of individual differences, demographic factors provide a useful starting point and allow us to capture some of this variance. However, the relevance of specific demographic factors varies between situations—where age might be the key factor in one context, ideology might dominate in another. To address this challenge, we introduce a method for combining demographics and context into situated demographic embeddings—mapping representations into a continuous geometric space appropriate for the given domain, showing the resulting representations to be functional and interpretable. We further demonstrate how to make use of related external data so as to apply this approach in low‐resource situations. Finally, we show how these representations can be incorporated into improve modeling of real‐world natural language understanding tasks, improving model performance and helping with issues of data sparsity.     

Generating Relations Elicits a Relational Mindset in Children

Relational reasoning is a hallmark of human higher cognition and creativity, yet it is notoriously difficult to encourage in abstract tasks, even in adults. Generally, young children initially focus more on objects, but with age become more focused on relations. While prerequisite knowledge and cognitive resource maturation partially explains this pattern, here we propose a new facet important for children's relational reasoning development: a general orientation to relational information, or a relational mindset. We demonstrate that a relational mindset can be elicited, even in 4‐year‐old children, yielding greater than expected spontaneous attention to relations. Children either generated or listened to an experimenter state the relationships between objects in a set of formal analogy problems, and then in a second task, selected object or relational matches according to their preference. Children tended to make object mappings, but those who generated relations on the first task selected relational matches more often on the second task, signaling that relational attention is malleable even in young children.     

“如果P,那么Q,……?”─—儿童充分条件假言演绎推理能力发展初探

以日常生活事件为内容的三套测验题探查了9－15岁儿童充分条件假言推理能力的发展。研究发现被试有关能力的发展可以区分出三种不同水平;儿童对充分条件假言推理规则的掌握没有固定的难易顺序,这取决于课题任务的性质和主体思维发展水平。研究还探查了发展的个体内部差异和个体之间的差异以及影响差异的各种内外因素。     

几何图形类比推理的ERP研究

该研究以几何图形作为实验材料,测定14名硕士研究生在完成两种类比推理任务（大小变化和颜色变化）和其基线任务时的事件相关电位（ERP）,探讨类比推理过程的脑内时程动态变化。研究发现,两种推理任务所诱发的波形基本一致,而推理任务与其基线任务之间的ERP波形存在显著差异,两种基线任务之间的ERP波形也存在显著差异;类比推理的加工过程是有阶段性的,即编码潍断、映射、得出结论,研究结果进一步支持了Sternberg的成分理论;推断和映射这两个类比推理所特有的加工阶段都有其对应的脑机制,图式推断阶段主要激活的是前额皮层和双侧的顶叶皮层,类比映射和调整阶段主要激活的是左半球的颞叶、额叶和中央顶。     

Mutual influences between the implicit and explicit self-concepts: The role of memory activation and motivated reasoning

Whereas previous research has predominantly focused on dissociations between the explicit and implicit self-concepts, the current research investigates how these aspects of self-representation come into correspondence through the activation of information about the self in memory. Experiment 1 provides evidence for a “bottom-up” process of self-construal in which information activated in the implicit self-concept produces congruent changes in the explicit self-concept. Experiment 2 provides evidence for a “top-down” process of self-construal in which the motivated assertion of a propositional belief in the explicit self-concept leads, via a process of confirmatory hypothesis testing, to the activation of substantiating information in the implicit self-concept. These two processes of self-concept change are integrated within a framework that specifies how the explicit and implicit self-concepts are related within an overall, dynamic self-system. Possibilities for expanding the framework to account for self-concept dissociations are discussed.     

When good evidence goes bad: the weak evidence effect in judgment and decision-making

An indispensable principle of rational thought is that positive evidence should increase belief. In this paper, we demonstrate that people routinely violate this principle when predicting an outcome from a weak cause. In Experiment 1 participants given weak positive evidence judged outcomes of public policy initiatives to be less likely than participants given no evidence, even though the evidence was separately judged to be supportive. Experiment 2 ruled out a pragmatic explanation of the result, that the weak evidence implies the absence of stronger evidence. In Experiment 3, weak positive evidence made people less likely to gamble on the outcome of the 2010 United States mid-term Congressional election. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated these findings with everyday causal scenarios. We argue that this “weak evidence effect” arises because people focus disproportionately on the mentioned weak cause and fail to think about alternative causes.     

Young children's use of statistical sampling evidence to infer the subjectivity of preferences

A crucial task in social interaction involves understanding subjective mental states. Here we report two experiments with toddlers exploring whether they can use statistical evidence to infer the subjective nature of preferences. We found that 2-year-olds were likely to interpret another person’s nonrandom sampling behavior as a cue for a preference different from their own. When there was no alternative in the population or if the sampling was random, 2-year-olds did not ascribe a preference and persisted in their initial beliefs that the person would share their own preference. We found similar but weaker patterns of responses in 16-month-olds. These results suggest that the ability to infer the subjectivity of preferences based on sampling information begins to emerge between 16 months and 2 years. Our findings provide some of the first evidence that from early in development, young children can use statistical evidence to make rational inferences about the social world.     

Connecting instances to promote children's relational reasoning

The practice of learning from multiple instances seems to allow children to learn about relational structure. The experiments reported here focused on two issues regarding relational learning from multiple instances: (a) what kind of perceptual situations foster such learning and (b) how particular object properties, such as complexity and similarity, interact with relational learning. Two kinds of perceptual situations were of interest here: simultaneous view, where instances are viewed at once, and sequential view, where instances are viewed one at a time (one right after the other). We examined the influence of particular perceptual situations and object properties using two tests of relational reasoning: a common match-to-sample task, where new instances are compared with a common sample, and a variable match-to-sample task, where new instances are compared with a sample that varies on each trial. Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that simultaneous presentation of even highly dissimilar instances, one simple and one complex, effectively connects them together and improves relational generalization in both match-to-sample tasks. Experiment 3 shows that simple samples are more effective than complex ones in the common match-to-sample task. However, when one instance is not used a common sample and various pairs of instances are simply compared, as in Experiment 4, simple and rich instances are equally effective at promoting relational learning. These results bear on our understanding of how children connect instances and how those initial connections affect learning and generalization.     

Children's reasoning about the temporal order of past and future events

Four- and five-year-olds completed two sets of tasks that involved reasoning about the temporal order in which events had occurred in the past or were to occur in the future. Four-year-olds succeeded on the tasks that involved reasoning about the order of past events but not those that involved reasoning about the order of future events, whereas 5-year-olds passed both types of tasks. Individual children who failed the past-event tasks were not particularly likely to fail the more difficult future-event tasks. However, children's performance on the reasoning tasks was predictive of their performance on a task assessing their comprehension of the terms “before” and “after.” Our results suggest that there may be a developmental change over this age range in the ability to flexibly represent and reason about the before-and-after relationships between events.     

Leader‐driven distortion of probability and payoff information affects choices between risky prospects

Research indicating that decision makers often distort new information to favor nascent preferences has focused primarily on riskless choice rather than risky choice. In addition, the critical assumption that information distortion mediates the link between the initially preferred alternative and the final choice has not been tested in a compelling manner. In an experiment designed to fill these gaps, participants made six choices involving pairs of hypothetical three‐outcome monetary gambles. We manipulated initial preferences by varying the order in which gamble features were presented. Multilevel regressions indicated that participants distorted their evaluations of precise probabilities and payoffs in the direction of their emerging preferences and that they used their biased evaluations to update those preferences. As expected, information distortion mediated the effect of initial preferences on final choices and final preference strength. In a follow‐up experiment, we compared a standard measure of information distortion (based on comparisons to mean ratings in a no‐choice control task) to a more personalized measure (based on participants' own ratings in the control task) and found the mean‐based measure to be superior for the probability and payoff information in question. Other findings in Experiment 2 corroborated the results of Experiment 1. In both studies, the distortion of quantitative inputs in a simple task highlights the non‐normative circularity of the choice process. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.