大学生的认知风格与逻辑推理的关系

以大学生为被试,探讨认知风格与逻辑推理的关系。结果表明：（1）在三段论推理中,场依存型学生和场独立型学生推理成绩不存在显著差异,学过和未学过逻辑学的学生推理成绩也不存在显著差异,但男生和女生推理成绩差异显著,女生比男生更易受“气氛”的影响。（2）在命题推理中,对抽象材料构成的命题,场独立型学生和场依存型学生的推理存在显著差异,场独立型学生表现出更强的证伪倾向,场依存型学生表现出更强的换位倾向;对具体材料构成的命题,场独立型学生和场依存型学生的推理不存在显著差异。     

How do investors make predictions? Insights from analogical reasoning research

Previous work on investor decision making has focused almost exclusively on information specific to the company being judged. Consequently, every decision is viewed as a novel event, disconnected from the investor's existing knowledge. In this study, the analogical reasoning literature provides the theoretical support for arguing that investors frequently utilize existing knowledge as a basis for generating predictions about a company's future. The specific proposal is that investors transfer their existing knowledge via two different forms of analogical reasoning. The first, relational reasoning, is based primarily on structural correspondence between a novel company and an existing schema. The second, literal similarity reasoning, is based primarily on surface correspondence of a novel company and a previously encountered company. Our theoretical framework is tested in a study in which experienced investors predict the outcome of a novel company's strategy after reading about the experiences of other companies who implemented a similar strategy. The results are consistent with the occurrence of both relational and literal similarity reasoning, with relational reasoning emerging as the dominant approach to generating investors' predictions. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgment

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory (e.g., exercising, becoming thirsty, drinking water) led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks (e.g., having sex, becoming pregnant, becoming nauseous) led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links ((Experiments 1–3). Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments (Experiments 4 and 5).     

Predicting Political Biases Against the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party Movements

Accusations of hypocrisy have flown against both supporters and opponents of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) and Tea Party movements. Integrating the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM), a newly devised model of political judgment, with political tolerance research, we find that how the political activities of OWS and Tea Party demonstrators are described determines whether or not biases against these groups emerge among people low and high in right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA). Specifically, people low in RWA were more biased against the Tea Party than OWS regardless of whether the groups engaged in normatively threatening or reassuring political behavior, whereas people high in RWA were more biased against OWS than the Tea Party when the groups engaged in normatively threatening (and therefore objectionable), but not normatively reassuring (and therefore acceptable) behavior. These findings further support the IOPM's contention that premise objectionableness, not right‐wing orientation, determines biases in political judgment.     

The Wished‐For Always Wins Until the Winner Was Inevitable All Along: Motivated Reasoning and Belief Bias Regulate Emotion During Elections

How do biases affect political information processing? A variant of the Wason selection task, which tests for confirmation bias, was used to characterize how the dynamics of the recent U.S. presidential election affected how people reasoned about political information. Participants were asked to evaluate pundit‐style conditional claims like “The incumbent always wins in a year when unemployment drops” either immediately before or immediately after the 2012 presidential election. A three‐way interaction between ideology, predicted winner (whether the proposition predicted that Obama or Romney would win), and the time of test indicated complex effects of bias on reasoning. Before the election, there was partial evidence of motivated reasoning—liberals performed especially well at looking for falsifying information when the pundit's claim predicted Romney would win. After the election, once the outcome was known, there was evidence of a belief bias—people sought to falsify claims that were inconsistent with the real‐world outcome rather than their ideology. These results suggest that people seek to implicitly regulate emotion when reasoning about political predictions. Before elections, people like to think their preferred candidate will win. After elections, people like to think the winner was inevitable all along.     

Issues in Parent-Child Agreement: The Case of Structured Diagnostic Interviews

There are three primary purposes of this review. First, the review distinguishes among three types of reliability and describes the importance of evaluating the reliability of child psychopathology assessment instruments for clinical practice and research. Second, parent-child reliability findings from 5 of the more carefully studied and frequently used Structured (semi and highly) diagnostic interviews (The Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia for School-age Children, The Child Assessment Scale, The Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for Children. The Diagnostic Interview for Children and Adolescents, and the Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children) are examined. Finally, this review explores factors that have been implicated in terms of their potential effect on parent-child agreement. In addition, future directions for research and clinical practice within this area are identified and potential resolutions to the conundrum of parent-child discordance are discussed.     

Real Objects Can Impede Conditional Reasoning but Augmented Objects Do Not

In this study, Knauff and Johnson‐Laird's (2002) visual impedance hypothesis (i.e., mental representations with irrelevant visual detail can impede reasoning) is applied to the domain of external representations and diagrammatic reasoning. We show that the use of real objects and augmented real (AR) objects can control human interpretation and reasoning about conditionals. As participants made inferences (e.g., an invalid one from "if P then Q" to "P"), they also moved objects corresponding to premises. Participants who moved real objects made more invalid inferences than those who moved AR objects and those who did not manipulate objects (there was no significant difference between the last two groups). Our results showed that real objects impeded conditional reasoning, but AR objects did not. These findings are explained by the fact that real objects may over‐specify a single state that exists, while AR objects suggest multiple possibilities.     

Salience Versus Proportional Reasoning: Rethinking the Mechanism Behind Graphical Display Effects

Two experiments examined predictions from two separate explanations for previously observed display effects for communicating low‐probability risks: foreground:background salience and proportional reasoning. According to foreground:background salience, people's risk perceptions are based on the relative salience of the foreground (number of people harmed) versus the background (number of people at risk), such that calling attention to the background makes the risk seem smaller. Conversely, the proportional reasoning explanation states that what matters is whether the respondent attends to the proportion, which conveys how small the risk is. In Experiment 1, we made the background more salient via color and bolding; in contrast to the foreground:background salience prediction, this manipulation did not influence participants' risk aversion. In Experiment 2, we separately manipulated whether the foreground and the background were displayed graphically or numerically. In keeping with the proportional reasoning hypothesis, there was an interaction whereby participants given formats that displayed the foreground and background in the same modality (graphs or numbers, thereby making the proportion easier to form) saw the probability as smaller and were less risk averse than participants given the information in different modalities. There was also a main effect of displaying the background graphically, providing some support for foreground:background salience. In total, this work suggests that the proportional reasoning account provides a good explanation of many display effects related to communicating low‐probability risks, although there is some role for foreground:background salience as well. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An Empirical Evaluation of the Diagnostic Criteria for Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder: Problems with Sex Specificity and Validity

Premenstrual dysphoric disorder is a psychiatric disorder that reportedly affects between 3 to 8% of women. Although not an official diagnosis in the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, premenstrual dysphoric disorder has received increasing attention in the clinical literature, and considerable debate exists regarding the validity of this proposed condition. This study examined the prevalence of premenstrual dysphoric disorder in a sample of women and men and assessed the construct validity of the disorder. Twenty percent of women met the criteria for provisional diagnosis of premenstrual dysphoric disorder using Diagnostic and Statistical Manual criteria. In addition, 4% of men met these criteria when given sex-neutral assessment forms. Self-reported psychological distress and impaired interpersonal functioning did not predict women's likelihood of meeting the criteria for premenstrual dysphoric disorder. Results cast doubt on the sex-specificity of the diagnostic criteria of premenstrual dysphoric disorder and the construct validity of the disorder. Limitations of this study are discussed.     

Delusion‐proneness or miscomprehension? A re‐examination of the jumping‐to‐conclusions bias

Previous research has consistently shown that individuals with delusions typically exhibit a jumping‐to‐conclusions (JTC) bias when administrated the probabilistic reasoning ‘beads task’ (i.e., decisions made on limited evidence and/or decisions over‐adjusted in light of disconfirming evidence). However, recent work in this area has indicated that a lack of comprehension of the task may be confounding this finding. The purpose of the present study was to evaluate the influence of task administration, delusion‐proneness, and miscomprehension on the elucidation of the JTC bias. A total of 92 undergraduate university students were divided into one of two task conditions (i.e., non‐computerised and computerised) and were further identified as either delusion‐prone or non‐delusion‐prone and as comprehending or non‐comprehending the task. Overall, 25% of the sample demonstrated a JTC bias, and just over half made illogical responses consistent with a failure to comprehend the task. Qualitative evidence of comprehension revealed that these ‘illogical responses’ were being driven by a misunderstanding of task instructions. The way the task was administrated and levels of delusion‐proneness did not significantly influence JTC. However, miscomprehending participants were significantly more likely to exhibit the bias than those who did comprehend. These results suggest that miscomprehension rather than delusion‐proneness may be driving the JTC bias, and that future research should include measures of miscomprehension.