Instructions Moderate the Relationship between Creative Performance in Figural Divergent Thinking and Reasoning Capacity

In this study with within-subject design, the “be-creative effect” was investigated using three instructions in figural divergent-thinking tasks: Besides a be-fluent instruction, a be-creative instruction, and a be-creative instruction combined with strategies were applied. In addition, reasoning ability as part of fluid intelligence, self-reported creative ideation, current motivation after reading the instructions, and task-related interest were assessed. Multilevel analysis applying random-intercept-constant-slope models found significant main effects of the instructions on creative performance and fluency. Both be-creative instructions yielded a rise in creative performance in divergent thinking tasks with additional improvement due to supporting strategies. The be-fluent instruction enhanced the quantity of ideas but decreased creative performance. Task-related interest turned out to be a better predictor of creative performance than the self-estimated expected interest prior to working on the task. Moreover, the relationship of creative performance and reasoning ability was moderated by instruction, with no relationship with a be-fluent instruction and small to moderate positive effects with both instructions emphasizing creative ideas.     

A Process Model of Causal Reasoning

How do we make causal judgments? Many studies have demonstrated that people are capable causal reasoners, achieving success on tasks from reasoning to categorization to interventions. However, less is known about the mental processes used to achieve such sophisticated judgments. We propose a new process model—the mutation sampler—that models causal judgments as based on a sample of possible states of the causal system generated using the Metropolis–Hastings sampling algorithm. Across a diverse array of tasks and conditions encompassing over 1,700 participants, we found that our model provided a consistently closer fit to participant judgments than standard causal graphical models. In particular, we found that the biases introduced by mutation sampling accounted for people's consistent, predictable errors that the normative model by definition could not. Moreover, using a novel experimental methodology, we found that those biases appeared in the samples that participants explicitly judged to be representative of a causal system. We conclude by advocating sampling methods as plausible process-level accounts of the computations specified by the causal graphical model framework and highlight opportunities for future research to identify not just what reasoners compute when drawing causal inferences, but also how they compute it.     

条件推理:“演绎”与“概率”两种实验研究范式之比较

本研究通过推理心理学研究中的“演绎”和“概率”两种实验范式设计对同一个班级的大学生参与者(实验一中N=57,实验二中N=43)进行先后两次有关条件推理的实验研究后,得出如下主要结果:(1)推理者在对不同的“纯形式条件命题本身的认可度”以及对由它们各自建构的同类型推理题的推理结果之间的作答反应模式之间的差异都很小且具有较高的一致性;(2)对由不同的“含具体内容的假言命题”本身的认可度之间以及由它们建构的同类型条件推理题的推理结果之间具有较大的差异性;(3)推理者对“演绎”和“概率”两种不同实验范式分别建构的内容近似的推进题进行推理时具有大致相同的作答反应趋势。由此可以推论推理者在“概率推理实验范式”中的作答或推理结果可以被视为只是对“演绎推理实验范式”的相应推理题给出“概率解”的心理加工过程。     

演绎推理的形式和内容启动加工

聚焦推理加工初期,研究通过指导语操控主观加工倾向,考察不同指导语条件下内容可信度和形式有效性对演绎推理结果的影响,检验内容和形式两类加工过程的启动加工动态变化性。结果表明,指导语条件显著影响推理初期加工。在无提示指导语和形式判定指导语条件下,推理结果受到了形式有效性和内容可信度的影响;内容判定指导语下只受到了内容可信度的影响。证明主观加工倾向影响了内容和形式的启动加工关系,支持了动态变化性的假设。     

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

Development of rules and strategies: balancing the old and the new

The experiments described in the lead articles replicate findings from previous studies of development of knowledge about balance scales, add several new findings, and raise four key questions: (a) How can rule use best be assessed? (b) How can we reconcile systematic use of rules with variable use of strategies? (c) When do children begin to use rules? and (d) How do children generate new rules? In this Reflection, we summarize current understanding of development of knowledge about balance scales and consider each of the four questions.     

Developmental and content effects in reasoning with causal conditionals

Two predictions derived from Markovits and Barrouillet's (2001) developmental model of conditional reasoning were tested in a study in which 72 twelve-year-olds, 80 fifteen-year-olds, and 104 adults received a paper-and-pencil test of conditional reasoning with causal premises ("if cause P then effect Q"). First, we predicted that conditional premises would induce more correct uncertainty responses to the Affirmation of the consequent and Denial of the antecedent forms when the antecedent term is weakly associated to the consequent than when the two are strongly associated and that this effect would decrease with age. Second, uncertainty responding to the Denial of the antecedent form ("P is not true") should be easier when the formulation of the minor premise invites retrieval of alternate antecedents ("if something other than P is true"). The results were consistent with the hypotheses and indicate the importance of retrieval processes in understanding developmental patterns in conditional reasoning with familiar premises.     

小学儿童对日常生活事件时间关系推理能力的初探

探查小学儿童对含有“在什么之前”“同时”日常生活事件时间关系的推理发展过程及其影响因素。被试为7岁、9岁、11岁3个年龄组共54名小学儿童,每个年龄组18人。4种问题模式分别为带有传递关系的单模型问题、带有无关前提的单模型问题、含两个前提的单模型问题、有肯定答案的多模型问题。每种问题模式含3种具体探察任务。主要研究结果表明：在本实验条件下,（1）儿童对事件时间顺序关系的推理从7岁到9岁有快速发展的趋势;（2）单模型和多模型任务无显著差异,模型数量似乎不是影响儿童推理成绩的关键因素;（3）儿童能够主动采用5种策略解决问题。逆向关系传递策略是问题解决的有效策略。     

How (and where) does moral judgment work?

Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.