Towards the knowledge democracy? Knowledge production and the civic role of the university

In this paper I ask whether the University has a special role to play in democratic societies. I argue that the modern University can no longer lay claim to a research monopoly since nowadays research is conducted in many places outside of the University. The University can, however, still lay claim to a kind of knowledge monopoly which has to with the central role Universities play in the definition of what counts as scientific knowledge. The problem is, however, that the University’s knowledge monopoly is predominantly understood in epistemological terms. This leaves only one role for the University in a democratic society, viz., that of the expert. Based on ideas from John Dewey and Bruno Latour I suggest a different way to understand the distinction between ‘scientific’ and ‘everyday’ knowledge. Against this background I argue that the University can contribute towards the democratisation of knowledge if it articulates the difference between scientific and everyday knowledge in non-epistemological terms.

杜威反射弧概念中的具身认知思想

伴随第二代认知科学的兴起,大量研究者开始在具身认知这一主张上达成共识,即有机体的身体运动以及与身体运动相关的特征和感觉经验（或称身体经验）在认知过程中扮演重要角色,而有机体的身体又嵌入到其所处的动态环境之中,从而形成一个不可分割的整体。杜威在《心理学中的反射弧概念》一文中的论证蕴含了上述具身认知思想的雏形,主要体现在：（1）身体运动协调构成了感觉运动回路。（2）在身体运动协调基础上形成的身体经验在感觉运动回路中具有连续性。（3）感觉运动回路中的身体运动与经验以环境为背景,最终目的是为了适应环境。未来的具身认知研究可以借鉴杜威所论证的反射弧概念,对上述三个方面作出进一步探索。     

Healing the physical/spiritual divide through a holistic and hermeneutic approach to education

In this special edition of the journal, attention is being given to the two dimensions of spirituality and physicality. In this particular paper I argue that there is an unhelpful divide that is often assumed to exist between these two dimensions and that this divide can be transcended or ‘healed’ through a holistic and hermeneutic approach to education. Rather than give our focus to narrower concerns such as spiritual education and physical education, we ought instead to pursue education in such a way that it is understood to necessarily be inclusive of both the physical and the spiritual simultaneously. That is, our spirituality is necessarily embodied in the physical. In order to make this argument, references to holistic education shall mainly draw upon the works of Dewey and Gadamer.     

Pragmatic Democracy: Inquiry,Objectivity, and Experience

This essay argues that to understand Dewey's vision of democracy as “epistemic” requires consideration of how experiential and communal aspects of inquiry together produce what is named here “pragmatic objectivity.” Such pragmatic objectivity provides an alternative to absolutism and self‐interested relativism by appealing to certain norms of empirical experimentation. Pragmatic objectivity, it is then argued, can be justified by appeal to Dewey's conception of primary experience. This justification, however, is not without its own complications, which are highlighted with objections regarding “radical pluralism” in political life, and some logical problems that arise due to the supposedly “ineffable” nature of primary experience. The essay concludes by admitting that while Dewey's theory of democracy based on experience cannot answer all of the objections argumentatively, it nevertheless provides potent suggestions for how consensus building can proceed without such philosophical arguments.     

WIEMAN'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF DEWEY: THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY DISCUSSION

Abstract. An important issue in the development of the American school of philosophy known as critical naturalism was whether the naturalistic vision implied a humanistic or a theistic interpretation of religion. Is the divine a creativity within nature but more than human effort, or is it the human vision of ideal possibilities and the effort to realize them? This issue is clarified through a study of the concept of the divine developed by the leading naturalist John Dewey in A Common Faith, the misunderstanding of this book by Henry Nelson Wieman, and the discussion of this misunderstanding in the pages of Christian Century. The essay concludes that Wieman's misunderstanding of Dewey is instructive in that it reveals unintended possibilities in Dewey's thought.     

Interpretation and use of the Luria-Nebraska battery

In a recent article, T. V. Akhutina and L. S. Tsvetkova (1983, Brain and Cognition 2, 129-134) presented an analysis of the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery. Along with their generally positive review, they raised questions regarding the importance of the qualitative aspects of patients' performance in the interpretation of the battery. We agree with the authors that any interpretation of the battery which does not consider qualitative performance can limit the power and applicability of the battery. The procedures of item analysis and qualitative analysis are discussed as essential to a comprehensive interpretation of the battery. Also discussed are comments on additional scaling for the battery and the development of a standardized qualitative scoring system.     

Democratic classroom communities

I explore democractic communities using the classroom community as a metaphor. I suggest that democracies do justice to individuals as well as groups, because of the democratic focus on the interconnected, interdependent, interactive relationship that exists between selves and communities. However, the concept of community has problems and contradictions as well. Through the examples of Summerhill and Montessori schools it is easier to see a necessary quality of democratic communities that needs highlighting. That quality is caring. Making the connection between democracy and caring is what this article uniquely offers to the lively discussion on communities and selves.     

MacIntyre and the Idea of an Educated Public

Some years ago, 1985, Alasdair MacIntyre wrote a paper onThe Idea of an Educated Public in which he argued that the only route open for educators for the future, in order to emerge out of the current moral crisis created by the emotivist modernist culture is to bring back the idea of an educated public from the Scottish Enlightenment and to regard education as education into such a public. The notion of an educated public, in effect, reappears also in all his later books on moral philosophy, particular his latest,Three Rival Theories of Moral Enquiry, where he takes up his original proposal that educated publics should grow around universities and canvasses the new idea that under contemporary conditions what we may need is not one universal university but three kinds contextualized within the three rival kinds of cultural and moral programmes he identifies, and, correspondingly, three kinds of educated public. This paper tries to trace the evolution of MacIntyre's idea of an educated public throughout his work, (1) arguing that there is one particular perspective on the idea which he strangely omits, that represented by Dewey/Habermas, and (2) critiquing his final solution on the basis of its possibility and political desirability.     

Educational Theory as a Writerly Practice

Educational theory does not oppose educational practice, as manyseem to think; instead it is a form of practice and the action oftheory exists at two levels. At a cultural level theory ischaracterized by linguistic forms of action and at a social level it is characterized by the day to day practices thatorganize and reward the work of producing educational philosophy.While the social practices that govern the production ofphilosophy certainly beg for ethnographic attention,any consideration anthropologists or philosophers giveit will eventually find its way to the page and hence tothe cultural forms of linguistic action that are thesubject of this paper. Focusing on how educationalphilosophers see the things that they do, as opposedto what they see, I will suggest that the wayeducational philosophy is fashioned is an importantpart of what is fashioned. Ironically, as I will show,the ``way' of educational philosophy can flow with oragainst the ``what' of it – an author, that is, can saythat they are for or against this or that, but their stylized way of saying it can contradict the literalmeaning of their words.