Distraction from emotional information reduces biased judgements

Biases arising from emotional processes are some of the most robust behavioural effects in the social sciences. The goal of this investigation was to examine the extent to which the emotion regulation strategy of distraction could reduce biases in judgement known to result from emotional information. Study 1 explored lay views regarding whether distraction is an effective strategy to improve decision-making and revealed that participants did not endorse this strategy. Studies 2–5 focused on several established, robust biases that result from emotional information: loss aversion, desirability bias, risk aversion and optimistic bias. Participants were prompted to divert attention away from their feelings while making judgements, and in each study this distraction strategy resulted in reduced bias in judgement relative to control conditions. The findings provide evidence that distraction can improve choice across several situations that typically elicit robustly biased responses, even though participants are not aware of the effectiveness of this strategy.     

SHINTO RESEARCH AND THE HUMANITIES IN JAPAN

Three approaches to scholarship are “scholarship as a way,” which aims at perfection of character; “scholarship as a method,” which clearly limits objects and methods in order to achieve precise perception and new knowledge; and “scholarship as an expression,” which takes various approaches to questions and inquiry. The “humanities” participate deeply and broadly in all three of these approaches. In relation to this view of the humanities, Japanese Shinto is a field of study that yields rich results. As a religion of awe, shrine groves, community, arts, and entertainment, it offers a research field that joins together the study of human beings, nature, society, and expression. Though we elucidate the characteristics of Shinto and its differences with Buddhism, we also draw attention to the seven dimensions of “place, way, beauty, festival, technique, poetry, and ecological wisdom,” and then finally take up “research on techniques of body and mind transformation” as a comprehensive and creative development in the “humanities.”     

SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A PERSONAL VIEW ON THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

This article considers the current state of the science–religion debate in the United Kingdom. It discusses the societies, groups, and individual scholars that shape that debate, including the dialogue between theology and physics, biology, and psychology. Attention is also given to theology's engagement with ecological issues. The article also reflects on the loss of influence of denominational Christianity within British society, and the impact both on the character of the debate and the role of the churches. Finally, some promising trajectories of development for the future are outlined.     

EARLY MODERN PROTESTANT VIRTUOSOS AND SCIENTISTS: SOME COMMENTS

The following essay is divided in three parts. First, while sharing in principle Harrison's hypothesis of an affinity between the sixteenth‐century Reformation and early modern science, it questions the connection between the latter and the Weberian “disenchantment of the world.” Second, it suggests a broader group of possible actors than that envisaged by Harrison in referring to virtuoso collectors and their cabinets of curiosities who are rather marginalized in Harrison's narrative. And third, it highlights (in agreement with Harrison) the physico‐theology of the second half of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth century and beyond as an important temporary fusion of religion/theology and science at a time when the new science was still striving for social and religious respectability.     

Psychological adjustment to cleft lip and/or palate: A narrative review of the literature

Objective: Adjustment to cleft lip and/or palate (CL/P) is multifaceted, involving several domains of psychological and social functioning. A substantial increase in research in this area has been evident in recent years, along with a preliminary shift in how adjustment to CL/P is conceptualised and measured. An updated and comprehensive review of the literature is needed in light of the rapidly expanding and changing field.

Design: A narrative review of 148 quantitative and qualitative studies published between January 2004 and July 2015.

Main outcome measures: Findings are presented according to five key domains of adjustment: Developmental Trajectory, Behaviour, Emotional Well-being, Social Experiences and Satisfaction with Appearance and Treatment. Data pertaining to General Psychological Well-being were also examined.

Results: The overall impact of CL/P on psychological adjustment appears to be low. Nonetheless, the review demonstrates the complexity of findings both within and across domains, and highlights recurring methodological challenges.

Conclusions: Research findings from the last decade are considered to be largely inconclusive, although some areas of emerging consensus and improvements in the approaches used were identified. Efforts to collect data from large, representative and longitudinal samples, which are comparable across studies and encompassing of the patient perspective, should be doubled.     

Changes over time in head and neck cancer patients’ and caregivers’ illness perceptions and relationships with quality of life

Objective: This study investigated changes in illness perceptions from diagnosis to six months later in patients with head and neck cancer (HNC) and their caregivers. The study also examined whether discrepancy in patient and caregiver perceptions at diagnosis predicted patient health-related quality of life (HRQL) at six months.

Design: Forty-two patient–caregiver dyads completed the Brief Illness Perception Questionnaire (Brief IPQ) at diagnosis and again six months later. Patients also completed a HRQL questionnaire at both time points. Analyses were performed using the Actor–Partner Interdependence Model.

Main Outcome Measure: Total patient HRQL assessed by the Functional Assessment of Cancer Therapy (FACT-H&N).

Results: Perceptions of emotional impact and illness concern reduced over time in patients and caregivers. Perceptions of treatment control and identity increased in caregivers only. After controlling for the effects of baseline HRQL, and the individual contribution of patient and caregiver illness perceptions, greater discrepancy in perceptions of timeline, personal control, and illness identity among dyads at diagnosis predicted lower patient HRQL at six-month follow-up.

Conclusion: Patients’ and their caregivers’ perceptions of HNC are dynamic over time. Greater discrepancy between patients’ and caregivers’ illness perceptions at diagnosis predict poorer subsequent patient HRQL.     

Thinking sadly: In favor of an adverbial theory of emotions

Introspective as well as empirical evidence indicates that emotions shape our thinking in numerous ways. Yet, this modificatory aspect of emotions has received relatively little interest in the philosophy of emotion. I give a detailed account of this aspect. Drawing both on the work of William James and adverbialist conceptions of perception, I sketch a theory of emotions that takes these aspects into consideration and suggest that we should understand emotions as manners of thinking.     

On some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories

This paper addresses several objections that have been leveled against a behavioral approach to psychological categories. It reconstructs and critically assesses (a) the so-called causal objection; (b) alleged counterexamples whereby one can exhibit the typical behaviors associated with a psychological phenomenon without exhibiting the latter, including Lewis’ “perfect actor” case and Kirk’s “zombie”; (c) alleged counterexamples whereby organisms can exemplify psychological phenomena without exhibiting any behavior associated with them, including Armstrong’s imagined brain in a vat, Putnam’s “super-super-spartans” scenario, and related cases; and (d) the holistic objection. Mistaken assumptions in each of these objections are pinpointed. The paper starts with a brief characterization of behaviorism about psychological categories and a summary of the particular version thereof supported here, which draws upon Ryle and Skinner, among others.     

Three Conceptual Models of Patient and Public Involvement in Standard-setting: From Abstract Principles to Complex Practice

Clinical practice guidelines have been critiqued for prescribing standardized care that neglects patients’ personal circumstances and knowledge in health care decisions. To make care more patient centred, standard-setters are urged to involve patients and the public in guideline development and use. Despite widespread principled support for such Patient and Public Involvement (PPI), the underlying principles guiding PPI in standardization of care are mired on confusion and contradiction. Based on the PPI literature in general, and informed by empirical research on guideline development, it is possible to identify three rationales that justify PPI in clinical standard setting. Each rationale gives rise to a conceptual model which outlines a distinct purpose of participation, who is to be included, and what they are expected to contribute. The Consumer Choice model aims to involve autonomous consumers to personalize clinical care. The Democratic Voice model aims for health care recommendations to better reflect collective values of citizens. The Lay Expertise model aims to re-contextualize universal evidence by including experiential patient knowledge. However, these models can and should not function as ‘Gold Standards’ to be consistently followed in practice. First, the models rely on two distinct types of representation, resulting in contradictory notions of how to be a good representative. Second, imposing models on practice requires a top-down control that is practically and politically problematic. Not only is control difficult to achieve, it may compromise the participatory ideal of participants co-determine practice, and may result in excluding the values and views of ‘real’ patients and public entirely.