Recent research has identified three virtues from the 24 strengths in the VIA Classification of Strengths and Virtues, labeled caring, inquisitiveness, and self-control. This article explored this model further. Study 1 demonstrated substantial congruence in three-factor loadings across 12 samples (total N = 1,082,230) despite substantial differences in methodology. Study 2 (N = 1719) provided support for the use of aggregate scores for the three virtues. Study 3 (N = 498) demonstrated substantial overlap between measures of personality and the virtues. We conclude these three are potentially essential components of a theory of virtue. They cannot be considered a sufficient model, which may be unattainable. We also note that treating virtue as an individual difference concept neglects key elements of our understanding of virtue as a social construct, and these more amorphous elements must be considered in developing an optimal model of virtue. 相似文献
Bernard Williams questioned whether impartial morality “can allow for the importance of individual character and personal relations in moral experience.” Underlying his position is a distinction between factual and practical deliberation. While factual deliberation is about the world and brings in a standpoint that is impartial, practical deliberation is, he claims, radically first‐personal; it “involves an I that [is] intimately the I of my desires.” While it may be thought that Williams's claim implies an unpalatable Humean subjectivism, the present article argues that this does not follow: That first‐person practical deliberation is directed both by the “I of my desires” and by the world. Drawing on Peter Winch's argument against the universalizability of moral judgments and D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover, the article argues that practical deliberations involve discovering value in the world, but that what is revealed about the world depends constitutively on the first‐person deliberations and decisions of particular agents. 相似文献
Why do couples remain in hateful relationships? This article defines theoretically rigorous ways of viewing partners who stay together despite severe strife. A case presentation shows how a relationship of two people, each with his or her character structure and idealized image, creates interpersonal conflict because of opposing demands each makes on self and other. Such conflict requires radical defensive measures including alienation, idealization, and externalization that increase tensions. A vicious circle of malignant vindictiveness cements the relationship. Increasing implacability in the relationship is understood through Horneyan categories of interlocking idealized images, hurt pride reactions, and the externalizing process.
Many undergraduates are culturally shaped to avoid making ethical judgments. They spontaneously adopt relativist and skeptical strategies such as “It all depends,” or “Whose morality?” or “Who's to say?” as ways of fending off the challenge of making moral decisions. The current tsunami that is washing away traditional sexual norms is both a result and a cause of this cultural shift. Case studies can mitigate this decline and help students to grow in both confidence and ability to make good ethical judgments. The case method, used with a Socratic pedagogy, engages imagination and counters the deficits in empathy found in many contemporary students. It moves students toward understanding morality itself. Against skepticism, it assists students in exercising practical reason, culminating in decision. Five cases invite students to overcome extreme relativism, to look for and evaluate relevant differences, and to enter into ethical discussion with other students on the sexual issues they face in their college years. 相似文献