Unobtrusive indicators of culture for organizations: a systematic review

ABSTRACT

We systematically reviewed the literature using unobtrusive measures to study organizational culture. To synthesize, theorize, and evaluate this research, we introduce the concept of an unobtrusive indicator of culture (UIC) for organizations. A UIC measures organizational culture through collecting data without engaging employees, and is conceptualized in terms of cultural artefacts. We identified thirty-five articles, containing 135 distinct UICs, drawn from 16 distinct data sources. UICs coalesced into two groups. First, textual UICs, with culture measured through language patterns in annual reports, employee online reviews, and emails. Second, UICs focusing on organizational practices, for instance, organizational policies or executive rewards. Over two-thirds (68%) of UICs measured values for integrity, results orientation, and clan cultures, and we conjecture that UICs may be most useful for studying aspects of culture sensitive to reporting biases, and benchmarking large samples of organizations. Forty-eight percent of UICs had good or promising construct validity: many were textual UICs, and those focusing on organizational practices were less established. UICs can potentially advance the study of organizational culture, yet must be developed and applied cautiously, with careful consideration of their advantages and limitations, and how they complement existing measurements and conceptualizations of culture.     

The minimal self hypothesis

For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS’s current scientific status is analogous to that of the “atom,” at the time when “atom” was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for “MS.” Discovery of the brain’s Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit “MS” can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that “levels of consciousness” (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation—a bifurcation point—for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness.     

Introduction: Ethnography,Moral Theory,and Comparative Religious Ethics

Representing a spectrum of intellectual concerns and methodological commitments in religious ethics, the contributors to this focus issue consider and assess the advantages and disadvantages of the shift in recent comparative religious ethics away from a rootedness in moral theory toward a model that privileges the ethnography of moral worlds. In their own way, all of the contributors think through and emphasize the meaning, importance, and place of normativity in recent comparative religious ethics.     

Critical incident sparks critical incident sparks critical incident: an ‘aresolutionist’ method

In this article the authors propose a concept of aresolutionism and outline an aresolutionist method/ology which emerged from reflective practice research. This research was prompted by an event that occurred during a tutorial and the outlined methodology is illustrated by an account of subsequent events and processes. The authors draw on poststructuralist theorizing and methods such as writing as inquiry to counter the resolutionism that permeates dominant approaches to research and reflective practice. In their own research, the authors’ aim shifted from solving a pedagogic problem to analyzing the event as a complex assemblage and exploring the discourses that circled their discussions about the event. A problem to solve had become an object of curiosity.     

Multiperspectival designs and processes in interpretative phenomenological analysis research

ABSTRACT

Researchers using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) within applied research typically use homogenous samples exploring shared perspectives on a single phenomenon of interest. This article explores the challenges and opportunities involved with developing rigorous and epistemologically coherent research designs for capturing more complex and systemic experiential phenomena, through the use of multiple perspectives to explore the same phenomenon. We outline a series of multiple perspective designs and analytic procedures that can be adapted and used across many diverse settings and populations. Whilst building upon existing approaches within qualitative methods and IPA, these designs and procedures are intended to scaffold clear routes to practical application, psychological intervention, the design of behaviour change interventions, and other recommendations for policy and practice. We discuss a variety of conceptual antecedents which situate these designs within phenomenology, pluralistic idiography, qualitative psychology, and wider debates within psychology and other social and behavioural sciences.     

Examining the unfolding of moral decisions across time using the reach-to-touch paradigm

Abstract

Recent theories of decision making are characterised by a growing emphasis on understanding the cognitive mechanisms that produce decisions. This has seen a growth in methods that allow for the continuous collection of data during reasoning. Current applications of these methods to complex decision making have been limited in their ability to examine the dynamics of responding across time. In the current study we address this issue by examining the online dynamics of moral decisions. Participants were required to respond to moral dilemmas that differed according to harm or intention by reaching out and touching one of two response panels. Utilitarian and deontological responses to personal moral dilemmas were found to differ across time. Utilitarian decisions did not emerge more slowly overall, but rather emerged across a wider (less consistent) time period. Importantly, this result did not generalise to a set of standardized moral scenarios. Taken together these findings highlight how dilemma-specific variables can significantly influence moral reasoning and emphasize the importance of using well controlled stimuli together with a measure capable of examining decisions as they unfold over time.     

On the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics

In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics is taken to encompass normative and evaluative questions about concepts, words, and other broadly “representational” and/or “inferential” devices we use in thought and talk. We take some of the central questions in conceptual ethics to concern which concepts we should use and what words should mean, and why. We put forward a view of conceptual engineering in terms of the following three activities: conceptual ethics, conceptual innovation, and conceptual implementation. On our view, conceptual engineering can be defined in terms of these three activities, but not in a straightforward, Boolean way. Conceptual engineering, we argue, is made up of mereologically complex activities whose parts fall into the categories associated with each of these three different activities.