Effects of mindful eating training on delay and probability discounting for food and money in obese and healthy-weight individuals

Obese individuals tend to behave more impulsively than healthy weight individuals across a variety of measures, but it is unclear whether this pattern can be altered. The present study examined the effects of a mindful eating behavioral strategy on impulsive and risky choice patterns for hypothetical food and money. In Experiment 1, 304 participants completed computerized delay and probability discounting tasks for food-related and monetary outcomes. High percent body fat (PBF) predicted more impulsive choice for food, but not small-value money, replicating previous work. In Experiment 2, 102 randomly selected participants from Experiment 1 were assigned to participate in a 50-min workshop on mindful eating or to watch an educational video. They then completed the discounting tasks again. Participants who completed the mindful eating session showed more self-controlled and less risk-averse discounting patterns for food compared to baseline; those in the control condition discounted similarly to baseline rates. There were no changes in discounting for money for either group, suggesting stimulus specificity for food for the mindful eating condition.     

The Effect of Order and Rate of Presentation of Stimuli Upon the Establishment of a Conditioned Discrimination

The modified interfering cue theory put forward by Fletcher et al. (2) to explain performance in the ambiguous cue problem (ACP) was examined. Eight-year-old children were first trained to acquire response tendencies to the individual cues of this problem. When presented subsequently with the problem, the children showed marked differences in the number and type of errors made. The results were interpreted as supporting the theory of Fletcher et al. It was also suggested that the cues with clear positive or negative values were employed by the subjects to limit or neutralize the interference caused by the ambiguous cue.     

Discounting by Probabilistic Waiting

In everyday life, many probabilistic situations may be characterized as probabilistic waiting. A gambler, for example, bets repeatedly at the racetrack, the casino, or the card table. The gambler may not win on the first try, but if a gamble is repeated enough times, a win is almost certain to occur eventually. If repeated gambles are structured as strings of losses ending in a win (probabilistic waiting) and the amount won is discounted by the delay caused by the series of losses, then strings with many losses will be discounted more than those with fewer losses, thereby causing subjective value of the series of gambles as a whole to increase. The current study used the opposite effect that amount has on the degree of delay and probability discounting as a marker to determine whether people evaluate situations involving probabilistic waiting as they evaluate situations involving delayed outcomes or as situations involving probabilistic outcomes. We find that the more likely a probabilistic waiting situation is to end in reward (e.g., a gamble is repeated indefinitely until reward is obtained), the more that situation conforms to delay discounting; the less likely a probabilistic waiting situation is to end in reward (e.g., a fixed, small number of gambles), the more that situation conforms to probability discounting. We argue that the former situation is applicable to pathological gambling, and that people with steep delay discount functions would therefore be more likely to have gambling problems. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Associations Between Delay Discounting and Risk‐Related Behaviors,Traits, Attitudes,and Outcomes

Delay discounting—preference for immediate, smaller rewards over distal, larger rewards—has been argued to be part of the “generality of deviance”, which describes the co‐occurrence of various forms of impulsive and risky behaviors among individuals. Some studies have linked laboratory‐measured delay discounting to behaviors, traits, attitudes, and outcomes associated with risk, but these associations have been inconsistent. Furthermore, many of these studies have been conducted with exclusively undergraduate samples, or in samples offering low statistical power. In a large community sample (n = 328) diverse in age and socioeconomic status, we examined associations between two measures of behavioral delay discounting (single‐shot and canonical k‐parameter estimation) and behavioral risk‐taking, personality traits associated with risk, domain‐specific risk attitudes, gambling and problem gambling, antisocial behavior, and criminal outcomes. In addition, we explored whether a novel response time latency measure of delay discounting explained variance in these risk‐related outcomes. Results indicated that behavioral delay discounting was consistently associated with all variables related to impulse control: high trait impulsivity, low trait self‐control, risk‐averse attitudes toward financial investment, risk‐prone attitudes toward gambling and health/safety risks, gambling and problem gambling, antisocial conduct, and criminal outcomes. Latency‐measured delay discounting was inconsistently associated with behavioral delay discounting and risk‐related measures. Together, results suggest that delay discounting is associated with poor impulse control consistent with a generality of deviance account. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual Differences in Delay Discounting: Differences are Quantitative with Gains,but Qualitative with Losses

Research on delay discounting and inter‐temporal choice has yielded significant insights into decision making. Although research has focused on delayed gains, the discounting of losses is potentially important in precisely those areas where the discounting of gains has proved informative (e.g., substance use and abuse). Participants in the current study completed both a questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed gains and an analogous questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed losses. For almost all participants, the likelihood of choosing the delayed gain decreased with increases in the wait until it would be received. In contrast, when losses (i.e., payments) were involved, different participants showed quite different patterns of choices. More specifically, although the majority of the participants became increasingly likely to choose to pay later as the delay was increased, some participants appeared to be debt averse, in that they were more likely to choose the immediate payment option when the delay was long than when it was brief. These debt‐averse participants also were more likely to choose to wait for a larger delayed gain than other participants and scored lower on Impulsiveness than those who showed the typical pattern of discounting delayed losses. Taken together, these results suggest that in the case of delayed gains, people differ only quantitatively (i.e., in how steeply they discount), whereas in the case of delayed losses, people differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, contrary to the common assumption that a single impulsivity trait underlies choices between immediate and delayed outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

自我损耗促进冲动决策：来自行为和ERPs的证据

该研究以自我控制资源模型为理论框架, 采用行为实验和ERPs技术考察自我损耗对冲动决策的影响。实验1采用Stroop任务操纵自我控制资源并采用延迟折扣任务考察被试的决策冲动性, 实验2采用同样的实验任务并同时采用ERPs技术记录高、低自我损耗者在随后决策任务中的脑电成分。行为结果发现, 在控制心境、特质自我控制水平以及风险偏好等无关变量后, 高损耗者比低损耗者在延迟折扣任务上的折扣程度更大。ERPs结果发现, 不论延迟金额大小, 高损耗者在左侧额区诱发的N1波幅显著小于低损耗者; 高损耗者在右半球诱发的P2波幅显著大于低损耗者。研究表明, 自我损耗抑制决策早期左侧额区的激活水平, 个体因而无法识别冲突以及抵制即时满足的诱惑, 这促使他们采用直觉启发式进行决策, 最终导致冲动决策的产生。     

Development of hot and cool executive function during the transition to adolescence

This study examined the development of executive function (EF) in a typically developing sample from middle childhood to adolescence using a range of tasks varying in affective significance. A total of 102 participants between 8 and 15 years of age completed the Iowa Gambling Task, the Color Word Stroop, a Delay Discounting task, and a Digit Span task. Age-related improvements were found on all tasks, but improvements on relatively cool tasks (Color Word Stroop and Backward Digit Span) occurred earlier in this age range, whereas improvements on relatively hot tasks (Iowa Gambling Task and Delay Discounting) were more gradual and occurred later. Exploratory factor analysis indicated that performance on all tasks could be accounted for by a single-factor model. Together, these findings indicate that although similar abilities may underlie both hot and cool EF, hot EF develops relatively slowly, which may have implications for the risky behavior often observed during adolescence. Future work should include additional measures to characterize more intensively the development of both hot and cool EF during the transition to adolescence.     

Preference for the outcome that follows a relatively aversive event: Contrast or delay reduction?

Pigeons prefer a positive discriminative (S+) stimulus that follows a less preferred event (a large number of required responses, a longer delay, or the absence of food) over a different S+ with a similar history of reinforcement that follows a more preferred event (a single required response, no delay, or food). We proposed that this phenomenon results from contrast (referred to as within-trial contrast) between the less preferred initial event and the signal for reinforcement. Delay reduction theory (Fantino, 1969) can account for these results by proposing that the less preferred initial event lengthens the duration of the trial, thereby allowing the S+ stimulus to occur later in the trial and thus become a better predictor of reinforcement. In the present experiments, we further explored this effect. In Experiment 1, we controlled for trial duration by using a fixed ratio response (30 pecks) as one initial event and the absence of pecking for the same duration as the other initial event (0 pecks). The pigeons showed a reliable preference for the positive stimulus that followed the least preferred initial event. In Experiment 2, we controlled for trial duration by using 30 pecks as one initial event and 1 peck followed by a delay that matched the duration of the preceding 30-peck trial. (Group Time Same). For Group Time Different, there was no delay following the 1-peck initial event. For Group Time Same, preference for the initial event negatively predicted the pigeons’ preference for the S+ stimulus that followed, supporting the contrast account. A somewhat greater preference for the discriminative stimulus that followed the least preferred initial event was found for Group Time Different suggesting that in addition to contrast, delay reduction also may play a small role. However, the greater initial-event preference found for Group Time Different suggests that contrast can account for the group difference as well.     

A second type of magnitude effect: Reinforcer magnitude differentiates delay discounting between substance users and controls

Basic research on delay discounting, examining preference for smaller–sooner or larger–later reinforcers, has demonstrated a variety of findings of considerable generality. One of these, the magnitude effect, is the observation that individuals tend to exhibit greater preference for the immediate with smaller magnitude reinforcers. Delay discounting has also proved to be a useful marker of addiction, as demonstrated by the highly replicated finding of greater discounting rates in substance users compared to controls. However, some research on delay discounting rates in substance users, particularly research examining discounting of small‐magnitude reinforcers, has not found significant differences compared to controls. Here, we hypothesize that the magnitude effect could produce ceiling effects at small magnitudes, thus obscuring differences in delay discounting between groups. We examined differences in discounting between high‐risk substance users and controls over a broad range of magnitudes of monetary amounts ($0.10, $1.00, $10.00, $100.00, and $1000.00) in 116 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. We found no significant differences in discounting rates between users and controls at the smallest reinforcer magnitudes ($0.10 and $1.00) and further found that differences became more pronounced as magnitudes increased. These results provide an understanding of a second form of the magnitude effect: That is, differences in discounting between populations can become more evident as a function of reinforcer magnitude.