The effects of action,normality, and decision carefulness on anticipated regret: Evidence for a broad mediating role of decision justifiability

Two distinct theoretical views explain the effects of action/inaction and social normality on anticipated regret. Norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) emphasises the role of decision mutability, the ease with which one can imagine having made a different choice. Decision justification theory (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) highlights the role of decision justifiability, the perception that the choice was made on a defensible basis, supported by convincing arguments or using a thoughtful, comprehensive decision process. The present paper tests several contrasting predictions from the two theoretical approaches in a series of four studies. Study 1 replicated earlier findings showing greater anticipated regret when the chosen option was abnormal than when it was normal, and perceived justifiability mediated the effect. Study 2 showed that anticipated regret was higher for careless than for careful decisions. Study 3 replicated this finding for a sample holding a different social norm towards the focal decision. Finally, Study 4 found that, when decision carefulness, normality and action/inaction were all specified, only the former showed a significant effect on anticipated regret, and the effect was again mediated by perceived justifiability. Decision justification theory thus appears to provide a better account of anticipated regret intensity in this context than does norm theory.     

Cognitive-behavioral therapy and decision science

In recent decades cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) and decision science (DS) have emerged within the field of psychological science. Though these are two vastly different areas of study, they are similar in that they address human information processing, cognition, behavior, and the link between them. In this article, we provide brief summaries of CBT and decision science, discuss their similarities and differences, and discuss how future research can identify ways in which these fields can inform each other. Several CBT techniques that might be of use to the efforts of the decision science field to prevent cognitive biases are suggested. Research that integrates these two fields may lead to the improvement of both.     

Task conflict,information processing,and decision-making: The damaging effect of relationship conflict

A popular theoretical assumption holds that task-related disagreements stimulate critical thinking, and thus may improve group decision making. Two recent meta-analyses showed, however, that task conflict can have a positive effect, a negative effect, or no effect at all on decision-making quality (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; De Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012). In two studies, we built upon the suggestion of both meta-analyses that the presence of relationship conflict determines whether a task conflict is positively or negatively related to decision making. We hypothesized and found that the level of perceived relationship conflict during task conflict (Study 1), and the actual presence (vs. absence) of relationship conflict during task conflict (Study 2), increased group members’ rigidity in holding onto suboptimal initial preferences during decision making and thus led to poor decisions. In both studies the effect of relationship conflict on decision making was mediated by biased use of information.     

Functional versus dysfunctional team change: Problem diagnosis and structural feedback for self-managed teams

We describe and examine three changes (personnel, process, and structure) that self-managed teams can make to remedy performance problems. We also discuss why self-managed teams may over-emphasize process and (to a lesser extent) personnel changes over structural changes. Furthermore, we describe and test two specific diagnostic feedback interventions aimed at helping teams make functional structural change. Seventy-eight 4-person teams of undergraduate students participated in two trials of a networked laboratory simulation task. All teams were initially structurally misaligned and subsequently received (a) no feedback, (b) one type of feedback only, or (c) both types of feedback. Results confirmed that structurally misaligned teams demonstrated dysfunctional change by changing process more frequently than structure, with detrimental effects for subsequent performance. When teams received the feedback interventions, however, they were more likely to change their structure and thereby improve their performance.     

Goal‐Proximity Decision‐Making

Reinforcement learning (RL) models of decision‐making cannot account for human decisions in the absence of prior reward or punishment. We propose a mechanism for choosing among available options based on goal‐option association strengths, where association strengths between objects represent previously experienced object proximity. The proposed mechanism, Goal‐Proximity Decision‐making (GPD), is implemented within the ACT‐R cognitive framework. GPD is found to be more efficient than RL in three maze‐navigation simulations. GPD advantages over RL seem to grow as task difficulty is increased. An experiment is presented where participants are asked to make choices in the absence of prior reward. GPD captures human performance in this experiment better than RL.     

Enhanced Cardiac Perception Is Associated With Increased Susceptibility to Framing Effects

Previous studies suggest in line with dual process models that interoceptive skills affect controlled decisions via automatic or implicit processing. The “framing effect” is considered to capture implicit effects of task‐irrelevant emotional stimuli on decision‐making. We hypothesized that cardiac awareness, as a measure of interoceptive skills, is positively associated with susceptibility to the framing effect. Forty volunteers performed a risky‐choice framing task in which the effect of loss versus gain frames on decisions based on identical information was assessed. The results show a positive association between cardiac awareness and the framing effect, accounting for 24% of the variance in the framing effect. These findings demonstrate that good interoceptive skills are linked to poorer performance in risky choices based on ambivalent information when implicit bias is induced by task‐irrelevant emotional information. These findings support a dual process perspective on decision‐making and suggest that interoceptive skills mediate effects of implicit bias on decisions.     

Decision Making with Uncertain Reinforcement in Children with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)

Reward-related processes are impaired in children with ADHD. Whether these deficits can be ascribed to an aversion to delay or to an altered responsiveness to magnitude, frequency, valence, or the probability of rewards still needs to be explored. In the present study, children with ADHD and normal controls aged 7 to 10 years performed a simple probabilistic discounting task. They had to choose between alternatives where the magnitude of rewards was inversely related to the probability of outcomes. As a result, children with ADHD opted more frequently for less likely but larger rewards than normal controls. Shifts of the response category after positive or negative feedback, however, occurred as often in children with ADHD as in control children. In children with ADHD, the frequency of risky choices was correlated with neuropsychological measures of response time variability but unrelated to measures of inhibitory control. It is concluded that the tendency to select less likely but larger rewards possibly represents a separate facet of dysfunctional reward processing, independent of delay aversion or altered responsiveness to feedback.     

Developmental changes of win-stay and loss-shift strategies in decision making

This study aims to clarify the developmental changes in real-life decision making when strategy is adjusted using both positive and negative feedback, that is, whether strategic adjustment evolves with age. A total of 84 participants divided into three age groups (children, adolescents, and adults) performed the standard version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Children and adolescents showed a strong bias in favor of disadvantageous choices whereas adults learned to decide advantageously during the course of the task. Interestingly, the results clearly demonstrate that children did not switch differently following gains and losses whereas adolescents and adults switched more often after a loss than after a gain, corresponding to the “loss-shift” and the “win-stay” strategies, respectively. The results also revealed that adults switched less often after losses compared to children and adolescents and, thus, used the loss-stay strategy more often than the 2 youngest groups. These new findings suggest that successful completion of the IGT by adults requires fine feedback monitoring and more frequent use of the win-stay and loss-stay strategic adjustments.     

Preparing young veterans for civilian life: The effects of a workshop on career decision-making difficulties and self-efficacy

The current study mapped the career decision-making difficulties and career decision self-efficacy of 1315 young veterans who participated in a 5-day workshop aimed at facilitating their transition to civilian life. A pre- and post-test comparison showed that participation in the workshop reduced (d = 0.57) the participants' career decision-making difficulties (measured by the CDDQ; Gati, Krausz, & Osipow, 1996) and increased (d = 0.77) their career decision self-efficacy (measured by the CDSE; Taylor & Betz, 1983). A more advanced decision status, as reflected in the participants' Range of Considered Alternatives ( Saka & Gati, 2007), was negatively associated with participants' career decision-making difficulties, and positively associated with career decision self-efficacy. However, a more advanced decision status and the perceived effectiveness of the workshop were not associated with the decrease in difficulties and the increase in self-efficacy that resulted from participating in the workshop. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

The Feasibility OF Collectives' Actions

Orthodox decision theory gives no advice to agents who hold two goods to be incommensurate in value because such agents will have incomplete preferences. According to standard treatments, rationality requires complete preferences, so such agents are irrational. Experience shows, however, that incomplete preferences are ubiquitous in ordinary life. In this paper, we aim to do two things: (1) show that there is a good case for revising decision theory so as to allow it to apply non-vacuously to agents with incomplete preferences, and (2) to identify one substantive criterion that any such non-standard decision theory must obey. Our criterion, Competitiveness, is a weaker version of a dominance principle. Despite its modesty, Competitiveness is incompatible with prospectism, a recently developed decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences. We spend the final part of the paper showing why Competitiveness should be retained, and prospectism rejected.