Career indecision: Three factors from decision theory

Three factors of indecision are derived from decision theory: being insufficiently informed about the alternatives, valuation problems, and uncertainty about the outcomes. The three factors are studied in high school students’ career decision process of choosing further studies. Using factor analysis, we found empirical evidence for a differentiation between the three theoretical sources of career indecision: an information factor, a valuation factor, and an outcomes factor, but only the valuation factor and the outcomes factor seem to associate empirically with career indecision. The importance of both factors for career indecision was further supported by their intermediate role between general indecisiveness and career indecision.     

Locomotion, assessment, and regulatory fit: Value transfer from “how” to “what”

Regulatory fit is experienced when people pursue a goal in a manner that sustains their regulatory orientation. Previous research on promotion and prevention orientations has found that regulatory fit increases people’s perception that a decision they made was “right,” which in turn transfers value to the decision outcome, including being willing to pay more for a product than those who chose the same product without regulatory fit (Higgins, 2000; Higgins et al., in press). We predicted that the effect of regulatory fit on monetary value could be generalized to locomotion and assessment orientations. Participants were willing to pay over 40% more for the same book-light when it was chosen with a strategy that fit their regulatory orientation (assessment/“full evaluation”; locomotion/“progressive elimination”) than when it was chosen with a non-fit strategy.     

The use of control charts by laypeople and hospital decision-makers for guiding decision making

Graphs presenting healthcare data are increasingly available to support laypeople and hospital staff’s decision making. When making these decisions, hospital staff should consider the role of chance—that is, random variation. Given random variation, decision-makers must distinguish signals (sometimes called special-cause data) from noise (common-cause data). Unfortunately, many graphs do not facilitate the statistical reasoning necessary to make such distinctions. Control charts are a less commonly used type of graph that support statistical thinking by including reference lines that separate data more likely to be signals from those more likely to be noise. The current work demonstrates for whom (laypeople and hospital staff) and when (treatment and investigative decisions) control charts strengthen data-driven decision making. We present two experiments that compare people’s use of control and non-control charts to make decisions between hospitals (funnel charts vs. league tables) and to monitor changes across time (run charts with control lines vs. run charts without control lines). As expected, participants more accurately identified the outlying data using a control chart than using a non-control chart, but their ability to then apply that information to more complicated questions (e.g., where should I go for treatment?, and should I investigate?) was limited. The discussion highlights some common concerns about using control charts in hospital settings.     

The impact of contextual priors and anxiety on performance effectiveness and processing efficiency in anticipation

It is proposed that experts are able to integrate prior contextual knowledge with emergent visual information to make complex predictive judgments about the world around them, often under heightened levels of uncertainty and extreme time constraints. However, limited knowledge exists about the impact of anxiety on the use of such contextual priors when forming our decisions. We provide a novel insight into the combined impact of contextual priors and anxiety on anticipation in soccer. Altogether, 12 expert soccer players were required to predict the actions of an oncoming opponent while viewing life-sized video simulations of 2-versus-2 defensive scenarios. Performance effectiveness and processing efficiency were measured under four conditions: no contextual priors (CP) about the action tendencies of the opponent and low anxiety (LA); no CP and high anxiety (HA); CP and LA; CP and HA. The provision of contextual priors did not affect processing efficiency, but it improved performance effectiveness on congruent trials. Anxiety negatively affected processing efficiency, but this did not affect the use of contextual priors or influence performance effectiveness. It appears that anxiety and prior contextual information impact attentional resources independent of each other. Findings are discussed with reference to current models of anticipation and anxiety.     

Manipulating memory associations changes decision-making preferences in a preconditioning task

Memories of past experiences can guide our decisions. Thus, if memories are undermined or distorted, decision making should be affected. Nevertheless, little empirical research has been done to examine the role of memory in reinforcement decision-making. We hypothesized that if memories guide choices in a conditioning decision-making task, then manipulating these memories would result in a change of decision preferences to gain reward. We manipulated participants’ memories by providing false feedback that their memory associations were wrong before they made decisions that could lead them to win money. Participants’ memory ratings decreased significantly after receiving false feedback. More importantly, we found that false feedback led participants’ decision bias to disappear after their memory associations were undermined. Our results suggest that reinforcement decision-making can be altered by false feedback on memories. The results are discussed using memory mechanisms such as spreading activation theories.     

The effect of multiple negative,neutral, and positive organizational changes

Organizational change research has largely concluded that employees appraise changes in their workplace negatively and thus respond negatively to greater amounts of change. However, whether this conclusion is warranted remains unclear because previous research has examined single workplace changes in isolation or asked employees to make a global assessment of the changing nature of their workplace. Researchers have not had the means to capture the number of changes employees experience or their appraisals of the many different changes occurring in their workplace. In this study, we developed and validated the Quantity of Change Scale (QCS) to provide a more nuanced understanding of employees’ appraisals of their changing workplace. We found that the negative changes employees experience disproportionately influenced their reactions to the changing work environment. However, we also demonstrated that contrary to popular belief, employees appraised fewer changes as negative than as positive or neutral. Together these findings provide new insight into why assessments of employees’ general reactions to workplace change tend to be negative. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our empirical examination of employees’ appraisals of the many changes in their workplace.     

Domain-specific and domain-general processes underlying metacognitive judgments

Metacognition and self-awareness are commonly assumed to operate as global capacities. However, there have been few attempts to test this assumption across multiple cognitive domains and metacognitive evaluations. Here, we assessed the covariance between “online” metacognitive processes, as measured by decision confidence judgments in the domains of perception and memory, and error awareness in the domain of attention to action. Previous research investigating metacognition across task domains have not matched stimulus characteristics across tasks raising the possibility that any differences in metacognitive accuracy may be influenced by local task properties. The current experiment measured metacognition in perceptual, memorial and attention tasks that were closely matched for stimulus characteristics. We found that metacognitive accuracy across the three tasks was dissociated suggesting that domain specific networks support an individual’s capacity for accurate metacognition. This finding was independent of objective performance, which was controlled using a staircase procedure. However, response times for metacognitive judgments and error awareness were associated suggesting that shared mechanisms determining how these meta-level evaluations unfold in time may underlie these different types of decision. In addition, the relationship between these laboratory measures of metacognition and reports of everyday functioning from participants and their significant others (informants) was investigated. We found that informant reports, but not self reports, predicted metacognitive accuracy on the perceptual task and participants who underreported cognitive difficulties relative to their informants also showed poorer metacognitive accuracy on the perceptual task. These results are discussed in the context of models of metacognitive regulation and neuropsychological evidence for dissociable metacognitive systems. The potential for the refinement of metacognitive assessment in clinical populations is also discussed.     

Developmental trends in everyday conditional reasoning: the retrieval and inhibition interplay

Two experiments examined developmental patterns in children’s conditional reasoning with everyday causal conditionals. In Experiment 1, a group of pre-, early, young, and late adolescents generated counterexamples for a set of conditionals to validate developmental claims about the counterexample retrieval capacity. In Experiment 2, participants in the same age range were presented with a conditional reasoning task with similar conditionals. Experiment 1 established that counterexample retrieval increased from preadolescence to late adolescence. Experiment 2 showed that acceptance rates of the invalid affirmation of the consequent inference gradually decreased in the same age range. Acceptance rates of the valid modus ponens inference showed a U-shaped pattern. After an initial drop from preadolescence to early adolescence, modus ponens acceptance ratings increased again after the onset of adolescence. Findings support the claim that the development of everyday conditional reasoning can be characterized as an interplay between the development of a counterexample retrieval and inhibition process.     

How smart do you need to be to get it wrong? The role of cognitive capacity in the development of heuristic-based judgment

We examined the relationship between cognitive capacity and heuristic responding on four types of reasoning and decision-making tasks. A total of 84 children, between 5 years 2 months and 11 years 7 months of age, participated in the study. There was a marked increase in heuristic responding with age that was related to increases in cognitive capacity. These findings are inconsistent with the predominant dual-process accounts of reasoning and decision making as applied to development. We offer an alternative explanation of the findings, considering them in the context of recent claims concerning the role of working memory in contextualized reasoning.