Seeing is believing: Priors,trust, and base rate neglect

Kahneman and Tversky (1973) described an effect they called ‘insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes’, later dubbed base rate neglect, which describes people’s tendency to underweight prior information in favor of new data. As probability theory requires that prior probabilities be taken into account, via Bayes’ theorem, the fact that most people fail to do so has been taken as evidence of human irrationality and, by others, of a mismatch between our cognitive processes and the questions being asked (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996). In contrast to both views, we suggest that simplistic Bayesian updating using base rates is not necessarily rational. To that end, we present experiments in which base rate neglect is often the right strategy, and show that people’s base rate usage varies systematically as a function of the extent to which the data that make up a base rate are perceived as trustworthy.     

Reducing self‐control depletion effects through enhanced sensitivity to implementation: Evidence from fMRI and behavioral studies

Research suggests self-control relies on a limited set of resources that can be diminished by use. Recent theories posit that there are two stages of self-control: recognizing the need for control and implementing controlled responses. We conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment and an intervention experiment to investigate whether one or both stages were affected by the prior exercise of self-control. Results from both experiments indicated that only the implementation stage was affected. Further, we demonstrate that self-control can be increased by an intervention designed to boost implementation, as opposed to the recognition of the need to control one's responses.     

Doing as they would do: How the perceived ethical preferences of third-party beneficiaries impact ethical decision-making

Although unethical behavior often benefits third-parties not directly complicit in the misconduct, not all beneficiaries welcome these ill-gotten benefits. We investigate whether actors consider the ethical preferences of potential beneficiaries or rely solely on their own ethical predispositions when making decisions that affect others. Three studies demonstrate that the perceived ethical preferences of these beneficiaries can substantially influence the likelihood that actors behave unethically on their behalves. These studies show that actors consider the ethical preferences of beneficiaries only when their own ethical disposition is outcome-based.     

On the short horizon of spontaneous iterative reasoning in logical puzzles and games

A reasoning strategy is iterative when the initial conclusion suggested by a set of premises is integrated into that set of premises in order to yield additional conclusions. Previous experimental studies on game theory-based strategic games (such as the beauty contest game) observed difficulty in reasoning iteratively, which has been partly attributed to bounded individual rationality. However, this difficulty has also been attributed to problems in adequately representing the beliefs, actions, and goals of other agents involved in the games. In four experiments, we observed similar difficulties in iterative reasoning in a variety of puzzles and games that did not involve social interactions with other agents, where they can only be caused by individual cognitive boundaries. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that an intrinsic difficulty in iterative reasoning originates from a tendency not to revise our initial mental representation of a problem in light of the initial conclusions that it implies.     

The use of implementation intentions and the decision balance sheet in promoting exercise behaviour

Although increasing exercise and fitness has often been associated with positive health outcomes, infrequent exercise participation has remained a problem. Since two distinct motivational and volitional phases to goal pursuit have been proposed, a combined motivational (decision balance sheet, DBS) and volitional (implementation intentions) intervention was predicted to be more effective in increasing exercise behaviour than a control or either strategy alone. A total of 86 students were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions, and were all asked to try to exercise two more times a week than they currently did, over a four week period. Their fitness levels were measured through fitness tests conducted pre- and post-intervention. A priori orthogonal contrasts indicated that the experimental strategies produced a greater increase in exercise frequency and total time spent exercising per week and accordingly showed greater fitness improvements than the control group. Moreover, the volitional groups taken together produced greater increase in time spent exercising and a marginally greater improvement in frequency than the DBS alone. The combined intervention led to improvements in fitness and marginal increases in frequency over the implementation intention alone group. It is proposed that for the combined group the DBS may have aided recall of the implementation intention or increased commitment to it, as remembering and then acting on the plan, in the stated place and time, mediated the implementation intention–behaviour relationship. The combined intervention produced the greatest fitness improvements, indicating that this strategy can lead to important health benefits.     

Who do you trust? The impact of facial emotion and behaviour on decision making

During social interactions, we use available information to guide our decisions, including behaviour and emotional displays. In some situations, behaviour and emotional displays may be incongruent, complicating decision making. This study had two main aims: first, to investigate the independent contributions of behaviour and facial displays of emotion on decisions to trust, and, second, to examine what happens when the information being signalled by a facial display is incongruent with behaviour. Participants played a modified version of the Trust Game in which they learned simulated players’ behaviour with or without concurrent displays of facial emotion. Results indicated that displays of anger, but not happiness, influenced decisions to trust during initial encounters. Over the course of repeated interactions, however, emotional displays consistent with an established pattern of behaviour made independent contributions to decision making, strengthening decisions to trust. When facial display and behaviour were incongruent, participants used current behaviour to inform decision making.     

Reasons for withdrawing belief in vivid autobiographical memories

Previous studies have shown that many people hold personal memories for events that they no longer believe occurred. This study examines the reasons that people provide for choosing to reduce autobiographical belief in vividly recollected autobiographical memories. A body of non-believed memories provided by 374 individuals was reviewed to develop a qualitatively derived categorisation system. The final scheme consisted of 8 major categories (in descending order of mention): social feedback, event plausibility, alternative attributions, general memory beliefs, internal event features, consistency with external evidence, views of self/others, personal motivation and numerous sub-categories. Independent raters coded the reports and judged the primary reason that each person provided for withdrawing belief. The nature of each category, frequency of category endorsement, category overlap and phenomenological ratings are presented, following which links to related literature and implications are discussed. This study documents that a wide variety of recollective and non-recollective sources of information influence decision-making about the occurrence of autobiographical events.     

Prevalence-based decisions undermine visual search

In visual search, observers make decisions about the presence or absence of a target based on their perception of a target during search. The present study investigated whether decisions can be based on observers’ expectation rather than perception of a target. In Experiment 1, participants were allowed to make target-present responses by clicking on the target or, if the target was not perceived, a target-present button. Participants used the target-present button option more frequently in difficult search trials and when target prevalence was high. Experiment 2 and 3 employed a difficult search task that encouraged the use of prevalence-based decisions. Target presence was reported faster when target prevalence was high, indicating that decisions were, in part, cognitive, and not strictly perceptual. A similar pattern of responses were made even when no targets appeared in the search (Experiment 3). The implication of these prevalence-based decisions for visual search models is discussed.     

Individual differences in strategies for syllogistic reasoning

Current theories of reasoning such as mental models or mental logic assume a universal cognitive mechanism that underlies human reasoning performance. However, there is evidence that this is not the case, for example, the work of Ford (1995), who found that some people adopted predominantly spatial and some verbal strategies in a syllogistic reasoning task. Using written and think-aloud protocols, the present study confirmed the existence of these individual differences. However, in sharp contrast to Ford, the present study found few differences in reasoning performance between the two groups, in terms of accuracy or type of conclusion generated. Hence, reasoners present an outward appearance of ubiquity, despite underlying differences in reasoning processes. These findings have implications for theoretical accounts of reasoning, and for attempts to model reasoning data. Any comprehensive account needs to account for strategic differences and how these may develop in logically untrained individuals.