The distortion of criteria after decision-making

The results of two experiments indicate that decision-makers separately distort their interpretations of decision criteria and evaluations of information in a manner that justifies their decisions. In Study 1, participants reported a yes/no decision either before or after they rated the applicable decision criterion and problem information. Participants distorted their criterion and information ratings more when they reported their decisions before, rather than after, they rated the decision criterion and problem information. Study 2 demonstrated that distortion of decision criterion ratings occurred after a decision had been made whereas distortion of information evaluations occurred during the process of reaching a decision. These results are consistent with a two-stage model of decision-making in which the distortion of decision criteria is distinct from the distortion of decision information.     

今本《周易》卦序排列数学规律新探

今本《周易》六十四卦卦序是依据什么道理排列出来的,迄今仍然没有一个完美的解答。本文尝试把卦序问题作为一个数学问题去考虑,探讨卦序的制作者所依据的数学思想与技巧。《六十四卦错综图》是我们研究序卦最重要的参考图,并指出十对三明三阳卦在序卦排列中起着骨架作用．无论是十对三明三阳卦,还是围绕这十对卦左右的其它卦,其排列在序数配置、卦区划分和爻画布排等诸多方面都蕴含着丰富的数学内容,充分反映了序卦的制作者运用数学技巧的娴熟技艺和精妙构想。     

科技伦理:在真与善之间

科技与伦理在实践中的内在关联,使科技伦理问题成为现代科技实践的重要方面。其中,科学活动的违规和失范现象,科技运行中的公正与效率问题,科技时代的生命安顿与伦理精神的创新,是当前在真与善之间特别为人们关注的问题。     

Probability, logic and the cognitive foundations of rational belief

Since Pascal introduced the idea of mathematical probability in the 17th century discussions of uncertainty and “rational” belief have been dogged by philosophical and technical disputes. Furthermore, the last quarter century has seen an explosion of new questions and ideas, stimulated by developments in the computer and cognitive sciences. Competing ideas about probability are often driven by different intuitions about the nature of belief that arise from the needs of different domains (e.g., economics, management theory, engineering, medicine, the life sciences etc). Taking medicine as our focus we develop three lines of argument (historical, practical and cognitive) that suggest that traditional views of probability cannot accommodate all the competing demands and diverse constraints that arise in complex real-world domains. A model of uncertain reasoning based on a form of logical argumentation appears to unify many diverse ideas. The model has precursors in informal discussions of argumentation due to Toulmin, and the notion of logical probability advocated by Keynes, but recent developments in artificial intelligence and cognitive science suggest ways of resolving epistemological and technical issues that they could not address.     

快速节俭启发式--基于有限理性和生态理性的简单决策规则

本文阐述了德国“马克斯．普朗克人类发展研究所”以Gerd Gigerenzer教授为代表的“适应行为与认知中心”简称“ABC研究中心(组)”关于判断、推理和决策制定简单启发式研究的理论背景、研究思路和技术路线,着重介绍了该研究中心在有限理性和生态理性假设基础上提出的一系列极富创意的快速节俭启发式规则,并对围绕这些简单决策规则开展的研究活动作了简要介绍。     

论宏观经济调控和管理中的若干伦理问题

宏观经济调控和管理中的伦理问题,是一个不可忽视的领域。中国是一个发展中国家,正处在从传统经济向现代市场经济转型,政府的宏观调控不可或缺;同时政府作为经济活动的主体,其行为也必须遵守适应市场经济运作的规则。     

Saving the worst for last: The effect of time horizon on the efficiency of negotiating benefits and burdens

Three experiments explored the effect of outcome delays—longer time horizons for the realization of outcomes—on the efficiency of negotiated agreements. We hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between a longer temporal distance to the consequences of negotiated agreements and the efficiency of those agreements. Outcome delays did increase the efficiency of the negotiated agreements. In addition, type of resource, burden or benefit, moderated this relationship. Because negotiating for burdens is more difficult than negotiating for benefits in the present, the salutary discounting effects of outcome delays were greater for burdens. The multifaceted effects of time on negotiations are discussed.     

Group decision process and incrementalism in organizational decision making

In two studies examining resource allocation, support is found for the notion that group decisions are affected in systematic ways depending on whether or not there was individual consideration of the problem before meeting as a group. Specifically, compared to no prior consideration groups, prior consideration groups (1) escalate their commitment more in progress (i.e., ongoing) decisions, and (2) are less willing to concentrate resources on a single project in adoption (i.e., resource utilization) decisions. The findings challenge the blanket assertion that promoting divergent views in a group decision context is always related to better decisions.     

Toward an Alliance Between the Issue-Processing Approach and Pragma-Dialectical Analysis

On the approach to discussions of policy choices that treats such discussions as instances of issue-processing, the joint use of the logic of questions and the logic of rules gives precise formulation to two sorts of issues. To one sort of issue belong issue-circumscribing questions; to another sort, issues-simplicter, which consist of disjunctions of policy proposals – so many proposed social rules – that are answers, in the case of each disjunction, to a given issue-circumscribing question. Work in pragma-dialectics can take over the issue-processing approach; and by doing so add to the pragma-dialectical repertory further dimensions in the analysis of issues and in protocol-narratives of discussion. The analysis and narratives would now include accounts of how issue-circumscribing questions generate initial standpoints and how discussions sometimes end with compromises between standpoints. Further research questions follow about transformations of issues and the comparison of successive rounds of discussion. A narrative of one period of discussion during `the War on Drugs' in the United States illustrates these points.     

The Brier Rule Is not a Good Measure of Epistemic Utility (and Other Useful Facts about Epistemic Betterness)

Measures of epistemic utility are used by formal epistemologists to make determinations of epistemic betterness among cognitive states. The Brier rule is the most popular choice (by far) among formal epistemologists for such a measure. In this paper, however, we show that the Brier rule is sometimes seriously wrong about whether one cognitive state is epistemically better than another. In particular, there are cases where an agent gets evidence that definitively eliminates a false hypothesis (and the probabilities assigned to the other hypotheses stay in the same ratios), but where the Brier rule says that things have become epistemically worse. Along the way to this ‘elimination experiment’ counter-example to the Brier rule as a measure of epistemic utility, we identify several useful monotonicity principles for epistemic betterness. We also reply to several potential objections to this counter-example.