Rationality and Judgment

Abstract: Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to the “classical model” of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. Critics of the classical model, such as Harold Brown and Trudy Govier, argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood, ultimately, in terms of judgment rather than rules. In this article I respond to Brown's and Govier's criticisms of the classical model, and to the “judgment model” they propose in its place. I argue that that model is unable both to distinguish between rational and irrational judgment and to avoid recourse to rules, and is therefore inadequate as an account of rationality, critical thinking, or argument appraisal. More positively, I argue that an adequate account of rationality must include a place for both rules and judgment.     

When is one head better than two? Interdependent information in group decision making

Research on information exchange in group decision making has frequently assumed that information items have independent meanings. Relaxing this assumption raises new issues and presents new possibilities. In the experiment presented here, dyads worked on hidden profile decision tasks in which pairs of unshared information items had interdependent meanings. Dyad decisions were more likely to be accurate when each pair of interdependent items was allocated to a single member (a “connected” hidden profile) than when each pair of interdependent items was separated between the two members (a “disconnected” hidden profile). These information distributions influenced the degree to which dyads considered unshared information. Cognitive load was manipulated, and it impaired decision makers’ ability to identify connections among interdependent information items. The differentiated distribution of information inherent in transactive memory systems moderated the negative effects of cognitive load on dyad decisions.     

Argumentation Schemes in Persuasive Brochures

Many public information documents attempt to persuade the recipients that they should engage in or refrain from specific behaviour. This is based on the assumption that the recipient will decide about his or her behaviour on the basis of the information given and a rational evaluation of the pros and cons. An analysis of 20 public information brochures shows that the argumentation in persuasive brochures is often not marked as such. Argumentation is presented as factual information, and in many instances the task of making argumentational links and drawing conclusions is left to the reader. However, since the information offered does follow familiar argumentational schemes, readers can, in principle, reconstruct the argument. All the brochures make use of pragmatic argumentation (argumentation from consequences),i. e.,they formulate at least certain benefits of the desirable behaviour or disadvantages of the undesirable behaviour. In addition, they make regular use of argumentation from cause to effect and argumentation from example. Argumentation from rules and argumentation from authority are less frequently used. This empirical analysis of the use of argumentation schemes is a solid base for interesting and rich hypotheses about the cognitive processing of persuasive brochures. Central processing requires the reader to be able to reconstruct argumentation from informational texts and to identify and evaluate various types of argumentation.     

儿童对情绪表达规则的认知发展

情绪表达规则知识的建构是儿童社会化和情绪健康发展过程中的一项重要任务,该文考察了情绪表达规则的概念及个体对其认知发展的相关理论和测量。同时,对情绪表达规则的认知发展从3个方面进行了探讨：儿童对情绪表达规则认知发展的关键阶段是小学,并且具有显著的年龄差异和性别差异;家庭情绪环境分别从不同方面对儿童情绪表达规则的认知发展水平有显著影响;儿童对情绪表达规则的认知发展水平与其社会能力有显著的正相关。     

Varieties of Linear Calculi

A uniform calculus for linear logic is presented. The calculus has the form of a natural deduction system in sequent calculus style with general introduction and elimination rules. General elimination rules are motivated through an inversion principle, the dual form of which gives the general introduction rules. By restricting all the rules to their single-succedent versions, a uniform calculus for intuitionistic linear logic is obtained. The calculus encompasses both natural deduction and sequent calculus that are obtained as special instances from the uniform calculus. Other instances give all the invertibilities and partial invertibilities for the sequent calculus rules of linear logic. The calculus is normalizing and satisfies the subformula property for normal derivations.     

Contingent reliance on the affect heuristic as a function of regulatory focus

Results from four studies show that the reliance on affect as a heuristic of judgment and decision making is more pronounced under a promotion focus than under a prevention focus. Two different manifestations of this phenomenon were observed. Studies 1–3 show that different types of affective inputs are weighted more heavily under promotion than under prevention in person-impression formation, product evaluations, and social recommendations. Study 4 additionally shows that valuations performed under promotion are more scope-insensitive—a characteristic of affect-based valuations—than valuations performed under prevention. The greater reliance on affect as a heuristic under promotion seems to arise because promotion-focused individuals tend to find affective inputs more diagnostic, not because promotion increases the reliance on peripheral information per se.     

Myopic regret avoidance: Feedback avoidance and learning in repeated decision making

Decision makers can become trapped by myopic regret avoidance in which rejecting feedback to avoid short-term outcome regret (regret associated with counterfactual outcome comparisons) leads to reduced learning and greater long-term regret over continuing poor decisions. In a series of laboratory experiments involving repeated choices among uncertain monetary prospects, participants primed with outcome regret tended to decline feedback, learned the task slowly or not at all, and performed poorly. This pattern was reversed when decision makers were primed with self-blame regret (regret over an unjustified decision). Further, in a final experiment in which task learning was unnecessary, feedback was more often rejected in the self-blame regret condition than in the outcome regret condition. We discuss the findings in terms of a distinction between two regret components, one associated with outcome evaluation, the other with the justifiability of the decision process used in making the choice.     

Predecision conflict and different patterns of postdecision attractiveness restructuring: empirical illustrations from an important real-life decision

This study presents different postdecision consolidation patterns following decisions made under value conflicts. The different patterns were illustrated by case studies of real-life decisions concerning university programs. There were five program alternatives each of which branched into a different professional area. These decisions were very important to the students. The subjects were followed during a year, from a couple of months before they made their choice of program and during several months after the start of the programs. Different postdecision strategies for consolidating a prior decision were derived from Differentiation and Consolidation Theory (Svenson, 1992). The strategies involved the following postdecision attractiveness restructuring patterns. (1) Reversing an attractiveness disadvantage into an advantage on a conflict attribute, (2) Compensating for a disadvantage through increase of an advantage of another attribute, (3) Reversing disadvantage on a conflict and decreasing advantage on non-conflict attribute(s), and (4) Increasing advantage for chosen alternative on all attributes. In addition, (5) downgrading of importance of the conflict attribute or a complete elimination of this attribute is also a possible way of consolidating the prior decision. The results illustrated the above consolidation patterns. A comparison with subjects who made the same decisions but with no value conflict indicated that postdecision consolidation was largely driven by value conflicts at the time of decision in conjunction with the outcome of the decision.     

换位棋问题规则的表征与解题正确率间关系的研究

本研究通过对被试求解换位棋过程的记录与分析,重点研究了问题表征在换位棋求解过程中的作用。实验结果表明：（1）正确表征问题规则是解题的必要前提.对问题规则信息的误解和遗漏,是影响解题正确率的重要因素。其中对非隐含问题规则的错误表征也占全部错误表征的很大比率。（2）“关键结构”的发现是解决换位棋的必要条件,对问题规则的错误表征影响“关键结构”的发现.（3）前置问题的解决经验对目标问题的正确表征无显著的影响作用。     

Estimation of the hypothesis hierarchy in probabilistic inference tasks*

Is there a hierarchical order among the hypotheses about functional rules in probabilistic inference tasks, i.e. what is the construction and the procedure of the “hypothesis sampling mechanism” employed by the subjects in this kind of task? According to the hypothesis sampling model initially proposed by Brehmer (1974) there should be a hierarchical order among the hypotheses in the subject's hypothesis pools. The procedures of hypothesis sampling and testing ought to follow this strict data independent order (see e.g. Sniezek, 1986; Brehmer, 1987). Knez (1991a, b) showed, however, that this assumption may be incorrect. As a follow up to these results the question regarding the construction of the subject's hypothesis pools was reapproached in the present study. The results indicated a consistency with the hierarchical assumption (Brehmer, 1974) only regarding the relation between the linear and nonlinear rules but not within these types of rules.