No Regrets, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory

I argue that standard decision theories, namely causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, both are unsatisfactory. I devise a new decision theory, from which, under certain conditions, standard game theory can be derived.

The relative success of recognition-based inference in multichoice decisions

The utility of an "ecologically rational" recognition-based decision rule in multichoice decision problems is analyzed, varying the type of judgment required (greater or lesser). The maximum size and range of a counterintuitive advantage associated with recognition-based judgment (the "less-is-more effect") is identified for a range of cue validity values. Greater ranges of the less-is-more effect occur when participants are asked which is the greatest of m choices ( m > 2) than which is the least. Less-is-more effects also have greater range for larger values of m . This implies that the classic two-alternative forced choice task, as studied by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) , may not be the most appropriate test case for less-is-more effects.     

On Reduction Rules,Meaning-as-use,and Proof-theoretic Semantics

The intention here is that of giving a formal underpinning to the idea of ‘meaning-is-use’ which, even if based on proofs, it is rather different from proof-theoretic semantics as in the Dummett–Prawitz tradition. Instead, it is based on the idea that the meaning of logical constants are given by the explanation of immediate consequences, which in formalistic terms means the effect of elimination rules on the result of introduction rules, i.e. the so-called reduction rules. For that we suggest an extension to the Curry– Howard interpretation which draws on the idea of labelled deduction, and brings back Frege’s device of variable-abstraction to operate on the labels (i.e., proof-terms) alongside formulas of predicate logic. Presented by Heinrich Wansing     

Advantages of Flexible over Traditional Benefits: A Procedural Justice Explanation

This study investigates the relationship between employee benefits plans and employees’ attitudes towards their benefits and the organization. In addition, this study examines the mediating role of perceived procedural justice (decision and process controls) to explain why the provision of benefits affects such attitudes. From a matched sample of two hotels, one offering fixed benefits and the other offering flexible benefits, the results showed that employees’ had higher levels of satisfaction with flexible benefits because of greater decision control in choosing the benefits they desired. Contrary to predictions, employees’ process control in flexible benefits plans had no significant effects on benefits satisfaction. Also, employees did not significantly perceive that their benefits had greater value when they were allowed to choose the benefits that they desired. Employees who were satisfied with their flexible benefits were more committed to their organizations and had lower intentions to quit.     

Neural affective decision theory: Choices, brains, and emotions

We present a theory and neurocomputational model of how specific brain operations produce complex decision and preference phenomena, including those explored in prospect theory and decision affect theory. We propose that valuation and decision making are emotional processes, involving interacting brain areas that include two expectation-discrepancy subsystems: a dopamine-encoded system for positive events and a serotonin-encoded system for negative ones. The model provides a rigorous account of loss aversion and the shape of the value function from prospect theory. It also suggests multiple distinct neurological mechanisms by which information framing may affect choices, including ones involving anticipated pleasure. It further offers a neural basis for the interactions among affect, prior expectations and counterfactual comparisons explored in decision affect theory. Along with predicting the effects of particular brain disturbances and damage, the model suggests specific neurological explanations for individual differences observed in choice and valuation behaviors.     

Preference for oddity: uniqueness heuristic or hierarchical choice process?

Traditional economic theories assume decision makers in multialternative choice tasks "assign" a value to each option and then express rational preferences. Here, I report an apparent violation of such rationality in gray jays (Perisoreus canadensis). I tested the jays' preference in a quaternary choice task where three options were the same color and the fourth option was a different color. All options offered an identical food reward and so the strictly rational expectation was that subjects would choose the odd-colored option in 25% of choices. In clear disagreement, every subject chose the odd option more frequently than expected. I speculate as to how this surprising preference for oddity might have been ecologically rational: by using a unique-choice heuristic, the jays might have been able to bypass a deliberative phase of the decision process and devote more attention to scanning for predators. Alternatively, it is conceivable that the jays did not prefer oddity per se. Instead, they might have used a hierarchical process, assigning options to color categories and then choosing between categories. If so, their behavior matches expectation after all (on average, subjects chose the odd option 50% of the time). It should be straightforward to test these competing hypotheses. The current results can be viewed as a new example of how simple mechanisms sometimes produce economically puzzling yet ecologically rational decision making.     

On the goal-dependency of unconscious thought

Recent research has shown that unconscious thought can improve the quality of complex decisions [Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). Think different: The merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 586–598; Dijksterhuis, A., Bos, M.W., Nordgren, L.F., & van Baaren, R. B. (2006). On Making the Right Choice: The deliberation-without-attention effect. Science, 311(5763), 1005–1007]. In the present research, we investigate whether unconscious thought is goal-dependent. In four experiments participants were given information pertaining to a decision problem or to an impression formation problem. Subsequently, they were either given time to think consciously about the information or they were distracted for some time, during which they could engage in unconscious thought. Of the participants that were distracted, however, some were given the goal to further process the information, whereas others were not given such a goal. Our experiments clearly show that unconscious thought is goal-dependent. Without a goal, people do not engage in unconscious thought.     

Take The First: Option-generation and resulting choices

Experimental decision-making research often uses a task in which participants are presented with alternatives from which they must choose. Although tasks of this type may be useful in determining measures (e.g., preference) related to explicitly stated alternatives, they neglect an important aspect of many real-world decision-making environments—namely, the option-generation process. The goal of the present research is to extend previous literature that fills this void by presenting a model that attempts to describe the link between the use of different strategies and the subsequent option-generation process, as well as the resulting choice characteristics. Specifically, we examine the relationship between strategy use, number and order of generated options, choice quality, and dynamic inconsistency. “Take The First” is presented as a heuristic that operates in ill-defined tasks, based on our model assumptions. An experiment involving a realistic (sports) situation was conducted on suitable participants (athletes) to test the predictions of the model. Initial results support the model’s key predictions: strategies producing fewer generated options result in better and more consistent decisions.     

Perceptions of accuracy and effort of decision strategies

A critical tenet of cost-benefit theories of decision strategy choice is that decision makers’ perceptions of accuracy and effort determine strategy selection. However, little research has been conducted on human perceptions of decision strategy accuracy and effort. Instead, researchers have substituted deductively derived inferences on strategy accuracy and effort for perceptions in interpreting decision processes. In this study, we used a survey to study perceptions of decision strategies. The results indicate that participants as a group understood the accuracy and effort dimensions of decision strategies. The participants’ perceptions of the accuracy and effort of various decision strategies largely agreed with researchers’ deductions. However, there was substantial variation across individuals in perceptions of various decision strategies and in the composition of efficient frontiers of decision strategies.     

Inferring the importance of arguments: Order effects and conversational rules

This paper investigates order effects in one-sided and two-sided communications. While most theorizing attributes both primacy and recency effects to cognitive processes (e.g., attention decrement), we propose that, in addition, communicative aspects play a central role in the emergence of order effects. We postulate that individuals—drawing on conversational norms—hold expectations about the order in which arguments are presented. Depending on these expectations, arguments presented first or last will be highly influential. The results of three studies indicate that recipients hold such expectations, which lead to order effects. Arguments were most influential when they were presented at a position where participants expected the most important arguments. Moreover, these effects were eliminated when the applicability of participants’ expectations was experimentally reduced.