Target prototypicality moderates racial bias in the decision to shoot

Research shows that target race can influence the decision to shoot armed and unarmed Black and White males (e.g., Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). To date, however, research has only examined category level effects by comparing average responses to Blacks and Whites. The current studies investigated whether target prototypicality influences the decision to shoot above and beyond the effect of race. Here, we replicated racial bias in shoot decisions and demonstrated that bias was moderated by target prototypicality. As target prototypicality increased, participants showed greater racial bias. Further, when targets were unprototypic, racial bias reversed (e.g., participants mistakenly shot more unarmed Whites than Blacks). Study 2 examined whether these effects were observed among police officers. Although police showed no racial bias on average, target prototypicality significantly influenced judgments. Across both studies, sensitivity to variability in Whites' prototypicality drove these effects, while variation in Black prototypicality did not affect participants' decisions.     

Piéron's Law holds during stroop conflict: insights into the architecture of decision making

Piéron's Law describes the relationship between stimulus intensity and reaction time. Previously (Stafford & Gurney, 2004), we have shown that Piéron's Law is a necessary consequence of rise-to-threshold decision making and thus will arise from optimal simple decision-making algorithms (e.g., Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006). Here, we manipulate the color saturation of a Stroop stimulus. Our results show that Piéron's Law holds for color intensity and color-naming reaction time, extending the domain of this law, in line with our suggestion of the generality of the processes that can give rise to Piéron's Law. In addition, we find that Stroop condition does not interact with the effect of color saturation; Stroop interference and facilitation remain constant at all levels of color saturation. An analysis demonstrates that this result cannot be accounted for by single-stage decision-making algorithms which combine all the evidence pertaining to a decision into a common metric. This shows that human decision making is not information-optimal and suggests that the generalization of current models of simple perceptual decision making to more complex decisions is not straightforward.     

Expertise in complex decision making: the role of search in chess 70 years after de Groot

One of the most influential studies in all expertise research is de Groot's (1946) study of chess players, which suggested that pattern recognition, rather than search, was the key determinant of expertise. Many changes have occurred in the chess world since de Groot's study, leading some authors to argue that the cognitive mechanisms underlying expertise have also changed. We decided to replicate de Groot's study to empirically test these claims and to examine whether the trends in the data have changed over time. Six Grandmasters, five International Masters, six Experts, and five Class A players completed the think-aloud procedure for two chess positions. Findings indicate that Grandmasters and International Masters search more quickly than Experts and Class A players, and that both groups today search substantially faster than players in previous studies. The findings, however, support de Groot's overall conclusions and are consistent with predictions made by pattern recognition models.     

Cheating more when the spoils are split

Four experiments demonstrated that people are more likely to cheat when the benefits of doing so are split with another person, even an anonymous stranger, than when the actor alone captures all of the benefits. In three of the studies, splitting the benefits of over-reporting one’s performance on a task made such over-reporting seem less unethical in the eyes of participants. Mitigated perceptions of the immorality of over-reporting performance mediated the relationship between split spoils and increased over-reporting of performance in Study 3. The studies thus showed that people may be more likely to behave dishonestly for their own benefit if they can point to benefiting others as a mitigating factor for their unethical behavior.     

Multi-attribute,multi-alternative models of choice: Choice,reaction time,and process tracing

The first aim of this research is to compare computational models of multi-alternative, multi-attribute choice when attribute values are explicit. The choice predictions of utility (standard random utility & weighted valuation), heuristic (elimination-by-aspects, lexicographic, & maximum attribute value), and dynamic (multi-alternative decision field theory, MDFT, & a version of the multi-attribute linear ballistic accumulator, MLBA) models are contrasted on both preferential and risky choice data. Using both maximum likelihood and cross-validation fit measures on choice data, the utility and dynamic models are preferred over the heuristic models for risky choice, with a slight overall advantage for the MLBA for preferential choice. The response time predictions of these models (except the MDFT) are then tested. Although the MLBA accurately predicts response time distributions, it only weakly accounts for stimulus-level differences. The other models completely fail to account for stimulus-level differences. Process tracing measures, i.e., eye and mouse tracking, were also collected. None of the qualitative predictions of the models are completely supported by that data. These results suggest that the models may not appropriately represent the interaction of attention and preference formation. To overcome this potential shortcoming, the second aim of this research is to test preference-formation assumptions, independently of attention, by developing the models of attentional sampling (MAS) model family which incorporates the empirical gaze patterns into a sequential sampling framework. An MAS variant that includes attribute values, but only updates the currently viewed alternative and does not contrast values across alternatives, performs well in both experiments. Overall, the results support the dynamic models, but point to the need to incorporate a framework that more accurately reflects the relationship between attention and the preference-formation process.     

What Are They Thinking? A National Study of Stability and Change in Divorce Ideation

This study reports on a nationally representative sample of married individuals ages 25–50 (N = 3,000) surveyed twice (1 year apart) to investigate the phenomenon of divorce ideation, or what people are thinking when they are thinking about divorce. Twenty‐eight percent of respondents had thought their marriage was in serious trouble in the past but not recently. Another 25% had thoughts about divorce in the last 6 months. Latent Class Analysis revealed three distinct groups among those thinking about divorce at Time 1: soft thinkers (49%), long‐term‐serious thinkers (45%), and conflicted thinkers (6%). Yet, divorce ideation was not static; 31% of Time 1 thinkers were not thinking about it 1 year later (and 36% of nonthinkers at Time 1 were thinking about it 1 year later). Also, Latent Transition Analysis revealed 49% of Time 1 long‐term‐serious thinkers, 56% of soft thinkers, and 51% of conflicted thinkers had shifted groups at Time 2, mostly in the direction of less and softer thinking about divorce. Overall, divorce ideation is common but dynamic, and it is not necessarily an indication of imminent marital dissolution.     

平辈亲属词语义加工中长幼概念的空间隐喻和重量隐喻——来自中国朝鲜族和汉族的证据

采用具身认知范式考察平辈亲属词语义加工中长幼概念的空间和重量隐喻,比较中国朝鲜族和汉族的长幼观念。实验1表明,中国朝鲜族人在平辈亲属词语义加工中对平辈年长亲属词的加工快于对平辈年幼亲属词的加工,并且存在着部分的上下隐喻一致性效应,平辈年幼亲属词呈现在屏幕的下方加工得快。汉族人在平辈亲属词语义加工中存在着完整的上下隐喻一致性效应:平辈年长亲属词呈现在屏幕上方加工得快,平辈年幼亲属词呈现在屏幕下方加工得快。实验2表明,"左大右小"的亲属词对促进了中国朝鲜族人对"左重右轻"天平倾斜方向的判断,表明亲属词对蕴含的长幼概念激活了重量概念,但对汉族人的天平倾斜方向判断却无显著的影响。实验3表明,"左重右轻"的天平倾斜方向促进了中国朝鲜族人对"左大右小"的朝鲜语亲属词对的年龄比较,表明重量加工激活了长幼概念,但不影响汉族人对汉语亲属词对的年龄比较。朝、汉两个民族对平辈亲属词的不同隐喻方式源于不同的文化图式,反映了两个民族的长幼文化的差异:与汉族人相比,中国朝鲜族人更重视长幼秩序,对长幼规范的要求更加严格。     

Three attempts to replicate the behavioral sunk-cost effect: a note on cunha and caldieraro (2009)

Cunha and Caldieraro (2009) investigated whether sunk-cost effects, which are well documented in hypothetical situations involving monetary investments, also occur in choice situations with purely behavioral investments. Their results suggest that decision makers indeed fall prey to behavioral sunk-cost effects under certain circumstances. I have been unable to replicate their pattern of results in three separate investigations. In these studies, I attempted to recover the effect using two other behavioral effort manipulations in addition to the manipulation used by Cunha and Caldieraro. This failure to replicate the pattern of results calls into question the robustness of the initial findings.     

« Contexte évaluatif,règles d’équité et d’égalité. Une approche stratégique de la justice distributive. »

This article must be considered within the framework of research on distributive justice in the organisational context (Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Colquitt and Jackson, 2002). The aim is to propose an analysis from a political point of view of the orientation towards equity and equality rules. We take as a starting point the model of political decision in the organisational context by Murphy and Cleveland (1995). The political approach postulates that one cannot pertinently give an account of the managers’ decision modes without locating them in their daily context of human relations management, and their management strategy. We will examine the links between the context of immediate management and the managers’ choices for equity or equality. The results of two studies will be presented. They tend to legitimate the relevance of this approach.     

Are risk preferences consistent?: The influence of decision domain and personality

This paper examines the consistency of risk preferences across three decision domains important in most people’s lives: work, health and personal finance. We consider the degree to which the five factor model of personality and a range of factors that influence risk-related decision-making (perceived risk, framing, emotions and cost–benefit analysis) impact upon cross-domain consistency. Data were gathered from a sample of participants for whom approaches to risk were likely to vary (academics, chess players, firefighters, mountaineers and City traders). The results showed that participants could be categorised into two groups: those who were consistent in their risk preferences in three decision domains, and those who were inconsistent or domain-specific. The consistent group was significantly lower on neuroticism and higher on agreeableness and conscientiousness with a less variable approach to weighing up the costs and benefits of taking risks than the inconsistent group. The majority of the consistent group was risk averse.When the domain-specific risk preferences of the inconsistent group were examined, data showed that different combinations of personality and decision-making factors predicted risk preferences within each domain.