The mismeasure of morals: antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas

Researchers have recently argued that utilitarianism is the appropriate framework by which to evaluate moral judgment, and that individuals who endorse non-utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas (involving active vs. passive harm) are committing an error. We report a study in which participants responded to a battery of personality assessments and a set of dilemmas that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. Participants who indicated greater endorsement of utilitarian solutions had higher scores on measures of Psychopathy, machiavellianism, and life meaninglessness. These results question the widely-used methods by which lay moral judgments are evaluated, as these approaches lead to the counterintuitive conclusion that those individuals who are least prone to moral errors also possess a set of psychological characteristics that many would consider prototypically immoral.     

What types of advice do decision-makers prefer?

In the decision-making literature, “advice” has typically been defined very restrictively, as a recommendation concerning which alternative the decision-maker should choose. The present paper examines decision-makers’ reactions to this and three additional types of advice (a recommendation concerning which alternative not to choose, information about alternatives, and a recommendation concerning how to make the decision), along with another common form of interpersonal assistance (Social Support), from the perspective of maximizing decision accuracy and maintaining decision autonomy. The role of situational and individual differences is also examined. Results from two multilevel policy-capturing studies indicate that, although they consider recommendations regarding which alternative to choose to be important in some contexts, decision-makers often prefer to receive a type of advice that is greatly understudied by researchers—namely, the provision of information about alternatives. The implications of these findings for the study of advice-taking are discussed, as are future research directions.     

Individual differences in fast-and-frugal decision making: Neuroticism and the recognition heuristic

The fast-and-frugal recognition heuristic (RH) claims that people base inferences on recognition only, thus ignoring further knowledge they possess. This claim has been repeatedly challenged, while recent evidence suggests that there are substantial individual differences in adhering to the RH. However, no personality or ability factors driving (non-)use of the RH have, as yet, been identified. In the present study, neuroticism was hypothesized to be a determinant of using the RH: participants high in neuroticism were expected to avoid making use of their knowledge beyond recognition, thus avoiding a diagnostic test of their abilities. The results corroborate this hypothesis: neuroticism predicted participants’ adherence to the RH while the other Big 5 factors and intelligence yielded no additional explanatory power. Moreover, the effect of neuroticism was not mediated by the accessibility of knowledge thus lending preliminary support for the notion that this effect may, in fact, be genuinely motivational in nature.     

When can we say 'if'?

In this study, we focus on the conditions which permit people to assert a conditional statement of the form 'if p then q' with conversational relevance. In a broadly decision-theoretic approach, also drawing on hypothetical thinking theory [Evans, J. St. B. T. (2007). Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgement. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.], we predicted that conditional tips and promises would appear more useful and persuasive and be more likely to encourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the cost of the action p was lower and (c) the benefit of the consequence q was higher. Similarly, we predicted that conditional warnings and threats would be seen as more useful and persuasive and more likely to discourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the benefit of the action p was lower and (c) the cost of the consequence q was higher. All predictions were strongly confirmed, suggesting that such conditionals may best be asserted when they are of high relevance to the goals of the listener.     

Seeing oneself in one’s choices: Construal level and self-pertinence of electoral and consumer decisions

Building on previous research examining the implications for self-regulation and decision making of construing action at varying levels of abstraction, the authors proposed that construing action in terms of its abstract purposes facilitates orienting one’s decisions toward the standards, characteristics, and goals that define one’s desired self-concept. Consistent with this proposal, desiring for oneself a political candidate’s personal qualities predicted evaluating favorably (in Study 1) and voting for (in Study 2) that candidate to a greater extent among participants focused on the distal future (and presumably construing action at a relatively high-level of abstraction) than the proximal future (and presumably construing action at a relatively low-level of abstraction). Moreover, individuals chronically construing action in high-level terms responded more favorably to advertisements appealing to their desired self-concept (in Study 3) than to product quality. These findings’ implications for decision making are discussed.     

Are Plans Necessary?

According to classical decision theory, an agent realises at time t the option with maximum expected utility (determined by his beliefs and desires at t), where the relevant options are possible actions performed at t. I consider an alternative according to which the relevant options are in general plans, complex courses of action extending into the future.     

People accounting: Social category-based choice

This paper presents people accounting—a hypothesis that describes how a simple numerical imbalance in representation along nominal social category lines can affect people’s choice of candidates in highly competitive situations (e.g., awards, jobs, etc.). For example, two scholarship finalists from California and New York may be equally qualified, but the award-winning chance for the California candidate will drop precipitously if 8 of the past 10 winners were from California. Studies 1-3 illustrate this effect. Study 4 links people accounting to intergroup fairness concerns and suggests that people accounting is more likely to occur when the category dimension is meaningful (e.g., Stanford/Princeton) than when it is not (e.g., left/right-handedness). Study 5 shows that candidates from overrepresented categories (e.g., “Californians”) must achieve higher minimum standards in order to be selected. The implication is that highly competitive decisions are often influenced by headcounts along mundane social category lines.