Gaze bias: Selective encoding and liking effects

People look longer at things that they choose than things they do not choose. How much of this tendency—the gaze bias effect—is due to a liking effect compared to the information encoding aspect of the decision-making process? Do these processes compete under certain conditions? We monitored eye movements during a visual decision-making task with four decision prompts: Like, dislike, older, and newer. The gaze bias effect was present during the first dwell in all conditions except the dislike condition, when the preference to look at the liked item and the goal to identify the disliked item compete. Colour content (whether a photograph was colour or black-and-white), not decision type, influenced the gaze bias effect in the older/newer decisions because colour is a relevant feature for such decisions. These interactions appear early in the eye movement record, indicating that gaze bias is influenced during information encoding.     

Keep or trade? Effects of pay-off range on decisions with the two-envelops problem

The “two-envelops” problem has stimulated much discussion on probabilistic reasoning, but relatively little experimentation. The problem specifies two identical envelopes, one of which contains twice as much money as the other. You are given one of the envelopes and the option of keeping it or trading for the other envelope. Variables of interest include the possible amounts of money involved, what is known about the process by which the amounts of money were assigned to the envelopes, and whether you are allowed to know how much money is in the envelope in hand before deciding whether to keep or trade. In an earlier study, Butler and Nickerson found that when participants were allowed to know how much was in the envelope in hand, they generally elected to trade if that amount was small relative to the range of possibilities and to keep otherwise. The present experiments showed that this propensity was independent of the amount of money in the envelopes. Participants made decisions with a strong bias for avoiding the risk of losing by trading, particularly when the amount in hand was known and large relative to the range of possible amounts, regardless of the absolute value of the gamble. The results illustrate the dependence of thinking on the context in which it occurs, and demonstrate a tendency to treat quantities that are large or small relative to a particular context in which they are encountered as though they were large or small in a more general sense.     

Impression making by résumé layout: Its impact on the probability of being shortlisted

This study examines the effect of the graphical layout of résumés on the shortlisting of applicants for employment interviews. Previous research has investigated the effect of bad printing quality, but this research has explored the impact of a creative layout of résumés of equal quality. A sample of 90 respondents (half professional recruiters, half students) was asked to rank 12 candidates applying for one vacancy. All 12 candidates were presented an equal number of times in three different layout formats—formal on white paper, coloured, and “creative” design. Results suggest that the graphical design may have a substantial impact on the likelihood of being shortlisted, where formal designs were preferred over the “creative” layouts. Professional recruiters were only slightly less influenced by the layout than nonprofessionals. Implications for employers and jobseekers are discussed.     

Infants' understanding of occlusion of others' line-of-sight: Implications for an emerging theory of mind

Infants' gaze following provides information about their understanding of others' perception and attention. Gaze following when the other looks in the presence (and absence) of visual obstacles can be especially informative. In the present study the gaze-following behaviour of 14- and 18-month-old infants was examined in opaque barrier, clear barrier, and non-barrier situations in order to investigate whether infants at this age understand the referential nature of looking. A hypothesis positing that infants grasp the referential nature of gaze would predict that infants would not follow gaze when the looker's gaze is blocked (as in an opaque barrier situation), but would follow gaze in both non-barrier and clear barrier situations. This hypothesis was contrasted with two other “leaner” interpretations predicting contrasting patterns of looking in the same situations. Results showed that both 18- and 14-month-old infants followed gaze as predicted by the richer, referential account.     

Pricing risk and ambiguity: The effect of perspective taking

In the valuation of uncertain prospects, a difference is often observed between selling and buying perspectives. This paper distinguishes between risk (known probabilities) and ambiguity (unknown probabilities) in decisions under uncertainty and shows that the valuation disparity increases under ambiguity compared to risk. It is found that both the comparative versus noncomparative evaluation of risky and ambiguous prospects and the uniqueness of the valuation perspective (either seller or buyer) moderate this increase in the disparity under ambiguity. The finding is consistent with recent theoretical accounts of pricing under uncertainty. We discuss implications for market behaviour and for the ambiguity paradigm as a research tool.     

Up north and down south: Implicit associations between topography and cardinal direction

Route planners show a reliable tendency to select south- relative to north-going routes between two horizontally (east/west) aligned landmarks, suggesting the application of a north-is-up heuristic (Brunyé, Mahoney, Gardony, & Taylor, 2010). The source of this north-is-up bias remains unknown, and there is no strong evidence to suggest that it is due to explicit strategy use. In four experiments, we attempt to further elucidate the source of this effect by testing whether it can be attributed to implicit associations between cardinal direction (north/south) and topography (mountainous/level terrain). Experiments 1 and 2 used an adapted Implicit Association Test and demonstrate automatically activated judgements that associate north with mountainous and south with relatively level terrain. Experiment 3 rules out the possibility that this effect is due to the local topography of New England by replicating in participants from the topographically dissimilar Midwestern United States. Finally, Experiment 4 tests the relative contribution of implicit versus explicit associations between cardinal direction and topography in predicting route-planning asymmetries; we show that implicit associations are a stronger predictor of southern route biases than explicit processes. Overall, results demonstrate that the conceptualization of space can be driven by physically unfounded implicit associations between cardinal directions and topographical features, and these associations are at least partially responsible for southern route preferences.     

On avoiding framing effects in experienced decision makers

The present study aimed to (a) demonstrate the effect of positive–negative framing on experienced criminal justice decision makers, (b) examine the debiasing effect of visually structured risk messages, and (c) investigate whether risk perceptions mediate the debiasing effect of visual aids on decision making. In two phases, 60 senior police officers estimated the accuracy of a counterterrorism technique in identifying whether a known terror suspect poses an imminent danger and decided whether they would recommend the technique to policy makers. Officers also rated their confidence in this recommendation. When information about the effectiveness of the counterterrorism technique was presented in a numerical format, officers' perceptions of accuracy and recommendation decisions were susceptible to the framing effect: The technique was perceived to be more accurate and was more likely to be recommended when its effectiveness was presented in a positive than in a negative frame. However, when the information was represented visually using icon arrays, there were no such framing effects. Finally, perceptions of accuracy mediated the debiasing effect of visual aids on recommendation decisions. We offer potential explanations for the debiasing effect of visual aids and implications for communicating risk to experienced, professional decision makers.     

Choice both affects and reflects preferences

The free-choice paradigm is a widely used paradigm in psychology. It has been used to show that after a choice between two similarly pleasant stimuli, the pleasantness of the chosen one tends to increase, whereas the pleasantness of the rejected one tends to decrease—a spreading of alternatives. However, the methodological validity of the free-choice paradigm to study choice-induced preference change has recently been seriously questioned [Chen, K. M., & Risen, J. L. (2010). How choice affects and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 573–594. doi:10.1037/a0020217]. According to this criticism, the classically reported spreading of alternatives between the first and second rating sessions cannot be unambiguously interpreted to reflect a true change in preferences and can be observed even for completely static preferences. Here, we used two measurement sequences, a classical Rating 1–choice–Rating 2 sequence and a control Rating 1–Rating 2–choice sequence, to disentangle the spreading of alternatives driven by the effect of choice from the artefactual effect highlighted by Chen and Risen. In two studies using different stimulus material (faces and odours), we find that choice has a robust modulatory impact on preferences for rejected odours, but not for chosen odours and not for faces.     

Correcting erroneous inferences in memory: The role of source credibility

People often continue to rely on erroneous information about people and events, even in the face of subsequent counter information. The current study examined whether this information could be effectively corrected by a credible source. We examined two aspects of credibility: trustworthiness and expertise. Experiment 1 showed that receiving a correction from a source high in trustworthiness and expertise reduced participants’ use of original information when making inferences. Experiment 2 showed that source expertise alone was not sufficient to reduce participants’ reliance on the original information. The results from Experiment 3 showed that source trustworthiness alone significantly decreased participants’ use of the original information when making inferences. The results suggest that people may be able to reduce their use of original information if they receive a correction from a person who is deemed to be highly trustworthy. These findings have implications for decision making in politics and other applied areas.     

The distortion of criteria after decision-making

The results of two experiments indicate that decision-makers separately distort their interpretations of decision criteria and evaluations of information in a manner that justifies their decisions. In Study 1, participants reported a yes/no decision either before or after they rated the applicable decision criterion and problem information. Participants distorted their criterion and information ratings more when they reported their decisions before, rather than after, they rated the decision criterion and problem information. Study 2 demonstrated that distortion of decision criterion ratings occurred after a decision had been made whereas distortion of information evaluations occurred during the process of reaching a decision. These results are consistent with a two-stage model of decision-making in which the distortion of decision criteria is distinct from the distortion of decision information.