Experience of agency and sense of responsibility

The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes using the intentional binding effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) as an implicit, quantitative measure related to sense of agency. We studied the time at which people perceived simple manual actions and their effects, when these actions were embedded in scenarios where their actions had unpredictable consequences that could be either moral or merely economic. We found an enhanced binding of effects back towards the actions that caused them, implying an enhanced sense of agency, in moral compared to non-moral contexts. We also found stronger binding for effects with severely negative, compared to moderately negative, values. A tight temporal association between action and effect may be a low-level phenomenal marker of the sense of responsibility.     

The influence of expertise and of physical complexity on visual short-term memory consolidation

This paper examines controversial claims about the merit of “unconscious thought” for making complex decisions. In four experiments, participants were presented with complex decisions and were asked to choose the best option immediately, after a period of conscious deliberation, or after a period of distraction (said to encourage “unconscious thought processes”). In all experiments the majority of participants chose the option predicted by their own subjective attribute weighting scores, regardless of the mode of thought employed. There was little evidence for the superiority of choices made “unconsciously”, but some evidence that conscious deliberation can lead to better choices. The final experiment suggested that the task is best conceptualized as one involving “online judgement” rather than one in which decisions are made after periods of deliberation or distraction. The results suggest that we should be cautious in accepting the advice to “stop thinking” about complex decisions.     

Improving time discrimination in children and adults in a temporal bisection task: The effects of feedback and no forced choice on decision and memory processes

In children aged 5 and 8 years old as well as in adults, Experiment 1 tested the effect of feedback on temporal performance using a bisection task. Experiment 2 added a no-forced-choice condition by giving the participants the possibility of responding “I don't know”. The results of Experiment 1 showed that providing feedback increased the bisection point value (point of subjective equality) in all age groups and increased sensitivity to time in the youngest children. The results of Experiment 2 showed that the proportion of “I don't know” responses peaked at the probe duration close to the arithmetic mean of the two anchor durations and decreased as the distance from this central value increased in both the adults and the 8-year-olds. In the 5-year-olds, the proportion of “I don't know” responses was lower and remained constant whatever the probe duration values. Unlike in the youngest children, giving the adults and the 8-year-olds the opportunity to respond “I don't know” increased their sensitivity to time. The modelling of our data suggests that providing feedback in a temporal bisection task affects both the memory and the decision processes. However, whereas the feedback-related effect had a similar effect on decision processes across the age groups, it had an opposite effect on memory processes in the 5-year-olds and the older participants, decreasing the variability of the memory representation of the anchor durations in the former while increasing it in the latter. Finally, in bisection, feedback only improved temporal performance when the memory for duration was imprecise as in the case of the children.     

Expertise and gambling: Using Type 2 signal detection theory to investigate differences between regular gamblers and nongamblers

This paper presents an experimental investigation into how individuals make decisions under uncertainty when faced with different payout structures in the context of gambling. Type 2 signal detection theory was utilized to compare sensitivity to bias manipulations between regular nonproblem gamblers and nongamblers in a novel probability-based gambling task. The results indicated that both regular gamblers and nongamblers responded to the changes of rewards for correct responses (Experiment 1) and penalties for errors (Experiment 2) in setting their gambling criteria, but that regular gamblers were more sensitive to these manipulations of bias. Regular gamblers also set gambling criteria that were more optimal. The results are discussed in terms of an expertise-transference hypothesis.     

Markedness effects in Norwegian–English bilinguals: Task-dependent use of language-specific letters and bigrams

This study investigates how bilinguals use sublexical language membership information to speed up their word recognition process in different task situations. Norwegian–English bilinguals performed a Norwegian–English language decision task, a mixed English lexical decision task, or a mixed Norwegian lexical decision task. The mixed lexical decision experiments included words from the nontarget language that required a “no” response. The language specificity of the Bokmål (a Norwegian written norm) and English (non)words was varied by including language-specific letters (“smør”, “hawk”) or bigrams (“dusj”, “veal”). Bilinguals were found to use both types of sublexical markedness to facilitate their decisions, language-specific letters leading to larger effects than language-specific bigrams. A cross-experimental comparison indicates that the use of sublexical language information was strategically dependent on the task at hand and that decisions were based on language membership information derived directly from sublexical (bigram) stimulus characteristics instead of indirectly via their lexical representations. Available models for bilingual word recognition fail to handle the observed marker effects, because all consider language membership as a lexical property only.     

Further attempts to clarify the importance of category variability for categorisation

The issue of how category variability affects classification of novel instances is an important one for assessing theories of categorisation, yet previous research cannot provide a compelling conclusion. In five experiments we reexamine some of the factors thought to affect participant performance. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants almost always classified the test item as belonging to the high variability category. By contrast, in Experiment 3 we employed an alternative experimental paradigm, where the difference in variability of the two categories was less salient. In that case, participants tended to classify a test item as belonging to the low variability category. Two additional experiments (4 and 5) explored in detail the differences between Experiments 1, 2 on the one hand, and 3 on the other. Some insight into the underlying psychological processes can be provided by computational models of categorisation, and we focus on the continuous version of Anderson's (1991) Rational Model, which has not been explored before in this context. The model predicts that test instances exactly halfway between the prototypes of two categories should be classified into the more variable category, consistent with the bulk of empirical findings. We also provided a comparison with a slightly reduced version of the Generalised Context Model (GCM) to show that its predictions are consistent with those from the Rational Model, for our stimulus sets.     

The impact of using forced decision-making strategies on post-decisional confidence

The impact of motivational and cognitive factors on post-decisional confidence (PDC) level was tested in two experiments. In the first experiment, subjects were first identified as having an intuitive preference toward using either a compensatory or a noncompensatory decision strategy and later on were forced to use either a compatible or a non-compatible strategy. PDC level decreased after using a noncompensatory strategy, and the decrease was higher when it was a noncompatible strategy. In a second experiment, subjects received feedback about their preferred strategy but were not later forced to use any specific strategy. Most subjects continued to utilize their preferred strategy and PDC level was not changed. Overall, intuitive PDC was not found to be sensitive to differences between compensatory and noncompensatory strategies. The result suggested that PDC is a function of an internal cost-benefit analysis which includes both cognitive and motivational factors.     

Rank disagreement: A comparison of multi-criteria methodologies

A number of multi-criteria decision support techniques have emerged in recent years that use varying computational approaches to arrive at the most desirable solution and thereby ‘recommend’ a course of action. Decision makers who use the results of this analytic work should be assured that the computational schemes used by their supporting analysts or decision support software produce the appropriate solutions. We conducted a series of simulation experiments that compared the top-ranked options resulting from the computational algorithms that support Multi-Attribute Value Theory (MAVT) and three methods that are reported in the literature that allow rank reversals, the change in rank order of two options when an unrelated option is added or deleted from the analysis: the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), Percentaging and the Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS). We also included a Fuzzy algorithm proposed by Yager to gauge its consistency with the other algorithms, even though it is not subject to rank reversals. These experiments demonstrated that the MAVT and AHP techniques, when provided with the same decision outcome data, very often identify the same alternative as ‘best’. The other techniques are noticeably less consistent with MAVT, the Fuzzy algorithm being the least consistent. The situations under which the most frequent and significant differences occurred were dependent upon the method. The results of our experiments indicate that other issues (e.g. the processes used for problem structuring and the elicitation of value weights) are likely to be of greater significance to problem outcome (based on our experience) than the choice between the computational algorithms of MAVT and AHP. The results cause us to be concerned about the use of the other methods.