Utilizing probabilities as decision weights in closed and open information boards: A comparison of children and adults

Decisions in preschoolers (6 years), elementary schoolers (9.7 years), and adults (21 years) were studied with an information board crossing three probabilistic cues (validities: .83, .67, .50) with two options. Experiment 1 (n = 215) applied a standard version of the information board (closed presentation format), in which information must be searched sequentially and kept in mind for the decision. Experiment 2 (n = 217) applied an open format (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008), in which all information was visible during decision making. Elementary schoolers but not preschoolers benefited from an open format — indicated by an increase in using probabilities as decision weights. In the open but not closed format, choices were biased by normatively irrelevant information (the lure). Variations in the prediction patterns of the cues influenced decisions in all age groups. Effects for presentation format, pattern, and lure jointly indicate that even children are capable of considering multiple information in their decisions.     

Effects of information accuracy and volume on decision making

Recent advances in information technology have resulted in increasingly complex work environments. Much of the complexity is due to a deluge of information available across networks (Gleick, 2011) and unknown reliability, which introduces additional uncertainty (Platt & Huettel, 2008). Understanding the performance characteristics of human information processing for optimal decision making under such conditions of data abundance and uncertainty is critical in complex networked information environments, such as military operations. One focus of the United States military is providing troops with the richness of information formally reserved for higher echelons (Bawden & Robinson, 2009). However, this effort risks cognitive overload, where too much information can result in impaired performance. The present study examined human decision making under varying levels of cognitive load and source reliability. Participants determined the reliability of two information sources and decided how to use them to minimize cognitive load and improve performance in a visual search task. Unbeknownst to participants, one source provided highly accurate information and one provided moderately accurate information. Results showed that participants had more trust in the more accurate than the less accurate source, and decision making accuracy decreased as cognitive load increased. When cognitive load was highest, participants were more accurate on trials with the more accurate source. Thus, the more accurate source facilitated better performance, whether through better intel or through participants offloading some of the cognitive load to the reliable source.     

Information about expert decision and post‐decision distortion of facts of own decision

Cognitive representations of decision problems are dynamic. During and after a decision, evaluations and representations of facts change to support the decision made by a decision maker her‐ or himself (Svenson, 2003). We investigated post‐decision distortion of facts (consolidation). Participants were given vignettes with facts about two terminally ill patients, only one of whom could be given lifesaving surgery. In Study 1, contrary to the prediction, the results showed that facts were distorted after a decision both by participants who were responsible for the decisions themselves and when doctors had made the decision. In Study 2 we investigated the influence of knowledge about expert decisions on a participant's own decision and post‐decisional distortion of facts. Facts were significantly more distorted when the participant's decision agreed with an expert's decision than when the participant and expert decisions disagreed. The findings imply that knowledge about experts' decisions can distort memories of facts and therefore may obstruct rational analyses of earlier decisions. This is particularly important when a decision made by a person, who is assumed to be an expert, makes a decision that is biased or wrong.     

The Loss of Loss Aversion: Paying Attention to Reference Points

We agree with Gal and Rucker ( 2018 , in press) that loss aversion is not as firmly established as typically assumed. We affirm, however, the more general principle put forward within Prospect Theory (D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, 1979), which is that reference points increase people's sensitivity to objective changes in value. We show how the literatures on counterfactual thought, social comparison, and goal pursuit are consistent with the notion that reference points increase sensitivity to change in value, while not being consistent with loss aversion. We then examine, within the framework of Regulatory Focus theory (E. T. Higgins, 1997, 1998), how different reference points combine with characteristics of the actor and the situation to give rise to loss aversion (more sensitivity to negative outcomes than to positive outcomes) as well as to the reverse pattern (more sensitivity to positive outcomes than to negative outcomes). Our review suggests that the status quo, even when used as a reference point, is not necessarily neutral. It also suggests that anchor points other than the status quo may serve as reference points and that people may use more than one reference point simultaneously. More generally, we call for a critical examination of the “bad is stronger than good” principle.     

Does playing blindfold chess reduce the quality of game: comments on chabris and hearst (2003)

Blindfold chess is a special type of chess game where both the board and pieces are not visible to its players. This paper aims to determine whether the quality of the game played blindfolded is lower than when played under normal conditions. The best chess program was used to analyze games played by the world's top Grandmasters under both conditions. We have analyzed the Monaco 1993–1998 data set introduced by Chabris and Hearst (2003) . The results showed that although a larger number of mistakes occurred while playing blindfolded, no significant statistical difference between the rapid and blindfold games has been found. Nevertheless, by applying the same methodology to the Monaco 2002–2007 data set a substantial difference between the blindfold and the rapid chess game was noticed. In this paper, we have addressed the possible improvement of the chess game quality and the advances in chess programs that may be responsible for detecting more blunders.     

Moral Principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem

We created paired moral dilemmas with minimal contrasts in wording, a research strategy that has been advocated as a way to empirically establish principles operative in a domain-specific moral psychology. However, the candidate "principles" we tested were not derived from work in moral philosophy, but rather from work in the areas of consumer choice and risk perception. Participants were paradoxically less likely to choose an action that sacrifices one life to save others when they were asked to provide more reasons for doing so (Experiment 1), and their willingness to sacrifice lives depended not only on how many lives would be saved, but on the number of lives at risk (Experiment 2). The latter effect was also found in a within-subjects design (Experiment 3). These findings suggest caution in the use of artificial dilemmas as a key testbed for revealing principled bases for moral judgment.     

Tainted recommendations: The social comparison bias

The present analysis reveals the social comparison bias – a bias that emerges from the social comparison process and taints recommendations. We hypothesize that people who have high standing on a relevant dimension (e.g., quantity of publications) begin to protect their social comparison context by making recommendations that prevent others, who might surpass them on the relevant dimension, from entering their comparison context. Studies 1 and 2 instantiate this effect in both hypothetical and real decision situations, showing that people tend not to recommend individuals who surpass them on the relevant dimension on which they have high standing. Finally, Study 3, in a sample of real employees, links the effect to one’s concern for protecting self-esteem. Theoretical and organizational implications are discussed.     

Subjective reports of stimulus,response, and decision times in speeded tasks: How accurate are decision time reports?

Four experiments examined how accurately participants can report the times of their own decisions. Within an auditory reaction time (RT) task, participants reported the time at which (a) the tone was presented, (b) they decided on the response, or (c) the response key was pressed. Decision time reports were checked for plausibility against the actual RTs, and we compared the effects of experimental manipulations on these two measures to see whether the reported decision times showed appropriate effects. In addition, we estimated the amount of error associated with individual decision time reports by checking how often participants’ decision time reports were implausibly early (i.e., before stimulus onset) or late (i.e., after response), and by using several quantitative models. Overall, the results suggest that decision time reports are not very accurate but they may be usable for some purposes.     

Bounded Ornstein-Uhlenbeck models for two-choice time controlled tasks

The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (O-U) model has been successfully applied to describe the response accuracy and response time in 2-alternative choice tasks. This paper analyses properties and performance of variants of the O-U model with absorbing and reflecting boundary conditions that limit the range of possible values of the integration variable. The paper focuses on choice tasks with pre-determined response time. The type of boundary and the growth/decay parameter of the O-U model jointly determine how the choice is influenced by the sensory input presented at different times throughout the trial. It is shown that the O-U models with two types of boundary are closely related and can achieve the same performance under certain parameter values. The value of the growth/decay parameter that maximizes the accuracy of the model has been identified. It is shown that when the boundaries are introduced, the O-U model may achieve higher accuracy than the diffusion model. This suggests that given the limited range of the firing rates of integrator neurons, the neural decision circuits could achieve higher accuracy employing leaky rather than linear integration in certain tasks. We also propose experiments that could distinguish between different models of choice in tasks with pre-determined response time.