Language, moral order and political praxis

The paper argues that the debate between objectivist criticism and postmodern critique represents a fracturing of the modes of mundane social and linguistic practice. The two together miss the open-textured character of language-in-use and the reflexive properties of situated human practice. Both difference and agreement are grounded in the multiplicity of criteria that are a feature of the logical grammar of language, and therefore of everyday praxis, including that of critique. To escape the duality of foundationalism on the one hand, and radical relativism on the other, attention to the praxiological details of human action and reasoning is needed. The paper draws on Wittgensteinian philosophy and ethnomethodological studies of reasoning to make its case.     

Zur Rekonstruktion der Philosophischen Hermeneutik

Towards a reconstruction of philosophical hermeneutics. Following Nietzsche, Heidegger and, on the other hand, Cassirer and Wittgenstein, a philosophy of interpretation, i.e. a relativism of world-views, is at present increasing in continental as well as in analytical philosophy. From the basis of a critical fallibilism the shortcomings of the new epistemological antirealism are pointed out in general, and, hence, consequences are drawn for the more specialized case of metahermeneutics (hermeneutics being defined as a sort of pragmatical semiotics). A combination of realistic and antirealistic elements is recommended as unevitable. According to this, firstly, the key-concepts of hermeneutics must be differentiated, and, secondly, a fundamental set of criteria can be established that bridges the gap between metahermeneutics and hermeneutical practice.

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Der Artikel führt den überwiegend kritisch gerichteten Beitrag Thesen zur Philosophischen Hermeneutik, Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie 1993/1, 173–188 nach der konstruktiven und systematischen Seite hin weiter.     

Need for closure and dealing with uncertainty in decision making context: The role of the behavioral inhibition system and working memory capacity

The aim of the present study was to investigate the moderated mediation model of the relationship between the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), need for closure (NFC) and working memory capacity (WMC) in the decision making process. It was assumed that NFC works as a motivational mechanism that enables individuals high in BIS to deal with uncertainty; therefore, NFC mediates the effect of BIS on behavior in a decision-making situation. Moreover, as uncertainty management requires cognitive resources, we expected WMC to moderate this relationship. In line with our hypothesis, we found that NFC mediated the relationship between BIS and the information search about the job candidates, and this effect occurred only for individuals high in WMC. We discuss these results in the context of effective self-regulation, as well as motivational and cognitive determinants of effort.     

Intelligence and Extraversion in the neural evaluation of delayed rewards

Temporal discounting (TD), the preference for earlier, smaller rewards over delayed, larger rewards, is a pervasive phenomenon that covaries with Big Five personality traits and Intelligence (IQ). This study provides novel insight by identifying correlates for IQ and Extraversion in the neural representation of TD preferences. An intertemporal choice task was employed, where offers were sequentially presented, distinguishing between one evaluation phase (first offer is presented) and one comparison phase (second offer is presented and values are compared). IQ correlated with responses of caudate nucleus to the subjective values of the offers, suggesting a role of cognitive abilities in modulating reward responses. Extraversion correlated with the strength of functional connectivity of a reward evaluation network centered on ventromedial prefrontal cortex.     

Effects of information accuracy and volume on decision making

Recent advances in information technology have resulted in increasingly complex work environments. Much of the complexity is due to a deluge of information available across networks (Gleick, 2011) and unknown reliability, which introduces additional uncertainty (Platt & Huettel, 2008). Understanding the performance characteristics of human information processing for optimal decision making under such conditions of data abundance and uncertainty is critical in complex networked information environments, such as military operations. One focus of the United States military is providing troops with the richness of information formally reserved for higher echelons (Bawden & Robinson, 2009). However, this effort risks cognitive overload, where too much information can result in impaired performance. The present study examined human decision making under varying levels of cognitive load and source reliability. Participants determined the reliability of two information sources and decided how to use them to minimize cognitive load and improve performance in a visual search task. Unbeknownst to participants, one source provided highly accurate information and one provided moderately accurate information. Results showed that participants had more trust in the more accurate than the less accurate source, and decision making accuracy decreased as cognitive load increased. When cognitive load was highest, participants were more accurate on trials with the more accurate source. Thus, the more accurate source facilitated better performance, whether through better intel or through participants offloading some of the cognitive load to the reliable source.     

Information about expert decision and post‐decision distortion of facts of own decision

Cognitive representations of decision problems are dynamic. During and after a decision, evaluations and representations of facts change to support the decision made by a decision maker her‐ or himself (Svenson, 2003). We investigated post‐decision distortion of facts (consolidation). Participants were given vignettes with facts about two terminally ill patients, only one of whom could be given lifesaving surgery. In Study 1, contrary to the prediction, the results showed that facts were distorted after a decision both by participants who were responsible for the decisions themselves and when doctors had made the decision. In Study 2 we investigated the influence of knowledge about expert decisions on a participant's own decision and post‐decisional distortion of facts. Facts were significantly more distorted when the participant's decision agreed with an expert's decision than when the participant and expert decisions disagreed. The findings imply that knowledge about experts' decisions can distort memories of facts and therefore may obstruct rational analyses of earlier decisions. This is particularly important when a decision made by a person, who is assumed to be an expert, makes a decision that is biased or wrong.     

The Loss of Loss Aversion: Paying Attention to Reference Points

We agree with Gal and Rucker ( 2018 , in press) that loss aversion is not as firmly established as typically assumed. We affirm, however, the more general principle put forward within Prospect Theory (D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, 1979), which is that reference points increase people's sensitivity to objective changes in value. We show how the literatures on counterfactual thought, social comparison, and goal pursuit are consistent with the notion that reference points increase sensitivity to change in value, while not being consistent with loss aversion. We then examine, within the framework of Regulatory Focus theory (E. T. Higgins, 1997, 1998), how different reference points combine with characteristics of the actor and the situation to give rise to loss aversion (more sensitivity to negative outcomes than to positive outcomes) as well as to the reverse pattern (more sensitivity to positive outcomes than to negative outcomes). Our review suggests that the status quo, even when used as a reference point, is not necessarily neutral. It also suggests that anchor points other than the status quo may serve as reference points and that people may use more than one reference point simultaneously. More generally, we call for a critical examination of the “bad is stronger than good” principle.     

Voluntary decision-making in addiction: A comprehensive review of existing measurement tools

The notion of voluntariness, notably the inability to refrain from using an addictive substance, is central to addiction. This review examines different constructs measuring voluntariness in the context of drug addiction. We found 117 articles featuring 123 distinct scales for 11 of the 16 constructs initially searched. Self-efficacy was by far the construct with most scales. Most scales were not specifically developed with samples of people with addictions. From a methodological standpoint, current literature jeopardizes the validity of generalizations about how voluntariness functions and is measured in people with and without a drug addiction. From the standpoint of social psychology, the study of voluntariness remains anchored in an individualistic orientation to the study of cognition and behavior, thus calling for greater crosstalk between psychology subspecialties.     

Late‐life Depression,Suicidal Ideation,and Attempted Suicide: The Role of Individual Differences in Maximizing,Regret, and Negative Decision Outcomes

Suicide rates are highest in adults of middle and older age. Research with psychiatric patients has shown that proneness to feel regret about past decisions can grow so intense that suicide becomes a tempting escape. Here, we examine the additional role of individual differences in maximizing, or the tendency to strive for the best decision, rather than one that is good enough. We provided individual‐difference measures of maximizing, regret proneness, and negative life decision outcomes (as reported on the Decision Outcome Inventory) to a nonpsychiatric control group, as well as three groups of psychiatric patients in treatment for suicide attempts, suicidal ideation, or non‐suicidal depression. We found that scores on the three individual‐difference measures were worse for psychiatric patients than for nonpsychiatric controls and were correlated to clinical assessments of depression, hopelessness, and suicidal ideation. More importantly, maximizing was associated with these clinical assessments, even after taking into account maximizers' worse life decision outcomes. Regret proneness significantly mediated those relationships, suggesting that maximizers could be at risk for clinical depression because of their proneness to regret. We discuss the theoretical relevance of our findings and their promise for clinical practice. Ultimately, late‐life depression and suicidal ideation may be treated with interventions that promote better decision making and regret regulation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.