Trade‐off ranking method for multi‐criteria decision analysis

Multi‐criteria decision analysis presumes trade‐off between different criteria. As a result, the optimal solution is not unique and can be represented by the Pareto frontier in the objective space. Each Pareto solution is a compromise between different objectives. Despite a limited number of Pareto optimal solutions, the decision‐maker eventually has to choose only one option. Such a choice has to be made with the use of additional preferences not included in the original formulation of the optimization problem. The paper represents a new approach to an automatic ranking that can help the decision‐maker. In contrast to the other methodologies, the proposed method is based on the minimization of trade‐off between different Pareto solutions. To be realized, the approach presumes the existence of a well‐distributed Pareto set representing the entire Pareto frontier. In the paper, such a set is generated with the use of the directed search domain algorithm. The method is applied to a number of test cases and compared against two existing alternative approaches.     

Give them what they want: The benefits of explicitness in gift exchange

Five studies show that gift recipients are more appreciative of gifts they explicitly request than those they do not. In contrast, gift givers assume that both solicited and unsolicited gifts will be equally appreciated. At the root of this dilemma is a difference of opinion about what purchasing an unsolicited gift signals: gift givers expect unsolicited gifts will be considered more thoughtful and considerate by their intended recipients than is actually the case (,  and ). In our final two studies, we highlight two boundary conditions for this effect: identifying a specific gift and using money as a gift. When gift recipients request one specific gift, rather than providing a list of possible gifts, givers become more willing to purchase the requested gift (Study 4). Further, although givers believe that recipients do not appreciate receiving money as much as receiving a solicited gift, recipients feel the opposite about these two gift options (Study 5).     

Keeping one's options open: The detrimental consequences of decision reversibility

People generally prefer to have the opportunity to revise their decisions. Surprisingly however, research has shown that keeping one's options open yields lower satisfaction with the decision outcome (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). Two studies aimed to gain more insight into the detrimental consequences of decision reversibility and the cognitive processes underlying decision reversibility. Building upon literature on goal fulfillment we hypothesized and found in a first experiment that as long as decisions are still open to change, accessibility of decision-related constructs is increased compared to neutral constructs. A second experiment demonstrated that decision reversibility undermines working memory capacity. Moreover participants experienced higher regret after having made a reversible decision, an effect that was mediated by decreased working memory capacity. The study set implies that reversible decisions yield lower working memory capacity because people continue to think about the, still relevant, choice options. In the end this might increase dissatisfaction with the decision and regret.     

Subjective expected utility without preferences

This paper proposes a theory of subjective expected utility based on primitives only involving the fact that an act can be judged either “attractive” or “unattractive”. We give conditions implying that there are a utility function on the set of consequences and a probability distribution on the set of states such that attractive acts have a subjective expected utility above some threshold. The numerical representation that is obtained has strong uniqueness properties.     

Target prototypicality moderates racial bias in the decision to shoot

Research shows that target race can influence the decision to shoot armed and unarmed Black and White males (e.g., Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). To date, however, research has only examined category level effects by comparing average responses to Blacks and Whites. The current studies investigated whether target prototypicality influences the decision to shoot above and beyond the effect of race. Here, we replicated racial bias in shoot decisions and demonstrated that bias was moderated by target prototypicality. As target prototypicality increased, participants showed greater racial bias. Further, when targets were unprototypic, racial bias reversed (e.g., participants mistakenly shot more unarmed Whites than Blacks). Study 2 examined whether these effects were observed among police officers. Although police showed no racial bias on average, target prototypicality significantly influenced judgments. Across both studies, sensitivity to variability in Whites' prototypicality drove these effects, while variation in Black prototypicality did not affect participants' decisions.     

Piéron's Law holds during stroop conflict: insights into the architecture of decision making

Piéron's Law describes the relationship between stimulus intensity and reaction time. Previously (Stafford & Gurney, 2004), we have shown that Piéron's Law is a necessary consequence of rise-to-threshold decision making and thus will arise from optimal simple decision-making algorithms (e.g., Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006). Here, we manipulate the color saturation of a Stroop stimulus. Our results show that Piéron's Law holds for color intensity and color-naming reaction time, extending the domain of this law, in line with our suggestion of the generality of the processes that can give rise to Piéron's Law. In addition, we find that Stroop condition does not interact with the effect of color saturation; Stroop interference and facilitation remain constant at all levels of color saturation. An analysis demonstrates that this result cannot be accounted for by single-stage decision-making algorithms which combine all the evidence pertaining to a decision into a common metric. This shows that human decision making is not information-optimal and suggests that the generalization of current models of simple perceptual decision making to more complex decisions is not straightforward.     

Expertise in complex decision making: the role of search in chess 70 years after de Groot

One of the most influential studies in all expertise research is de Groot's (1946) study of chess players, which suggested that pattern recognition, rather than search, was the key determinant of expertise. Many changes have occurred in the chess world since de Groot's study, leading some authors to argue that the cognitive mechanisms underlying expertise have also changed. We decided to replicate de Groot's study to empirically test these claims and to examine whether the trends in the data have changed over time. Six Grandmasters, five International Masters, six Experts, and five Class A players completed the think-aloud procedure for two chess positions. Findings indicate that Grandmasters and International Masters search more quickly than Experts and Class A players, and that both groups today search substantially faster than players in previous studies. The findings, however, support de Groot's overall conclusions and are consistent with predictions made by pattern recognition models.     

Cheating more when the spoils are split

Four experiments demonstrated that people are more likely to cheat when the benefits of doing so are split with another person, even an anonymous stranger, than when the actor alone captures all of the benefits. In three of the studies, splitting the benefits of over-reporting one’s performance on a task made such over-reporting seem less unethical in the eyes of participants. Mitigated perceptions of the immorality of over-reporting performance mediated the relationship between split spoils and increased over-reporting of performance in Study 3. The studies thus showed that people may be more likely to behave dishonestly for their own benefit if they can point to benefiting others as a mitigating factor for their unethical behavior.     

Multi-attribute,multi-alternative models of choice: Choice,reaction time,and process tracing

The first aim of this research is to compare computational models of multi-alternative, multi-attribute choice when attribute values are explicit. The choice predictions of utility (standard random utility & weighted valuation), heuristic (elimination-by-aspects, lexicographic, & maximum attribute value), and dynamic (multi-alternative decision field theory, MDFT, & a version of the multi-attribute linear ballistic accumulator, MLBA) models are contrasted on both preferential and risky choice data. Using both maximum likelihood and cross-validation fit measures on choice data, the utility and dynamic models are preferred over the heuristic models for risky choice, with a slight overall advantage for the MLBA for preferential choice. The response time predictions of these models (except the MDFT) are then tested. Although the MLBA accurately predicts response time distributions, it only weakly accounts for stimulus-level differences. The other models completely fail to account for stimulus-level differences. Process tracing measures, i.e., eye and mouse tracking, were also collected. None of the qualitative predictions of the models are completely supported by that data. These results suggest that the models may not appropriately represent the interaction of attention and preference formation. To overcome this potential shortcoming, the second aim of this research is to test preference-formation assumptions, independently of attention, by developing the models of attentional sampling (MAS) model family which incorporates the empirical gaze patterns into a sequential sampling framework. An MAS variant that includes attribute values, but only updates the currently viewed alternative and does not contrast values across alternatives, performs well in both experiments. Overall, the results support the dynamic models, but point to the need to incorporate a framework that more accurately reflects the relationship between attention and the preference-formation process.     

What Are They Thinking? A National Study of Stability and Change in Divorce Ideation

This study reports on a nationally representative sample of married individuals ages 25–50 (N = 3,000) surveyed twice (1 year apart) to investigate the phenomenon of divorce ideation, or what people are thinking when they are thinking about divorce. Twenty‐eight percent of respondents had thought their marriage was in serious trouble in the past but not recently. Another 25% had thoughts about divorce in the last 6 months. Latent Class Analysis revealed three distinct groups among those thinking about divorce at Time 1: soft thinkers (49%), long‐term‐serious thinkers (45%), and conflicted thinkers (6%). Yet, divorce ideation was not static; 31% of Time 1 thinkers were not thinking about it 1 year later (and 36% of nonthinkers at Time 1 were thinking about it 1 year later). Also, Latent Transition Analysis revealed 49% of Time 1 long‐term‐serious thinkers, 56% of soft thinkers, and 51% of conflicted thinkers had shifted groups at Time 2, mostly in the direction of less and softer thinking about divorce. Overall, divorce ideation is common but dynamic, and it is not necessarily an indication of imminent marital dissolution.