On avoiding framing effects in experienced decision makers

The present study aimed to (a) demonstrate the effect of positive–negative framing on experienced criminal justice decision makers, (b) examine the debiasing effect of visually structured risk messages, and (c) investigate whether risk perceptions mediate the debiasing effect of visual aids on decision making. In two phases, 60 senior police officers estimated the accuracy of a counterterrorism technique in identifying whether a known terror suspect poses an imminent danger and decided whether they would recommend the technique to policy makers. Officers also rated their confidence in this recommendation. When information about the effectiveness of the counterterrorism technique was presented in a numerical format, officers' perceptions of accuracy and recommendation decisions were susceptible to the framing effect: The technique was perceived to be more accurate and was more likely to be recommended when its effectiveness was presented in a positive than in a negative frame. However, when the information was represented visually using icon arrays, there were no such framing effects. Finally, perceptions of accuracy mediated the debiasing effect of visual aids on recommendation decisions. We offer potential explanations for the debiasing effect of visual aids and implications for communicating risk to experienced, professional decision makers.     

Choice both affects and reflects preferences

The free-choice paradigm is a widely used paradigm in psychology. It has been used to show that after a choice between two similarly pleasant stimuli, the pleasantness of the chosen one tends to increase, whereas the pleasantness of the rejected one tends to decrease—a spreading of alternatives. However, the methodological validity of the free-choice paradigm to study choice-induced preference change has recently been seriously questioned [Chen, K. M., & Risen, J. L. (2010). How choice affects and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 573–594. doi:10.1037/a0020217]. According to this criticism, the classically reported spreading of alternatives between the first and second rating sessions cannot be unambiguously interpreted to reflect a true change in preferences and can be observed even for completely static preferences. Here, we used two measurement sequences, a classical Rating 1–choice–Rating 2 sequence and a control Rating 1–Rating 2–choice sequence, to disentangle the spreading of alternatives driven by the effect of choice from the artefactual effect highlighted by Chen and Risen. In two studies using different stimulus material (faces and odours), we find that choice has a robust modulatory impact on preferences for rejected odours, but not for chosen odours and not for faces.     

Correcting erroneous inferences in memory: The role of source credibility

People often continue to rely on erroneous information about people and events, even in the face of subsequent counter information. The current study examined whether this information could be effectively corrected by a credible source. We examined two aspects of credibility: trustworthiness and expertise. Experiment 1 showed that receiving a correction from a source high in trustworthiness and expertise reduced participants’ use of original information when making inferences. Experiment 2 showed that source expertise alone was not sufficient to reduce participants’ reliance on the original information. The results from Experiment 3 showed that source trustworthiness alone significantly decreased participants’ use of the original information when making inferences. The results suggest that people may be able to reduce their use of original information if they receive a correction from a person who is deemed to be highly trustworthy. These findings have implications for decision making in politics and other applied areas.     

Certainty and Uncertainty: The Two Faces of the Hindsight Bias

“Hindsight Bias” is a person's tendency, after learning about the actual outcome of a situation or the correct answer to a question, to distort a previous judgment in the direction of this new information. In the literature, hindsight bias has been mostly discussed as an inevitable result of a “judgment under uncertainty.” We think that the hindsight bias is due to memorial as well as inferential processes: Whereas certainty about the recollection is memorial and concerns the recollective experience, certainty at the time of the judgment is inferential and concerns the individual's metaknowledge (“I know that I knew that”). In two experiments participants' feelings of certainty were measured indirectly (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) by giving participants the option of leaving those questions unanswered about which they felt uncertain. This free-report option was offered to half of the participants in the first estimate phase (concerning time of judgment) and to the second half in the memory phase (concerning the recollective experience). At the end of the session, participants were presented again with the questions they had skipped and were now required to answer them. This procedure allowed us to compare the amount of hindsight bias for the skipped, uncertain items to the spontaneously answered, certain ones. Both experiments demonstrated that the hindsight bias is a result of the interaction of both uncertainty and certainty.     

The distortion of criteria after decision-making

The results of two experiments indicate that decision-makers separately distort their interpretations of decision criteria and evaluations of information in a manner that justifies their decisions. In Study 1, participants reported a yes/no decision either before or after they rated the applicable decision criterion and problem information. Participants distorted their criterion and information ratings more when they reported their decisions before, rather than after, they rated the decision criterion and problem information. Study 2 demonstrated that distortion of decision criterion ratings occurred after a decision had been made whereas distortion of information evaluations occurred during the process of reaching a decision. These results are consistent with a two-stage model of decision-making in which the distortion of decision criteria is distinct from the distortion of decision information.     

Probability, logic and the cognitive foundations of rational belief

Since Pascal introduced the idea of mathematical probability in the 17th century discussions of uncertainty and “rational” belief have been dogged by philosophical and technical disputes. Furthermore, the last quarter century has seen an explosion of new questions and ideas, stimulated by developments in the computer and cognitive sciences. Competing ideas about probability are often driven by different intuitions about the nature of belief that arise from the needs of different domains (e.g., economics, management theory, engineering, medicine, the life sciences etc). Taking medicine as our focus we develop three lines of argument (historical, practical and cognitive) that suggest that traditional views of probability cannot accommodate all the competing demands and diverse constraints that arise in complex real-world domains. A model of uncertain reasoning based on a form of logical argumentation appears to unify many diverse ideas. The model has precursors in informal discussions of argumentation due to Toulmin, and the notion of logical probability advocated by Keynes, but recent developments in artificial intelligence and cognitive science suggest ways of resolving epistemological and technical issues that they could not address.     

大学生自信发展特点的研究

本研究选取931名大学生为被试,采用自编“大学生自信问卷”?考察了大学生自信的年龄特点、性别差异及学校类型差异。结果表明：大学生自信总水平差异显著,除社交自信外,整体自信、学业自信和身体自信均存在极显著性别差异,男生高于女生;大学生在整体、学业和身体自信及其分维度上存在显著年级差异：一、四年级显著高于二、三年级,其中三年级自信度明显低于其它年级;学业、社交、身体自信及其分维度存在显著学校类型差异,非重点大学学生显著高于重点大学学生;年级和学校类型在身体自信、整体自信、学业自信、社交自信及其某些层面上存在显著交互作用;性别和学校类型在身体自信某分维度的交互作用达显著水平。     

Saving the worst for last: The effect of time horizon on the efficiency of negotiating benefits and burdens

Three experiments explored the effect of outcome delays—longer time horizons for the realization of outcomes—on the efficiency of negotiated agreements. We hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between a longer temporal distance to the consequences of negotiated agreements and the efficiency of those agreements. Outcome delays did increase the efficiency of the negotiated agreements. In addition, type of resource, burden or benefit, moderated this relationship. Because negotiating for burdens is more difficult than negotiating for benefits in the present, the salutary discounting effects of outcome delays were greater for burdens. The multifaceted effects of time on negotiations are discussed.     

Group decision process and incrementalism in organizational decision making

In two studies examining resource allocation, support is found for the notion that group decisions are affected in systematic ways depending on whether or not there was individual consideration of the problem before meeting as a group. Specifically, compared to no prior consideration groups, prior consideration groups (1) escalate their commitment more in progress (i.e., ongoing) decisions, and (2) are less willing to concentrate resources on a single project in adoption (i.e., resource utilization) decisions. The findings challenge the blanket assertion that promoting divergent views in a group decision context is always related to better decisions.     

Fluctuations of answer and confidence rating in a general-knowledge problem task: Is confidence rating a result of direct memory-relevant output monitoring?

In order to examine whether confidence rating is a result of direct memory-relevant output monitoring, a general-knowledge test was used. A question set was answered in experimental session 1, and the same question set was employed in session 2. Subjects chose one answer from two alternatives. No significant difference in answer accuracy was found between sessions, which suggests that identical information processing was carried out, and that any difference between sessions was based on probabilistic fluctuation. The major results were as follows: (a) In both sessions, answer accuracy was an increasing function of confidence. (b) Answer-change rate (rate of different answers to the same question between sessions) decreased monotonically with confidence. (c) The distributions of confidence rating in session 2, conditional on the rating in session 1, were nearly identical in no-answer-change and answer-change cases. These results suggest that confidence rating is not a result of monitoring memory-relevant output itself but an estimation of possibility of answer fluctuation.