Flexible use of spatial cues in the southern flying squirrel (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Glaucomys volans</Emphasis>)

Insects, birds, and mammals have been shown capable of encoding spatial information in memory using multiple strategies or frames of reference simultaneously. These strategies include orientation to a goal-specific cue or beacon, to the position of the goal in an array of local landmarks, or to its position in the array of distant landmarks, also known as the global frame of reference. From previous experiments, it appears that birds and mammals that scatter hoard rely primarily on a global frame of reference, but this generalization depends on evidence from only a few species. Here we examined spatial memory in a previously unstudied scatter hoarder, the southern flying squirrel. We dissociated the relative weighting of three potential spatial strategies (beacon, global, or relative array strategy) with three probe tests: transposition of beacon and the rotation or the expansion of the array. The squirrels’ choices were consistent with a spatial averaging strategy, where they chose the location dictated by at least two of the three strategies, rather than using a single preferred frame of reference. This adaptive and flexible heuristic has not been previously described in animal orientation studies, yet it may be a common solution to the universal problem of encoding and recalling spatial locations in an ephemeral physical landscape.     

Are Newcomb problems really decisions?

Richard Jeffrey long held that decision theory should be formulated without recourse to explicitly causal notions. Newcomb problems stand out as putative counterexamples to this ‘evidential’ decision theory. Jeffrey initially sought to defuse Newcomb problems via recourse to the doctrine of ratificationism, but later came to see this as problematic. We will see that Jeffrey’s worries about ratificationism were not compelling, but that valid ratificationist arguments implicitly presuppose causal decision theory. In later work, Jeffrey argued that Newcomb problems are not decisions at all because agents who face them possess so much evidence about correlations between their actions and states of the world that they are unable to regard their deliberate choices as causes of outcomes, and so cannot see themselves as making free choices. Jeffrey’s reasoning goes wrong because it fails to recognize that an agent’s beliefs about her immediately available acts are so closely tied to the immediate causes of these actions that she can create evidence that outweighs any antecedent correlations between acts and states. Once we recognize that deliberating agents are free to believe what they want about their own actions, it will be clear that Newcomb problems are indeed counterexamples to evidential decision theory.     

基于心理痛苦理论与决策树的中学生心理危机分类模型

中学生心理危机分类模型属于复杂数据模型，本文采用分类树算法探究家庭、校园、同伴和个体因素在中学生心理危机分类中的相对重要性差异，尤其是心理痛苦三因素对致死性危机的独特作用。结果显示：（1）中学生自杀危机和非致死性危机分类树的分类效果良好，自伤危机分类树的分类效果欠佳；（2）中学生自杀危机中，痛苦逃避最为重要，痛苦唤醒次之，之后为痛苦体验和学校满意度；（3）中学生自伤危机中，同伴问题行为最为重要，之后为父母陪伴和家庭监督；（4）中学生非致死性危机中，歧视知觉最为重要，之后为痛苦唤醒和同伴支持。提示中学生不同心理危机的促发机制存在差异，心理痛苦三因素模型在自杀分类模型中作用显著，但并非自伤危机和非致死性危机的关键变量。     

Thinking about complex decisions: How sleep and time-of-day influence complex choices

In this study, we systematically manipulate a person’s state of sleep; Sleep-deprived and Well-rested along with Matching or Mismatching the decision time-of-day to their circadian preferred time-of-day. We assessed how these conditions influenced performance on an incentivized complex decision task. In the overall analysis of these variables no differences emerged. However, a comparison of the more cognitively depleting Sleep-deprivation/Circadian-mismatch condition to the cognitively enhancing Well-rested/Circadian-match condition showed improved performance in the Well-rested/Circadian matched group for one complex decision task but not for the other. These findings build upon the existing literature on sleep and circadian rhythm effects while uniquely observing the combined effects of these variables on complex decision making.     

Rightly crossing the Rubicon: Evaluating goal self-concordance prior to selection helps people choose more intrinsic goals

We studied how people “cross the Rubicon” when making personal goal selections. In Studies 1 and 2 participants rated the self-concordance of four candidate goals, two with intrinsic and two with extrinsic content, before selecting two goals to actually pursue. Intrinsic goal content predicted higher self-concordance, as did matching between goal content and participant values and motives. Self-concordance in turn explained participants’ actual goal-selections. In longitudinal Study 2, intrinsic goal selection predicted increased well-being. In experimental Study 3, participants randomly assigned to rate candidate goals prior to selection made more intrinsic selections on average, compared to those not afforded this opportunity. We conclude that considering one’s motivations for various candidate goals prior to selecting among them can improve one’s goal choices.     

Visualization,pattern recognition,and forward search: effects of playing speed and sight of the position on grandmaster chess errors

A new approach examined two aspects of chess skill, long a popular topic in cognitive science. A powerful computer‐chess program calculated the number and magnitude of blunders made by the same 23 grandmasters in hundreds of serious games of slow (“classical”) chess, regular “rapid” chess, and rapid “blindfold” chess, in which opponents transmit moves without ever seeing the actual position. Rapid chess led to substantially more and larger blunders than classical chess. Perhaps more surprisingly, the frequency and magnitude of blunders did not differ in rapid versus blindfold play, despite the additional memory and visualization load imposed by the latter. We discuss the involvement of various cognitive processes in human problem‐solving and expertise, especially with respect to chess. Prior opposing views about the basis of general chess skill have emphasized the dominance of either (a) swift pattern recognition or (b) analyzing ahead, but both seem important and the controversy appears currently unresolvable and perhaps fruitless.     

人事决策信息利用和效能预测模型

本研究以 1 2 2名人事管理人员为被试 ,采用问卷测量法 ,分析了企业人事决策信息利用的现状 ,信息利用指标和效能的关系。结果发现 :1企业人事决策中比较重视能力要求信息、组织环境信息和个人档案材料 ,忽略心理特点信息的利用 ;2非程序信息、人职匹配信息对效能指标的直接预测力较强 ,其他指标的预测力较弱 ;3能力要求、考核成绩、个人档案材料等信息通过人职匹配信息的利用对效能指标产生影响。文章还构建了人事决策的效能预测模型 ,并讨论了研究结果对企业人事决策诊断和发展的理论和实际意义。     

Should I Drive Today? Development of a daily driving decisions model for older adults

BackgroundOlder adults in communities make daily decisions about how to meet their transportation needs so they can access services and stay socially connected. With the aging of populations in developed countries, the travel decisions of older adults will have increasing impacts. Research studies have identified different sets of factors that contribute to certain travel decisions, but little research has been directed towards understanding how individuals select information from all available factors, what information they include in their decisions under different circumstances, and the processes they use in making their transportation decisions.MethodsThis exploratory study involved 20 men and 17 women, mean age 78.6 years (range 70–96), who drove weekly. All participants were involved in each phase of the 3-phase study. In Phase 1, a review of the literature and interviews with the participants was used to collect information, and inductive thematic analysis was employed to construct a draft conceptual model of older driver decision-making. In Phase 2, participants completed a stated preference task of written scenarios to demonstrate their decision-making strategies. Results were tabulated and used to refine a final Daily Driving Decisions model. In Phase 3, a card sorting decision task was used to test the model with participants.ResultsThe final dynamic Daily Driving Decisions Model was confirmed to describe decision processes used by the participants in making decisions about how they would meet their transportation needs. The model describes three categories of factors used in decisions, labelled Motivators, Constraint/Enablers and Context, each containing four attribute themes. A significant finding was the variable use of the same item to either constrain or enable the decision to drive depending on the variation of other factors in the scenario. Participants demonstrated use of compensatory and noncompensatory (heuristic, habitual) decision processes that were accommodated by the model.ConclusionThe proposed Daily Driving Decisions Model addresses a gap in our understanding of how older drivers make their decisions about meeting their transportation needs. The model presents a template for classifying the types of information used, ignored or discarded by older adults, and the pathways that they take to arrive at their decisions. The model provides opportunities for further research in testing the influence of other factors such as urban/rural residence, income, health status and culture on driving decisions. Further, the model can be used by practitioners to gain insight into the decision-making behaviours of individuals and to develop interventions to enhance their decision-making skills.     

Witness confidence and accuracy: is a positive relationship maintained for recall under interview conditions?

A large positive correlation between eyewitness recall confidence and accuracy (C-A) is found in research when item difficulty is varied to include easy questions. However, these results are based on questionnaire responses. In real interviews, the social nature of the interview may influence C-A relationships, and it is the interviewer's perception of the accuracy of a witness that counts. This study was conducted to investigate the influence of these factors for recall of a video. Three conditions were used; the same questions were used in each. Participants in condition 1 (self-rate questionnaire condition, n = 20) were given a questionnaire that required them to answer questions and rate confidence on a scale. Pairs of participants in condition 2 (self-rate interview condition, n = 40) were given the role of eyewitness or interviewer. Eyewitnesses were asked questions by an interviewer and responded orally with answers and confidence judgements on a Likert scale. Participants in condition three (interviewer-rate interview condition, n = 40) were tested in the same way as condition two but provided confidence judgements in their own words. Interviewers independently rated each confidence judgement on the Likert scale. The experiment showed high C-A relationships, particularly for ‘absolutely sure’ responses. The main effect of the social interview condition was to increase confidence in correct answers but not in incorrect answers. However, the advantage of this effect was tempered by the fact that, although observers can differentiate between confident and less confident answers, less extreme confidence judgements were ascribed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.