Psychological determinants of decision attitude

Decision attitude — an analog of risk attitude — is the propensity to make (or avoid making) a decision: in decision aversion, a person finds it more desirable to receive through fiat the better of two options than to have a choice between them; in decision seeking, the choice is more desirable, even though it can lead to nothing better than the best option. Both decision aversion and decision seeking were found in hypothetical scenarios. Experimental manipulations and subjects' justifications point to anticipated regret, fear of blame for poor outcomes, and desire for equitable distributions as sources of decision aversion. One source of decision seeking (for self) and decision aversion (when deciding for others) appears to be the desire for the self-determination of the affected parties. We consider the implications of our results for personal choice and public policy decisions.     

Human Signal-detection Performance: Effects Of Signal Presentation Probabilities And Reinforcer Distributions

University students participated in one of four standard two-choice signal-detection experiments in which signal presentation probability was varied and the reinforcement distribution was held constant and equal. In Experiments 1, 3 and 4, subjects' performance showed a systematic response bias for reporting the stimulus presented least often. Experiments 1 and 4 showed that this effect was reliable with extended training and monetary, rather than point, reinforcement. In Experiment 2, all correct responses were signaled in some way, and this produced the opposite relationship between signal presentation probability and response bias. Experiments 1 and 3 found that explicitly deducting money (intended as punishment) for equal numbers of incorrect responses on each alternative, or varying the obtained overall rate of reinforcement, produced no clear change in response bias. The bias, shown by humans, for reporting the stimulus presented least often remains a challenge for theories of stimulus detection.     

Appraisals of Child Behavior by Mothers of Problem and Nonproblem Toddlers

Mothers of problem and nonproblem toddlers rated videotapes of their own and unfamiliar children's behavior. They classified the behaviors as positive, negative, or neutral, and evaluated the intensity of the positive or negative behaviors. Ratings did not differ by problem status; however, all mothers classified their own children's behavior as less negative than did an independent observer. Mothers also evaluated all children's negative behavior as less aversive than did the observer. Finally, mothers mistakenly classified less of their own children's behavior as negative and more as positive when compared to their biases in classifying unfamiliar children's behavior.     

父母心理控制与小学生的欺负行为:敌意归因和冷酷无情的作用检验

采用班级整群抽样法选取1847名3~6年级小学生（男生987名;平均年龄10.73±1.16岁）及其家长为被试,采用问卷法考察父母心理控制与小学生欺负行为的关系,同时探讨敌意归因和冷酷无情的中介作用。结果发现：（1）父母心理控制显著正向预测小学生的欺负行为;（2）冷酷无情在父母心理控制与小学生欺负行为间的关系中存在中介作用,敌意归因不发挥中介作用;（3）父母心理控制对小学生欺负行为影响的中介机制不存在显著的性别差异和学段差异。本研究结果表明,冷酷无情是父母心理控制影响小学生欺负行为的重要机制,但敌意归因不是。研究者和实践者应注重对欺负者情感加工能力的关注和干预。     

The effects of different component response requirements in multiple and concurrent schedules

Six pigeons were trained on multiple and concurrent schedules. The reinforcement rates were varied systematically (a) when lever pressing was required in one component and key pecking in the successive component; (b) when lever pressing was required in both multiple components; (c) when key pecking was required in both multiple components; and (d) when key pecking was required on one schedule and lever pressing was required on the concurrently-available schedule. Only the absolute level of responding was changed by different response requirements. Analyzed by the generalized matching law, performance under different response requirements resulted in a bias toward key pecking, and the measured response bias was the same in multiple and concurrent schedule arrangements. The bias in time measures obtained from concurrent schedule performance was reliably smaller than the obtained response biases. The sensitivity to reinforcement-rate changes was ordered: concurrent key-lever; multiple key-key; multiple lever-key; and, the least sensitive, multiple lever-lever. The results confirm that requirements of different topographical responses can be handled by the generalized matching law mainly in the bias parameter, but problems for this type of analysis may be caused by the changing sensitivity to reinforcement in multiple schedule performance as response requirements are changed.     

On the discriminability of stimulus duration.

The performance of pigeons trained to detect differences in the duration of stimuli was analysed using a matching model of signal detection. Two white stimuli, S1 and S2, differing in duration, were arranged with equal probability on the center key of a three-key chamber. S1 was systematically varied from 5 seconds to 25 seconds while S2 remained constant at 30 seconds. On completion of the center-key stimulus, a peck on the center key turned on the two red side keys. A left-key response was "correct" when S1 had been in effect on the center key and a right-key response was "correct" on S2 trials. A correct response produced a 3-second magazine light accompanied intermittently by food. Incorrect responses produced 3-second blackouts. Detection performance was measured under two procedures. In the first, the obtained reinforcement ratio was uncontrolled by allowing the number of food reinforcements obtained for correct left- and right-key responses to vary as the stimuli were changed. In the second procedure, the presentation of food reinforcement was controlled by holding the obtained reinforcement ratio constant. Discriminability changed as a function of stimulus differences under both procedures. No such trend was found in response bias.     

Concurrent fixed-interval variable-ratio schedules and the matching relation

Five rats responded under concurrent fixed-interval variable-ratio schedules of food reinforcement. Fixed-interval values ranged from 50-seconds to 300-seconds and variable-ratio values ranged from 30 to 360; a five-second changeover delay was in effect throughout the experiment. The relations between reinforcement ratios obtained from the two schedules and the ratios of responses and time spent on the schedules were described by Baum's (1974) generalized matching equation. All subjects undermatched both response and time ratios to reinforcement ratios, and all subjects displayed systematic bias in favor of the variable-ratio schedules. Response ratios undermatched reinforcement ratios less than did time ratios, but response ratios produced greater bias than did time ratios for every subject and for the group as a whole. Local rates of responding were generally higher on the variable-ratio than on the fixed-interval schedules. When responding was maintained by both schedules, a period of no responding on either schedule immediately after fixed-interval reinforcement typically was followed by high-rate responding on the variable-ratio schedule. At short fixed-interval values, when a changeover to the fixed-interval schedule was made, responding usually continued until fixed-interval reinforcement was obtained; at longer values, a changeover back to the variable-ratio schedule usually occurred when fixed-interval reinforcement was not forthcoming within a few seconds, and responding then alternated between the two schedules every few seconds until fixed-interval reinforcement finally was obtained.     

The interaction between stimulus and reinforcer control on remembering.

In a symbolic matching-to-sample task, 6 pigeons obtained food by pecking a red side key when the brighter of two white lights had been presented on the center key and by pecking a green side key when the dimmer of two white lights had been presented on the center key. Across Part 1 and Parts 6 to 10, the delay between sample-stimulus presentation and the availability of the choice keys was varied between 0 s and 25 s. Across Parts 1 to 5, the delay between the emission of a correct choice and the delivery of a reinforcer was varied between 0 s and 30 s. Although increasing both types of delay decreased stimulus discriminability, lengthening the stimulus-choice delay produced a greater decrement in choice accuracy than did lengthening the choice-reinforcer delay. Additionally, the relative reinforcer rate for correct choice was varied across both types of delay. The sensitivity of behavior to the distribution of reinforcers decreased as discriminability decreased under both procedures. These data are consistent with the view, based on the generalized matching law, that sample stimuli and reinforcers interact in their control over remembering.     

Decisions,actions, and the appropriateness of confidence in knowledge

This research examines the appropriateness of confidence (i.e., subjective probability judgments) in knowledge associated with decisions and actions of social importance. One hundred and thirty seven participants completed a 50 item questionnaire assessing their knowledge of the two leading candidates in the 1988 presidential election in the U.S.A. Ninety one of the respondents completed the questionnaire one week prior to the election, whereas the other 46 completed the questionnaire on election day shortly after voting. After each item in the questionnaire, all respondents indicated whether or not the item content represented a reason why they voted (or intended to vote) for or against the candidate to whom the item referred. Within-person results indicated that, in comparison to items that were not cited as reasons for voting intentions or voting behavior, items endorsed as reasons were characterized by better accuracy and resolution, but worse overconfidence. Between groups, decision makers were significantly more accurate and better calibrated than those who had not made a decision between the candidates. Implications of inappropriate confidence on decision making effectiveness are discussed.     

Do medical decision analyses' largest gains grow from the smallest trees?

Some decision analysts recommend reserving their models for careful, complete study of complex problems. Others believe simple problem analyses provide the greatest gains. To clarify these issues, I tested: (1) whether simple published analyses compared to complex ones, produced results as non-intuitive; and (2) whether non-intuitiveness represented analytic gain (or equivalently, intuitive loss). Very limited data also examined (3) the gain from adding model intricacy for a given problem vs. selecting more complex problems for analysis. To assess two non-intuitiveness measures, 75 subjects (33 physicians and 42) non-physicians stated their intuitive preferences in 40 (22 published and 18 unpublished) medical dilemmas. For both physicians and non-physicians, simpler models (those with lees than 30 terminal branches in the decision tree) had about one third the non-intuitiveness of more complex ones. Three tests also supported the premise that analyses outperform intuition, therefore that on average the formers' non-intuitiveness reflects less analytic gain. In addition, for different models of the same problem, tree complexity did not correlate with gain. Thus, simpler trees may not generally gain less because they inadequately describe problems. Instead, simpler analyses may represent simpler problems, with more similar intuitive and formal solutions. If so, these findings may help us avoid some costly but unnecessary simple analyses.