Can brown lemurs (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Eulemur fulvus</Emphasis>) learn to deceive a human competitor?

In the present study we asked whether lemurs could learn to manipulate information in order to deceive a human competitive trainer. Four brown lemurs were trained to communicate about the location of a hidden reward to a cooperative trainer, who rewarded the subject if he indicated the baited bowl. Next, a competitive trainer was introduced who kept the reward for himself if the subject indicated the baited bowl. In a first experiment, sessions were randomly assigned to be with either the cooperative or competitive trainer. No subject was able to show an efficient tactic with both trainers. In a second experiment, the participation of the two trainers was randomized across the trials for each session. When trials were mixed, one subject significantly chose baited location when interacting with the cooperative trainer, and reliably increased his choices of the unbaited location when presented with the competitive trainer. As with most other primate species tested under the same paradigm, associative learning may explain deceptive pointing by lemurs in this study.     

Are errors differentiable from deceptive responses when feigning memory impairment? An fMRI study

Previous neuroimaging studies have suggested that the neural activity associated with truthful recall, with false memory, and with feigned memory impairment are different from one another. Here, we report a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study that addressed an important but yet unanswered question: Is the neural activity associated with intentional faked responses and with errors differentiable? Using a word list learning recognition paradigm, the findings of this mixed event-related fMRI study clearly indicated that the brain activity associated with intentional faked responses was different to the activity associated with errors committed unintentionally. For intentional faked responses, significant activation was found in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate region, and the precuneus. However, no significant activation was observed for unintentional errors. The results suggest that deception, in terms of feigning memory impairment, is not only more cognitively demanding than making unintentional errors but also utilizes different cognitive processes.     

Lying about facial recognition: an fMRI study

Novel deception detection techniques have been in creation for centuries. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a neuroscience technology that non-invasively measures brain activity associated with behavior and cognition. A number of investigators have explored the utilization and efficiency of fMRI in deception detection. In this study, 18 subjects were instructed during an fMRI "line-up" task to either conceal (lie) or reveal (truth) the identities of individuals seen in study sets in order to determine the neural correlates of intentionally misidentifying previously known faces (lying about recognition). A repeated measures ANOVA (lie vs. truth and familiar vs. unfamiliar) and two paired t-tests (familiar vs. unfamiliar and familiar lie vs. familiar truth) revealed areas of activation associated with deception in the right MGF, red nucleus, IFG, SMG, SFG (with ACC), DLPFC, and bilateral precuneus. The areas activated in the present study may be involved in the suppression of truth, working and visuospatial memories, and imagery when providing misleading (deceptive) responses to facial identification prompts in the form of a "line-up".     

Cognitive Lie Detection: Response Time and Consistency of Answers as Cues to Deception

Purpose  The purpose of this study was to test a new cognitive lie detection method, time restricted integrity confirmation (Tri-Con), which uses response time and inconsistencies across answers as cues to deception. Design/methodology/approach   Data were obtained from two samples of students enrolled in psychology classes (n = 96 for Experiment 1, n = 99 for Experiment 2). The experimental task required students to lie or tell the truth to questions probing biodata under time restriction. The foci of questions (such as Academics or Employment History) were chosen because of their relevance to participants’ lives. Findings  Tri-Con was able to distinguish between truth tellers and liars after controlling for individual differences. In one experiment, liar-truth teller classification accuracies reached 89%. Mean response times and answer consistency can be used to distinguish those who lie from those who tell the truth. Implications  Research on cognitive-based lie detectors, such as Tri-Con, hold the potential for developing reliable and valid methods of screening out employees likely to engage in misconduct and providing deceptive answers to screening questions. A cognitive lie detector would constitute a paradigm shift away from the polygraph, and could be used in tandem with integrity tests. Originality/value   This study was a preliminary test of a cognitive lie detection method based on a model of cognitive events (the Activation-Decision-Construction model) when people answer questions deceptively. It constitutes a step in translating laboratory-based cognitive research into applied technologies for the real world detection of lying, including lying that occurs during pre-employment screening. Received and reviewed by former editor, George Neuman.     

Are Bald‐Faced Lies Deceptive after All?

According to the traditional philosophical definition, you lie if and only if you say something that you believe to be false and you intend to deceive someone into believing what you say. However, philosophers have recently noted the existence of bald‐faced lies, lies which are not intended to deceive anyone into believing what is said. As a result, many philosophers have removed deception from their definitions of lying. According to Jennifer Lackey, this is ‘an unhappy divorce’ because it precludes an obvious explanation of the prima facie wrongness of lying. Moreover, Lackey claims that there is a sense of deception in which all lies are deceptive. In this paper, I argue that bald‐faced lies are not deceptive on any plausible notion of deception. In addition, I argue that divorcing deception from lying may not be as unhappy a result as Lackey suggests.     

Catching the liar as a matter of justice: Effects of belief in a just world on deception detection accuracy and the moderating role of mortality salience

Belief in a just world has been linked to high interpersonal trust and less suspicion of deception. We therefore predicted people with a strong dispositional belief in a just world to have low motivation to accurately detect deception. Accordingly, we hypothesized such a belief to be negatively related to accuracy in deception detection. Furthermore, research on Terror Management Theory has indicated that culturally shared values, such as justice, become more important after mortality salience. Thus, we assumed engaging in justice concerns after a death threat is especially relevant for people with a strong belief in a just world, and further, that accurate deception detection is a matter of justice. Based on this reasoning, we expected people with a strong belief in a just world to have an increased motivation to accurately detect deception after mortality salience. Consequently, we hypothesized dispositional differences in belief in a just world to be unrelated to accuracy in deception detection after mortality salience. In line with these predictions, our study revealed that participants with a strong (vs. weak) belief in a just world were worse in deception detection unless they had first been reminded of their mortality.     

The Overclaiming Questionnaire: A good way to measure faking?

We evaluated the validity of the Overclaiming Questionnaire (OCQ) as a measure of job applicants’ faking of personality tests. We assessed whether the OCQ (a) converged with an established measure of applicant faking, Residualized Individual Change Scores (RICSs); (b) predicted admission of faking and faking tendencies (Faking Frequency, Minimizing Weaknesses, Exaggerating Strengths, and Complete Misrepresentation); and, (c) predicted the aforementioned measures as strongly as RICSs did. First, 261 participants were instructed to respond honesty to an extraversion measure. Next, in a mock job application, they filled out the extraversion measure again, as well as the OCQ. The OCQ only weakly predicted RICSs (r = .17), Faking Admission (r = .18), and Faking Frequency (r = .15), and it failed to correlate significantly with Minimizing Weaknesses, Exaggerating Strengths, and Complete Misrepresentation. Moreover, the OCQ performed significantly worse than RICS in predicting Faking Admission, Faking Frequency, Minimizing Weaknesses, Exaggerating Strengths, and Complete Misrepresentation. We urge caution in using the current version of the OCQ to measure faking, but speculate that the innovative approach taken in the OCQ might be more effectively exploited if the OCQ content were tailored to the specific job that applicants are being tested for.     

Robust,unconscious self-deception: Strategic and flexible

In recent years deflationary accounts of self-deception, under the banner of motivationalism, have proven popular. On these views the deception at work is simply a motivated bias. In contrast, we argue for an account of self-deception that involves more robustly deceptive unconscious processes. These processes are strategic, flexible, and demand some retention of the truth. We offer substantial empirical support for unconscious deceptive processes that run counter to certain philosophical and psychological claims that the unconscious is rigid, ballistic, and of limited cognitive sophistication.     

Collective interviewing: A transactive memory approach towards identifying signs of truthfulness

Group interviewing has been neglected in the deception literature, yet it coincides with recent collective memory research. The present experiment applied the transactive memory theory to a collective interviewing situation and explored whether signs of truthfulness emerged through measuring joint memory recall. Truth-tellers were real couples who had been in a relationship for at least one year and cohabiting. Lying pairs were friends who pretended to be in a relationship for at least one year and cohabiting. All couples were interviewed in their pairs about their ‘real’ or ‘fictitious’ relationships. It was found that truth-telling pairs posed questions to one another, provided cues to one another, handed over remembering responsibility, and finished each others’ sentences significantly more than lying pairs, supporting the idea that real couples have a transactive memory system, unlike pretending couples. Implications for a collective interview approach that considers memory within deception detection are discussed.     

The good,the bad and the ugly thing to do when sharing information: Revealing,concealing and lying depend on social motivation,distribution and importance of information

Research on information sharing in group decision-making has widely assumed a cooperative context and focused on the exchange of shared or unshared information in the hidden profile paradigm (36 and 37), neglecting the role of information importance. We argue that information sharing is a mixed-motive conflict setting that gives rise to motivated strategic behavior. We introduce a research paradigm that combines aspects of the traditional information sampling paradigm with aspects of a public good dilemma: the information pooling game. In three experiments, we show that information sharing is strategic behavior that depends on people’s pro-social or pro-self motivation, and that people consider information sharedness and information importance when deciding whether to reveal, withhold, or falsify their private or public information. Pro-social individuals were consistently found to honestly reveal their private and important information, while selfish individuals strategically concealed or even lied about their private and important information.