The being-with of being-there

In Being and Time, Heidegger affirms that being-with or Mitsein is an essential constitution of Dasein but he does not submit this existential to the same rigorous analyses as other existentials. In this essay, Jean-Luc Nancy points to the different places where Heidegger erased the possibility of thinking an essential with that he himself opened. This erasure is due, according to Nancy, to the subordination of Mitsein to a thinking of the proper and the improper. The polarization of Being-with between an improper face, the Anyone, and a proper one, the people, which is also, as Nancy shows, a polarization between everydayness and historicity, between a being-together in exteriority (indifference and anonymity) and a being-together in interiority (union through destiny), between a solitary dying and the sacrificial death in combat, leaves the essential with unthought. This essay shows not only the tensions that arise out of Heidegger’s own analyses of Mitsein and affect the whole of Being and Time but also underlines in the end a “shortfall in thinking” inherent not only to Heidegger’s work but, as Nancy claims, to our Western tradition, a shortfall which Nancy has attempted to remedy in his Being Singular Plural. A slightly different version has been published under the title “L’être-avec de l’être-là” in Lieu-Dit 19 “Communauté” (Spring 2003). All additions in square brackets are the translators’ unless otherwise indicated. The German words in parentheses are Nancy’s additions. For the translation of citations from Being and Time, we have used the Macquarrie & Robinson’s translation which we have modified only when constrained by Nancy himself. Overall, we have tried to be faithful to the Heideggerian tone of Nancy’s text by using the accepted English translation of the central concepts of Being and Time. When we depart from the accepted translations, it is to remain true to Nancy’s paraphrases, emphases, and displacements. For example, we refrain from using “authentic” and “inauthentic.” Translated by Marie-Eve Morin Department of Philosophy, 4-97 Humanities Centre, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada T6G 2E5 e-mail: mmorin1@ualberta.ca

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Who wants to live forever? Immortality,authenticity, and living forever in the present

Death is a bad thing by virtue of its ability to frustrate the subjectively valuable projects that shape our identities and render our lives meaningful. While the presumption that immortality would necessarily result in boredom worse than death proves unwarranted, if the constraint of mortality is a necessary element for virtues, relationships, and motivation to pursue our life-projects, then death might nevertheless be a necessary evil. Mortal or immortal, it’s clear that the value of one’s life depends on its subjectively determined quality, rather than its quantity. Thus, it is imperative to live forever in the present, with flourishing always in mind.     

Christianity and the Death Instinct: Perfect Together?

This article is a fictional letter. This “letter” is the fourth fictional letter published by the author. In each letter, I take on a different persona and address issues and questions of theological students at Princeton Seminary, all of whom I imagine to be in their early or mid-twenties, because that is when I attended Princeton Seminary (Carlin 2004, 2006a, 2006b). By doing so, I am endorsing the introspective method in the psychology of religion, which I’ve learned from Donald Capps (1997). This letter is also a reflection on a passage found in the work Erik Eriksons (1962), which is the below epigram. In this letter, a seminarian writes to his mother during his second year of seminary, shortly before Thanksgiving break. The purpose of his letter is to inform his mother—from whom he received his Christianity—about some of his latest thoughts, particularly about the doctrine of the atonement. He has come to believe that the doctrine is problematic for society and he seeks a way to (re)make Christianity into a force for good. Perhaps strangely, he concludes by calling for the death of God, apparently oblivious to this forgotten debate in theological circles. This article raises a number of questions, but perhaps most importantly this one: How far can we take the lament?     

Immortality and boredom: a response to Wisnewski

This article contributes to the ongoing debate initiated by Bernard Williams’ claim that, due to the non-contingent finitude of the categorical desires that give meaning to our lives, an immortal life would necessarily become intolerably boring. Jeremy Wisnewski has argued that even if immortality involves periods in which our categorical desires have been exhausted, this need not divest life of meaning since some categorical desires are revivable. I argue that careful reflection upon the thought-experiments adduced by Wisnewski reveals that they do not substantiate his proposal, and hence that a plausible reason for rejecting Williams’ position has not been provided.     

Sorrow and the Sage: Grief in the Zhuangzi

The Zhuangzi offers two apparently incompatible models of bereavement. Zhuangzi sometimes suggests that the sage will greet loss with unfractured equanimity and even aplomb. However, upon the death of his own wife, Zhuangzi evinces a sorrow that, albeit brief, fits ill with this suggestion. In this essay, I contend that the grief that Zhuangzi displays at his wife’s death better honors wider values averred elsewhere in the text and, more generally, that a sage who retains a capacity for sorrow will be better positioned for the robust joy so often identified as central to the Zhuangzi’s vision of flourishing. The sagely figures who entirely forego sorrow, I argue, achieve equanimity only through a sacrifice of the emotional range and responsiveness necessary not only for grief but also for the delight Zhuangzi recommends.     

Defining ‘Dead’ in Terms of ‘Lives’ and ‘Dies’

What is it for a thing to be dead? Fred Feldman holds, correctly in my view, that a definition of ‘dead’ should leave open both (1) the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being alive, and (2) the possibility of things that go directly from being alive to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. But if this is right, then surely such a definition should also leave open the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. I show that Feldman’s own definition of ‘dead’ (in terms of ‘lives’ and ‘dies’) does not leave this possibility open. I propose a new definition that does.     

Dyadic coping mediates the relationship between parents’ grief and dyadic adjustment following the loss of a child

Background and Objectives: This study aimed to examine forms of dyadic coping (DC) as mediators of the association between parents’ grief response and dyadic adjustment and to determine whether these indirect effects were moderated by the child’s type of death, timing of death, and age.

Design: The study design was cross-sectional.

Method: The sample consisted of 197 bereaved parents. Participants completed the Prolonged Grief Disorder Scale, Revised Dyadic Adjustment Scale, and Dyadic Coping Inventory.

Results: Significant indirect effects of parents’ grief response on dyadic adjustment were found through stress communication by oneself and by the partner, positive and negative DC by the partner, and joint DC. The timing of death moderated the association between grief response and dyadic adjustment and between joint DC and dyadic adjustment. Grief response was negatively associated with dyadic adjustment only when the death occurred after birth. Grief response was negatively associated with joint DC, which, in turn, was positively associated with dyadic adjustment, when the death occurred both before and after birth. However, the association was stronger in the latter.

Conclusions: Specific forms of DC might be mechanisms through which grief response is associated with dyadic adjustment and should be promoted in clinical practice.     

拖延原因的精神分析探索

拖延行为在日常生活中非常普遍,给人们的学习、生活带来不利影响。本文阐述了拖延的概念和性质,结合精神分析理论,从冲突、焦虑、防御机制和本能等几个方面对消极拖延行为进行分析,旨在为拖延行为的干预提供借鉴。     

Hopelessly mortal: The role of mortality salience,immortality and trait self-esteem in personal hope

Do people lose hope when thinking about death? Based on Terror Management Theory, we predicted that thoughts of death (i.e., mortality salience) would reduce personal hope for people low, but not high, in self-esteem, and that this reduction in hope would be ameliorated by promises of immortality. In Studies 1 and 2, mortality salience reduced personal hope for people low in self-esteem, but not for people high in self-esteem. In Study 3, mortality salience reduced hope for people low in self-esteem when they read an argument that there is no afterlife, but not when they read “evidence” supporting life after death. In Study 4, this effect was replicated with an essay affirming scientific medical advances that promise immortality. Together, these findings uniquely demonstrate that thoughts of mortality interact with trait self-esteem to cause changes in personal hope, and that literal immortality beliefs can aid psychological adjustment when thinking about death. Implications for understanding personal hope, trait self-esteem, afterlife beliefs and terror management are discussed.     

Managing the death of close others: Evidence of higher valuing of ingroup identity in young adults who have experienced the death of a close other

The death of a close other (DOCO) is perhaps the most difficult experience that people endure. According to terror management theory (TMT), people manage the potentially terrorizing awareness of their mortality by immersing in cultural worldviews that allow them to feel like valuable members of a meaningful universe who may have some existence or trace after death. Although TMT has potential implications for understanding how people cope with DOCO, few studies have examined this possibility. We report results from four studies showing that, in line with TMT, students who experienced DOCO reported stronger valuing of their identification with their in-groups, which in turn was associated with higher levels of self-esteem. These findings shed new light on the social-psychological dynamics of DOCO.