The limits of the just-too-different argument

According to moral non-naturalism, the kind of genuine or robust normativity that is characteristic of moral requirements cannot be accounted for within a wholly naturalistic worldview, but requires us to posit a domain of non-natural properties and facts. The main argument for this core non-naturalist claim appeals to what David Enoch calls the ‘just-too-different intuition’. According to Enoch, robust normativity cannot be natural, since it is just too different from anything natural. Derek Parfit makes essentially the same claim under the heading of ‘the normativity objection’, and several other non-naturalists have said similar things. While some naturalists may be tempted to reject this argument as methodologically or dialectically illegitimate, we argue instead that there are important limits to what the just-too-different intuition can show, even setting all other worries aside. More specifically, we argue that the just-too-different argument will backfire on any positive, independent specification of the distinction between the natural and the non-natural. The upshot is that the just-too-different argument can show significantly less than non-naturalists have suggested.     

The advantages of mathematical modeling over traditional methods in the analysis of category clustering

A mathematical model for the analysis of category clustering is developed and testd. The model, which can be applied to categories of any size, is an extension of a two-item statistical model developed by Batchelder and Riefer (Psychological Review, 1980, 87, 375–397), and is equivalent to their model when categories consist of two items. The model is based on a current theory of clustering which postulates that the learning of a list of category items occurs on different hierarchical levels. Two category list-learning experiments are presented, and the data from these experiments are analyzed using the general statistical model. The first experiment reveals that the probabilities of storing and retrieving a cluster increase with category size, while the learning of items as singletons decreases. The effects of within-category spacing indicate that the storage of clusters decreases while cluster retrievability increases with an increase in input spacing. In the second experiment, the storage and retrieval of clusters are shown to be unaffected by whether the presentation of items is uncued or cued with the name of the category. However, the association of items decreases and the learning of items as singletons increases with uncued presentation. In the final sections, the general statistical model is compared to other methods for the measurement of category clustering. The model is shown to be superior to numerical indices of clustering, since these measures are not based on any theory of clustering, and because unitary measures cannot capture the multiprocess nature of categorized recall. The model is also argued to have certain advantages over other mathematical models that have been applied to category clustering, since these models cannot account for situations in which a portion of the items are clustered while others are learned singularly.     

The effects of display and report order asymmetries on lateralized word recognition

Word recognition typically is better or faster in the right visual field than in the left visual field, an effect that often interacts with the handedness of subjects or the phonetic characteristics of the language employed. While these findings suggest a hemispheric locus, it is possible that the field difference is confounded with display or report order asymmetries. Here two experiments manipulate word orientation (horizontal vs. vertical), letter symmetry, and report order variables, and they demonstrate a generalized right field superiority that fails to interact with other factors. Since the superiority appears even when all apparent artifactual asymmetries are eliminated, the findings support a hemispheric interpretation.     

The Argument from Design: What Is at Stake Theologically?

This article offers a brief overview of the argument for God's existence grounded in the evidence of design. It gives particular attention to the way the argument has evolved over time and in relation to changing scientific perspectives. The argument from de-sign has in fact been formulated and reformulated in response to the discoveries and challenges it has encountered from the field of science. The conclusion of the article explores the theological importance of this argument—its extent and its limits.     

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY,ETHICS, AND LOVE: TOWARD A NEW RELIGION AND SCIENCE DIALOGUE

Religion and science dialogues that orbit around rational method, knowledge, and truth are often, though not always, contentious. In this article, I suggest a different cluster of gravitational points around which religion and science dialogues might usefully travel: philosophical anthropology, ethics, and love. I propose seeing morality as a natural outgrowth of the human desire to establish and maintain social bonds so as not to experience the condition of being alone. Humans, of all animals, need to feel loved—defined as a compassionate present‐with in dynamic dyadic relation such that one experiences the sense of mattering—but that need has an equally natural tendency to be met by creating biased us‐and‐them distinctions. A “critical” natural ethics, then, is one in which we become aware of and work to undermine our tendency to reify in‐group distinctions between “us” and “them.” Religious communities that work intentionally on this can be seen, to some extent, as laboratories of love—or as sites for co‐creating knowledge in perilous times.     

The Concept of Miracle

The concept of miracle has often been regarded as irreconcilable with the concept of natural law. But this contradiction applies only to an understanding of a miracle as a break of natural law. Such a violation would destroy the assertion of natural law, because its universal claim does not permit exceptions. However, the idea of miracle need not be conceived in this way, though it has often been done since medieval times. Augustine thought of miracles simply as unusual events that contradict our accustomed views of the course of nature but not nature itself. According to that definition of miracle, no contradiction of natural laws need be assumed. It is sufficient to regard unusual occurrences as "signs" of God's special activity in creation.     

Promoting spiritual well-being: a quasi-experimental test of an element of Hay and Nye’s theory of children’s spirituality

This study is one of the first tests of key implicit claims of Hay and Nye’s theory of children’s spirituality and spiritual development. Two quasi-experimental studies tested two claims: that exposure to six conditions posited as fostering relational consciousness in a programme of spiritual formation promotes spiritual well-being; that the effect of the conditions continues after exposure ends. The results for Study One revealed that length of exposure to any of the six conditions was not a significant predictor of spiritual well-being, F(3, 179)?=?1.49, p = 0.22. Study Two results indicated that as the length of time since exposure increased so did spiritual well-being, r(38)?=?0.39, p = 0.01 at the bivariate level, and F(4, 35)?=?2.4, p = 0.06 in the regression. These results reveal a possible relationship between exposure to the six conditions and spiritual well-being.     

On Quantitative and Qualitative Parsimony

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony is supposed to allow David Lewis to dismiss one of the charges against his modal realism: that is, the charge of bloated ontology. The aim of this paper is to undermine Lewis's response to this objection. In order to do this, a distinction between multipliable and nonmultipliable objects is introduced. Based on this it is argued that the acceptance of Lewis's response requires one to believe in modal realism in the first place—that is, one has to believe in the view that the existence of nonactual spatiotemporal worlds does not affect the quality of the ontological commitment. Although the paper focuses on the problem of the metaphysics of possible worlds, this should be regarded merely as a case study. Accordingly, the results of this analysis should find applications in other metaphysical debates as well.     

Reason and Emotion in the Ethics of Self‐Restraint

In this essay I argue that Reinhold Niebuhr's ethics of self‐restraint, though promising, is based on an incomplete and imprecise moral psychology. Although Niebuhr claims that reason cannot provide a sufficient grounding to motivate self‐restraint, he does not disclose which human capacity might serve this purpose. I suggest that we can address this oversight by strengthening Niebuhr's tentative embrace of David Hume, and by developing a concept of the emotions in order to explain how human beings can cultivate a stable inclination to self‐restraint. This project is informed by and in the service of feminist critiques of Niebuhr and social concerns.